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INTRODUCTION
Disapproval of homosexuality is widespread, deep-rooted, and of long
standing. Although some cultures have tolerated some homosexual acts,
more often they have been condemned. In the West, including America,
homosexual acts were often crimes, and society often shunned homosexu-
als. Many religions denounce homosexuality. For nearly 3,000 years the
people of "the Book"-Jews, Christians, and Muslims-have deemed ho-
mosexuality a grave sin, but disapproval of homosexuality is so widespread
that it cannot be ascribed to theology. More likely, most people have an
innate distaste for homosexuality. Put another way, given human nature,
heterosexuality can be considered intrinsically better, an aspect of human
flourishing.3 Further, heterosexuality, and especially traditional marriage,
have important benefits for society.4
In the last forty years, however, a movement to change the treatment
of homosexuality has emerged in parts of the West. This movement first
sought only tolerance-the removal of legal burdens on homosexuality
and an end to violence against homosexuals. Now the movement demands
approval of homosexuality as legally and socially equal to heterosexuality.
The demand for approval brings the gay movement into conflict with "tra-
ditional" religion. This conflict flares throughout our culture, from the por-
trayal of homosexuality in the media to its treatment in public schools. A
key, if not paramount, battleground in this culture war is the law.6 In myriad
contexts, from the right of university students to form Christian societies to
the treatment by private employers of the gay partners of their employees,
the gay movement is pressing for laws to require people and institutions to
accept homosexuality regardless of their religious beliefs.
In many a skirmish in this war, the tangible stakes are small, even trivial.
Even taken as a whole, the material interests may not be that great. Homo-
2 See the TORAH (Leviticus 18:22, 20:13) (Jewish), the NEW TESTAMENT (Romans 1:26-28, 1
Timothy 1:9-1o, 1 Corinthians 6:9-IO) (Christian), and the KORAN (The Heights 7:80) (Moslem).
See generally WARREN J. BLUMENFELD & DIANE RAYMOND, LOOKING AT GAY AND LESBIAN LIFE
152-217 (1988).
3 See infra notes 560-63 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 564-73 and accompanying text.
5 Not all religions resist the demand. Although it is hard to find any acceptance of ho-
mosexuality in Judaism or Christianity until the last few decades, some of their branches now
condone homosexuality. This Article calls sects that reject equality "traditional." The term is
imprecise since attitudes toward the gay movement range from enthusiastic support to blan-
ket rejection, but it includes Orthodox Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and most Muslim and
evangelical Protestant congregations.
6 See Joseph P. Shapiro & Gareth G. Cook, Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 5, 1993, at 47, 48 (stating that "laws are often the first step toward changing hearts
and minds"). See generally JAMES DAvISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: 'IHE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991). Hunter lists law as one of the five fiercest battlegrounds in this war. Id. at
173.
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sexuals have considerable economic and political power; in a free market
democracy most businesses and governments will not want to antagonize
this constituency. Even religious organizations that consider homosexual
acts a sin often eschew discrimination against homosexuals in most spheres,
including employment.
Yet this war is not amenable to compromise. Again, the goal of the gay
movement is not primarily economic; most gays already have above-aver-
age incomes. The goal, rather, is approval of homosexuality as legally and
socially equal to heterosexuality. Because of the tremendous influence of
religion in America, this goal cannot be achieved unless religious groups
either surrender, thus affirming this equality or, at least, those that do not
are reduced to a despised minority compelled to keep its views to itself. In
other words, the goal of the gay movement is to confine its opponents in
the closet.
Since the gay movement's goals are not primarily economic, it cares
about the law not so much for its financial impact as for its symbolic or ex-
pressive significance.9 Thus it matters little that only one employee regis-
ters for domestic partner benefits at a large university. What matters is that
by offering such benefits the university announces to its constituents-stu-
dents, alumni, faculty and staff-and to the world that it condones homo-
sexuality. Since the prize is a symbol, compromise is unacceptable except,
perhaps, as a temporary tactic: anything less than full equality is inferior,
second-class status, intolerable. 10
Full legal and social equality of homosexuality, however, cannot be
squared with respect for the traditional religions that disapprove of homo-
sexuality. If government treats homosexuality as equal to heterosexuality,
and through nondiscrimination laws requires citizens to do likewise, then
disparagement of homosexuality must be condemned and suppressed just
as racial discrimination now is. In effect, government must declare tradi-
tional religion to be false and evil. Many homosexual activists openly em-
brace this goal. Marshall Kirk and Erastus Pill call for an attack on "the
moral authority of homophobic churches by portraying them as antiquated
backwaters, badly out of step with the times and with the latest findings
7 See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: HomosexualRights Legislation, Public
Policy, andReligious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393,408-09 (1994) (summarizing data);
Hewitt, Socioeconomic Position of Gay Men: A Review of the Evidence, 54 AM. J. ECONS. & Soc. 461
(1995). However, a more complex and ambiguous picture is presented in MV. LEE BADGET'T,
MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIc LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (2001).
8 See Randy Shilts, The Queering ofAmerica, ADVOC., Jan. 2, 1 99 I, at 32-33 (stating that the
"gay movement" is "essentially a battle for social legitimacy" and "[alchieving... cultural ac-
ceptability" of "homosexuality as an acceptable and viable means of expression, on a par with
and equal to heterosexuality").
9 See infra notes 602-12 and accompanying text.
I o See id.
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of psychology."" Kirk and Hunter Madsen advise depicting traditionalists
as "[h]ysterical backwoods preachers, drooling with hate to a degree that
looks both comical and deranged."" Traditional believers will not accept
such treatment.
Perhaps we could aspire to legal neutrality, but it's unclear what neutral-
ity would be here. In any case, no recipe for neutrality would satisfy either
side. Presumably neutrality would include, for example, legal recognition
of same-sex "marriages," which is anathema to traditional faiths. Neutral-
ity presumably would also mean that individuals and private organizations
would be free to discriminate based on sexual orientation, which is unac-
ceptable to gay activists.
Arguably, local discretion could also abate, if not resolve, the conflict.
Some locales might broadly endorse homosexuality through comprehen-
sive nondiscrimination laws and through propaganda condoning homosex-
uality in public schools and elsewhere. Other locales could make homosex-
ual sodomy a crime and bar homosexuals from public employment. This
approach, too, is unacceptable to both sides. Each has routinely appealed
to a higher level of government when it loses a local battle. The gay move-
ment persuaded the Supreme Court to strike down criminal sodomy laws.
14
When some state courts required validation of gay "marriages," the other
side achieved enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act.15
In any case, it is in practice impossible to leave this issue to local govern-
ments. Federal funding pervades many activities. In an integrated national
economy there is always a case for uniform federal laws for matters like
employment discrimination. More importantly, homosexuality concerns
marriage and the family, every society's most basic institutions. Just as Lin-
coln believed that America could not "endure permanently, half slave and
half free," 16 so America cannot endure with two halves following radically
different policies on marriage and the family. Again, this is a struggle over
principle, so compromise seems impossible.
However, the legal war between religion and the gay movement will
not culminate in an Armageddon, a final showdown. To achieve total victo-
ii Marshall Kirk & Erastus Pill, Waging Peace, CHRISTOPHER ST., Dec. 1984, at 33, 38.
12 MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: How AMERICA WILL CONQUER
ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE 9O'S 189 (1989). Their goal is not only to change minds
but to render traditional attitudes "so discreditable that even Intransigents will eventually be
silenced in public . Id.
13 It is unclear in general what neutrality means or whether it can have a coherent mean-
ing, especially as applied to religion. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive andDisaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993(1990).
14 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15 Pub. L. No. Io4-199, I ioStat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of I and 28 U.S.C.).
16 Abraham Lincoln, Speech (June 16, 1858), in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
421 (4 th ed. 1992).
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ry, one side would need to obtain either a national law that would establish
the full legal and social equality of homosexuality with no substantial reli-
gious exceptions; or a law making all claims of religious freedom trump any
claim of gay ri hts. At least in this century such a triumph for either side
is implausible. Even if it were politically feasible, it is hard to imagine
what form any such law could take. Accordingly, the war between religion
and the gay movement seems fated to drag on indefinitely in innumerable
battles large and small.
Part I of this Article discusses general federal and state constitutions
and statutes that set some boundaries for specific disputes. Part II discusses
government action supporting homosexuality, including various antidis-
crimination laws and religious exemptions therefrom. Part III discusses
actions by private institutions against employees, students, or others who
manifest traditional views about homosexuality. Part IV discusses general
principles in the conflict between the gay movement and religious freedom
and suggests some resolutions.
I. LEGAL DEFENSES FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
No federal law substantially protects religious freedom. The Supreme
Court has rendered the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution almost
meaningless.' However, the First Amendment rights of free speech and
association also apply to religious activity and provide some shelter from
government intrusion.19 In theory the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment also offers some protection by forbidding government ac-
tion that deprecates a particular religion or religion generally, although in
practice the scope of this protection is negligible." To offset the Supreme
Court's gutting of the Free Exercise Clause, Congress enacted the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, but in 1997 the Supreme Court
held it unconstitutional as applied to the states." There also is no federal
law forbidding private discrimination against homosexuals or otherwise re-
quiring private parties to respect homosexuality.
A. The United States Constitution
1. Free Exercise of Religion.-In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme
Court declared: "the right of Free Exercise does not relieve an individual
17 Despite the forecasts of some gay activists, it is most unlikely that the gay movement
can achieve dominance over the opposition soon, if ever. See infra notes 532-53 and accom-
panying text.
18 See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
21 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (997).
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of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general appli-
cability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).""' However, there may be broader
"hybrid" rights when a claim of free exercise is conjoined "with other con-
stitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press .... or
the right of parents ... to direct the education of their children."
Smith addresses only the rights of individuals under the Free Exercise
Clause; the free exercise rights of religious organizations are arguably dif-
ferent. The Supreme Court has never granted a religious organization a
free exercise exemption from any law and has on occasion denied such an
exemption. However, the Court has never said that the free exercise right
is the same for religious organizations as for individuals. Religious organiza-
tions have a distinctive social function; that is why we speak of separation
of church and state but not separation of religious individuals and state.
Lower courts have found a free exercise exemption for religious organiza-
tions from general antidiscrimination laws with respect to employees who
perform priestly functions,"' but they have not exempted reliiously affili-
ated social services organizations and schools from labor laws.
22 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (199o) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
23 Id. at 881 (footnote and citations omitted).
24 See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (denying ex-
emption from minimum wage and other provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying claim of tax-exempt status to pri-
vate university that engaged in religiously motivated racial discrimination).
25 See, e.g., Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
377 E3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.
2oo4); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 32o E3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 E3d 795 (4th Cir. zooo); Gellington v. Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 E3d 1299 (1 ith Cir. 2000); Starkman v. Evans, 198
F3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9 th Cir.
1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 E3 d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The courts do not agree
about what constitutes "ministerial functions." See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations
and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1653. An exemp-
tion may also prevail "where employment regulation conflicts with specific religious doctrines
or practices." Id. at 1654-55. See generally G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to
Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J.
1189 (1994).
26 See Brady, supra note 25, at 1656-61. In Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Center and Chapel,
472 N.W.2d 355 (i99i), the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission found that the Catholic
Church violated an ordinance forbidding discrimination based on affectional preference by
refusing to renew a lease on space in a building it owned to an organization that rejected the
Church's teaching on homosexuality. The court held that application of the ordinance here
would be unconstitutional because it would create excessive state entanglement in religion.
The holding is dubious; the court did not even cite Employment Division v. Smith. Even if it
is correct, the decision has little precedential significance since most antidiscrimination laws
exempt church activities.
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Although Smith severely restricts the Free Exercise Clause, legislatures
may grant some accommodations of religion by statute without violating
the Establishment Clause. "[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to al-
leviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions."" The Court
in Smith acknowledged the propriety of legislative accommodations." Con-
gress has exempted religious organizations from prohibitions on religious
discrimination in employment but not on discrimination based on gender,29
race, or age. The Supreme Court upheld the exemption for religious or-
ganizations from the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.30 A legislative dispensation can extend to individuals as
well as to organizations. Recently, the Court upheld the special protection
of religious exercise for prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Insti-
• . ~31 . . . ,
tutionalized Persons Act. In so doing it said "[rieligious accommodations
.. need not 'come packaged with benefits to secular entities.'
32
Accommodations of religion do not violate the Establishment Clause
if they are "designed to alleviate government intrusions that might signifi-
cantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the
,33Free Exercise Clause." However, the Supreme Court struck down an ex-
emption from a state sales tax for the sale of religious literature by religious
. 34
organizations. The court also invalidated a statute that granted employees
an unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath, finding it had "a primary
effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious practice."
At least for religious organizations, exemptions from laws barring dis-
crimination against homosexuals seem clearly constitutional under Amos.
Exemptions for individuals and non-religious organizations should also
27 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
z8 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
29 Lower courts have refused to find an implied exemption. See Geary v. Visitation of the
Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 E3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High
Sch., 4 F3d 166, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1993); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 E2d 1389,
1394-95 (4th Cir. 199o); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (9th Cir.
1986); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Miss.
Coll., 626 F.zd 477,485 (5th Cir. i98o). But see McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 E2d 553, 56o-6i
(5th Cir. 1972).
30 Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. Lower courts have expanded the exemption. See supra note 29
and accompanying text.
31 42 U.S.C. § 200occ-i(a) (2000).
32 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 338, and
Madison v. Riter, 355 E3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003)).
33 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. i, 18, 18 n.8 (1989).
34 Id. at 25.
35 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 703-04 (1985).
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pass muster. Such exemptions confer no direct monetary benefit as did the
sales tax exemption in Bullock.
Further, unlike the statute entitling employees not to work on their Sab-
bath, an exemption from an antidiscrimination law confers no material ben-
efit on religion since these laws generally allow conduct based on economic16
considerations. Indeed, discrimination generally injures the discriminator
economically because it entails, for example, not hiring the best-qualified
applicant for a job. Antidiscrimination laws do bar some economically mo-
tivated discrimination, like employment discrimination intended to cater
to the biases of the employer's customers or clients. However, non-profit
religious organizations do not seek profit, and the material benefit to reli-
gious organizations from exemption from antidiscrimination laws is minor,
certainly smaller than the financial benefit of tax exemptions for religious
organizations, which the Court has upheld,37 so religious exemptions from
gay antidiscrimination laws should be valid.
2. Freedom of Expression and Association.-In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,• . 38
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, the South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council organized an annual St. Patrick's Day parade. The Supreme Court
sustained the Council's challenge to a Massachusetts law that forbade it to
exclude a homosexual organization from marching in the parade. First, the
Court held that parades are "a form of expression, not just motion."'3 9
Compelling the inclusion of a homosexual group would distort the pa-
rade's message, even though that message was not clearly and precisely
stated. The Court likened the Council to a composer who may choose "the
expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the
score may not produce a particularized message, each contingent's expres-
sion in the Council's eyes comports with what merits celebration on that
day."4° 41
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA")
were ordered to admit Dale as an assistant scoutmaster under a state law
forbidding discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation in
36 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(e)(i) (2000), specifically allows
employers to discriminate "in those certain circumstances where religion, sex, or national ori-
gin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise ...." Further, an employer may use practices that have a
"disparate impact" on a protected group if "the challenged practice is job related for the posi-
tion in question and consistent with business necessity . 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k)(I)(A)(i)
(2000).
37 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 68o (1970).
38 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
557 (995)-
39 Id. at 568.
40 Id. at 574.
41 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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places of public accommodation. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed. First, the Court reviewed the BSA's mission "[t]o instill values in
young people. '4 It concluded: "It seems indisputable that an association
that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activ-
ity."' 43 The Court found that the BSA sincerely believed homosexual con-
duct violates Scout values and that requiring the BSA to accept Dale would
significantly impair its message.44
The Court in Dale eschewed the intermediate standard of review of
45United States v. O'Brien; that standard applies when "a governmental regu-
lation ... has only an incidental effect on protected speech .. .. " 46 Instead,
the Court employed "traditional First Amendment analysis,"' 41 which pre-
sumably invokes a compelling interest standard. 4' Here, "[tihe state inter-
ests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify
such a severe intrusion on the [Boy Scouts' rights to] freedom of expressive
association. ' 49 The Court noted that it had upheld state laws that bar the
exclusion of women in public accommodations, but only where "enforce-
ment of these statutes would not materially interfere with the ideas that
the organization sought to express."' s
3. The Establishment Clause.-Lemon v. Kurtzman held that a government
act violates the Establishment Clause if it has the primary purpose or ef-
fect of advancing or inhibiting religion."1 Under Lemon, the Supreme Court
has often barred acts it found to have the purpose or effect of promoting
religion, but neither it nor the lower courts have ever invoked it to strike
down an act because it was intended to or did inhibit religion." Accordingly,
the Establishment Clause seems for now to offer little, if any, protection for
religious freedom.
42 Id. at 649.
43 Id. at 650.
44 Id. at 653-56.
45 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (the Court upheld a law banning the
burning of draft cards against a claim that the ban violated free speech).
46 Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
47 Id. The Court used this phrase to refer to its holding in Hurley, but then said "the
analysis we applied there is similar to the analysis we apply here." Id.
48 In Dale, the Court said a judge must consider whether the regulations "serve compel-
ling state interests ... that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms." Id. at 68o (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
49 Id. at 642.
50 Id. at 657 (distinguishing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537 (1987), and Roberts, 468 U.S. 609).
51 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971).
52 See infra notes 375-403 and accompanying text.
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B. Federal Statutes
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination based on an
employee's "race, color, religion, sex or national origin."" Although it does
not outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation, it has three features
relevant to religious freedom. First, it does not "apply . . . to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on ... of its activities" (the "religious work"
exception). 4 Second, case law in most federal circuits allow churches to
discriminate in the employment of ministers."
Title VII does not define "religious corporation," and courts have con-
strued the term narrowly. The Salvation Army was held to be a religious
corporation,56 but even charitable corporations with a church affiliation and
an overt religious mission do not necessarily qualify. United Methodist
Children's Homes of Virginia, Inc. originally qualified. However, a court
found that the home had changed over time to the point where "the day-
to-day life for the children at the Home ... is practically devoid of religious
content or training, as such"" and was no longer a religious corporation for
purposes of Title VII. Nothing in the statute or case law says a for-profit• ,, . . . ,58
corporation can not be a "religious corporation," but every reported claim
of that status by a for-profit corporation 
has been denied.
9
Third, Title VII permits discrimination on otherwise forbidden grounds
for a bonafide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"). This provision, too,
is sometimes narrowly interpreted. For instance, the Ninth Circuit denied
this exception to a non-profit school that hired only Protestant teachers; it
53 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a) (2000).
54 Id. § 2oooe-i(a).
55 See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F3d 795, 8oi (4th Cir. 2000) ("The
exception precludes any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a church's ministerial
employment decision.").
56 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); see
also Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 27 F. Supp 2d 1029, 1036-37 (W.D. Tenn. 1998),
aff'd, 215 F3 d 618 (6th Cir. zooo) (finding that a college of health sciences was "religious" for
purposes of Title VII).
57 Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home, 547 E Supp. 286, 290 (E.D. Va. 1982),
aff'd, 709 Fzd 284 (4th Cir. 1983).
58 See Andrew C. Nichols, Exemptions for "Religious Corporations" from Employment
Discrimination Statutes: Should Non-Profit Status Be Required?, 3 GEo. J.L. & PUB. PoCY 133, 137
(2005) ("No court has held that [the statute] is off-limits to for-profit corporations.").
59 See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.zd 61o, 619 (9th Cir. 1988); EEOC v.
Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 216 F Supp 2d 763 (S.D. Ind. 2ooz); Nichols, supra note 58, at 134 n.
2 ("Federal courts consistently have allowed only non-profit corporations to avail themselves
of this provision, even though some for-profit enterprises.., seem substantially more religious
than their non-profit counterparts.").
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(I) (2000).
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held that the "religious work" exception applied only to teachers of reli-S61
gion classes. Although Title VII does not bar discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation, these constructions may be significant because many state
antidiscrimination laws do bar such discrimination and have exceptions for
BFOQs,6' and judicial interpretations of these laws may be influenced by
Title VII cases.
Fourth, the prohibition on religious discrimination can also come into
play if an employee is ordered to behave toward homosexuals or homosex-
uality in a way incompatible with her religion. In that case, the employer
must accommodate the employee unless accommodation would cause an
11 63
"undue hardship" for the employer. However, "to bear more than a de
minimis cost... is an undue hardship," at least where it "would involve
unequal treatment of employees."6 This standard leaves little protection• 65
for employees in the duty to accommodate. As a policy matter, all three of
these provisions of Title VII are too narrow; they allow too little religious
freedom. 66
C. State Constitutions
Most state constitutions have free exercise clauses that track the federal
constitution. Courts are not bound by Employment Division v. Smith when
interpreting state constitutions, and some state courts adopt a broader defi-
nition of free exercise than Smith's.6' A few states have differently worded
constitutional clauses that have been construed to grant broader religious
freedom .6
6i EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch., 990 Fzd 458, 466 (9th Cir. 199o). Butsee Little v. Wuerl,
929 F2d 944 (3d Cir. i99i) (allowing Catholic school to discharge teacher who remarried
without following proper canonical process); Pime v. Loyola Univ., 803 F.zd 351 (7th Cir. 1986)
(allowing Jesuit university to reserve four positions in its philosophy department for Jesuits
because of the school's "tradition" and because most of its students were Catholic).
62 See Nichols, supra note 58, at 135 nn. 14-17.
63 "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hard-
ship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(j) (zooo).
64 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1997).
65 See, e.g. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 534 U.S. 952 (2001), discussed infra at
notes 481-83 and accompanying text. See generally Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality:
The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 Thx. L. REV. 312,
392-406 (1997) (survey of cases finding that courts require little of employers to accommodate
employees' religious exercise).
66 See infra notes 498-5oi and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. zd 32,44 (Cal.
Ct. App. 199 1), review dismissed, cause remanded by 859 P.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1993).
68 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. DeSilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (applying "compel-
ling governmental interest" and "least restrictive means" text to free exercise claims under
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D. State Statutes
Despite the demise of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act,69
some states have valid RFRAs7° that may expand religious freedom. To
date there are few decided cases under these laws, none involving the con-
flict between the gay movement and religious freedom, so their signifi-
cance to that conflict remains unclear.
71
II. GOVERNMENT ACTION SUPPORTING HOMOSEXUALITY
A. Laws Governing Private Employers and Service Providers
1. Discrimination Based on Homosexuality.-No federal law bars discrimina-
tion against homosexuals in employment," although "gender stereotyp-
,, 73 7 . .
ing and same-sex sexual harassment may constitute discrimination on
account of sex in violation of Title VII. Most states follow the employ-
state constitution); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2ooo) (semble); State v. Miller,
549 N.W.ad 235 (Wis. 1996) (semble); see also Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.ad 2, 8-9 (Minn.
199o) (stating that the Minnesota Constitution places "a more stringent burden on the state"
and affords "far more protection of religious freedom than the broad language of the United
States Constitution"); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.ad 174, 186 (Wash. 1992)
(en banc) ("Our state constitutional and common law history support a broader reading of
[free exercise] than of the First Amendment.").
69 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
70 See 63 AM. JUR. 3D, Proof of Facts 195 nn. 1-15 (2oo6) (listing state statutes).
71 See generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 116 A.L.R.5 th 233 (2004).
72 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to discrimination based on
homosexuality. See 1O EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 168.io[i] n.i (Matthew Bender 2o05).
Neither does 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Seeid. § 168.io[i] nn. 23-24; Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.ad
936 (5th Cir. 1979). The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) specifically excludes homo-
sexuality from protected condition status. ADA § 511(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (a) (2000).
73 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); 1 o EMPLOYMENT DISCRiMINATION
§ 168.Io[I] nn.4-14 (Matthew Bender aoo5). "Gender stereotyping" is "discrimination in-
flicted because a person does not meet an individual or group notion of what a person of that
gender should act and look like ..... Id. § 168.10[I]. However, employees cannot prevail with
"sexual orientation ... allegations masquerading as gender stereotyping claims." Id.
74 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
75 Some other possibilities are suggested by Beall v. London City School District Board of
Education, No. 2:o4-cv-29o, 2oo6 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 37657 (S.D. Ohio. June 8, 2oo6), where a
lesbian public school teacher whose contract was not renewed sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, which was granted in part but denied on two of the
claims. First, the court said there was an issue of fact whether defendant had a rational basis
for non-renewal. However, defendant apparently did not claim that plaintiff's homosexuality
was a rational basis; indeed, defendant denied that that was its motive. The court did not ad-
dress the issue because defendant declined to raise it. The court also denied summary judg-
ment on plaintiff's claim that defendant had violated her academic freedom, but that claim
does not implicate her sexuality.
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ment "at will" doctrine which is often said to allow private employers to
fire or refuse to hire an employee for any reason or for no reason at all.
6
The statement is misleading, though, because the rule is subject to several
exceptions. First, an employer may agree by contract not to fire employees
except for certain reasons. Moreover, contractual agreements can be im-
plied in fact and may be "objectively" construed to mean something the
employer never intended.
An employer who does not want to employ homosexuals should avoid
vague promises, such as not to fire employees who are "doing a good job."
An employer may also tell employees expressly that it considers homo-
sexual conduct immoral and grounds for dismissal. The statement should
refer specifically to homosexual conduct; a general reference, as to immoral
conduct, may be deemed too vague.7 9 As with all employment policies, it
is wise to have employees sign an acknowledgment that they have read
and understood this rule. The employer should also avoid contradictory
action that could invite a claim of estoppel or waiver. This could happen if,
for example, the employer hires or retains an employee despite knowledge
that she or he is an active homosexual. 81
Second, some states and many local governments have laws forbidding
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.82 Most of these
laws have exceptions for religious institutions and religious "practices" or
83
"exercises," but the scope of the exceptions varies; some do not cover
most employees. Third, despite the "any reason" principle, most states
subject the at-will doctrine to a public policy exception that varies by state.
A court may find that some condition or behavior has become sufficiently
recognized as deserving legal protection that it has become a public policy
of the state to forbid employment discrimination based on that condition
76 See, e.g., Valentzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 536 A.zd 237 (N.J. 1988); Phung v. Waste
Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1 14 (Ohio 1986). The only state that does not follow the "at will"
doctrine is Montana, which has a law providing that, after a probationary period, an employee
cannot be fired except for "good cause." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(I)(b) (2005).
77 See 1o LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 259.03 (Matthew Bender 2005).
78 See id. at § 259.o312].
79 See Burton v. Cascade Sch. Dist. Union High Sch., 512 E2d 854 (9th Cir. 1975) (hold-
ing that law allowing teachers to be fired for "immorality" was unconstitutionally vague).
8o See Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.zd 428, 431 (Va. 1992) (signed acknowl-
edgment that employment was at will held to override allegedly contradictory provision in
employee handbook).
81 See Ronnie Cohen, et al., Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation: The
American, Canadian and U.K. Responses, 17 LAW & INEQ. 1, 33 (1999).
82 See IO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § I68.i I[], n.i (Matthew Bender 2005).
83 See Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church, 679 N.W.zd 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(suit by church music director fired for homosexuality dismissed because state ban on sexual
orientation discrimination in employment excluded religious institutions). Some states do not
exempt religious institutions. See, e.g., MD. CODE art. 49B, § 16(g)(3) (2005); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4, subd. 18 (zoo6).
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or behavior." A few courts have found such a policy for sexual orientation;"'
most have not.86
Fourth, some states forbid any firing of an employee that intention-
. .. .. . 87
ally and unjustifiably inflicts emotional distress. Generally, the employee
must show that termination was "accompanied by serious unlawful harass-
ment that goes beyond the pale of what may reasonably be expected in the
workplace." This includes employer conduct that is "outrageous, 'beyond
all bounds of human decency"' and that "no reasonable person could be
expected to endure.",89 Finally, in some states disclosure of an employee's
sexual activity violates the employee's right to privacy.90
Many people have long believed that homosexuality is sinful, perverse,
or psychologically disordered. Accordingly, statements to this effect should
not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, it has
become common to treat any disapproval of homosexuality as unbearably
offensive.9' Even statements intended to help the employee, such as sug-
gesting corrective therapy, may be deemed abusive.9" Further, an employee
fired for homosexual acts can lie about oral statements by the employer. Ac-
cordingly, it may be wise for the employer to give the employee a written
explanation and to record any verbal exchange.
In addition to restrictions on discharge of employees for homosexual
conduct, in some cases employers are required to give the same bene-
fits to homosexual employees with a "partner" as to an employee with a
93
spouse.
84 See so LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 259.0511] (Matthew Bender 2005). "The sourc-
es of public policy that are deemed important enough to support a wrongful discharge cause
of action ... vary from state to state." Id.
85 See Leibert v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 70-73 (Ct. App. 1995);
Das v. Ohio State Univ., 115 F. Supp.2d 885, 892 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (dictum; suit dismissed
because plaintiff failed to prove sexual orientation discrimination), aff'd, 57 Fed. App'x 675
(6th Cir. 2003).
86 See White v. Martin, 23 F Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D. Conn. 1998) (applying Connecticut
law), aff'd, 198 F3d 235 (2d Cir. 1999); Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F Supp. 949,957 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), cert.
denied, 662 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio 1996).
87 io LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 259.05131 (Matthew Bender 2oo5).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Borquez v. Oser, 923 P2d 166, 173 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997); Greenwood, 663 N.E. 2d 1030; Cohen, supra note 81, at 39-41.
Tortious invasion of privacy could also occur when "intrusive, unreasonable methods are used
to obtain" information about. an employee's sexual conduct. Id. at 41.
91 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
93 See to EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 168. 11[4] (Matthew Bender 2005).
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2. Does Discrimination Based on Homosexuality Constitute Relious or Sex Dis-
crimination?-In Hall v. Baptist Memorial Healthcare Corp. and Pedreira v.
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc.95 employees were fired for homo-
sexual conduct. These employees claimed religious discrimination in vio-
lation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because they were compelled to
accept a particular religious view of homosexuality. In Hall, the plaintiff
tried to buttress this claim by becoming a lay minister with a church that
condoned homosexuality and then claiming that her discharge stemmed
from membership in this church and therefore violated Title VII.
Both cases rejected the claim. In Hall, the court said the plaintiff "must
show that it was the religious aspect of her leadership position that motivat-
ed her employer's actions .... The fact that the organization in which she
assumed a leadership position is a church does not transform her dismissal
into one based on religion."% Hall was fired because of her "leadership
position in an organization that condones a lifestyle the College consid-
ers antithetical to its mission." ' That the organization was a church was
merely coincidental. Similarly, in Pedreira the employer was fired because
of her conduct, not because of her "beliefs themselves."" Thus, her firing
did not violate Title VII.
These decisions are clearly correct. All employers impose some behav-
ioral restrictions on employees. It would result in a farce if an employee
could gain a right to engage in any behavior merely by declaring a religious
belief in the propriety of that behavior. Of course, an employer might im-
pose a prohibition on employee conduct that is facially religion-neutral but
in practice serves no purpose other than religious discrimination. An em-
ployer might, for instance, forbid employees to eat pork solely to exclude
Jews and Muslims. In Hall and Pedreira, though, the restriction was clearly
not a sham or pretext.
In Dorrv. First Kentucky NattionalCorp., the employee told his employ-
er that he was a homosexual and active in a church-related group that pro-
moted homosexual rights. He was told that to keep his job he must quit the
group. The court upheld the employee's claim of religious discrimination
under Title VII. Unlike the employers in Hall and Pedreira, the employer
in Dorr did not claim to have a religious mission. Further, the defendant
acted on the basis of the employee's activity in a religious group, not his
sexual conduct.1° Presumably, then, the employer's motive was concern
94 Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F3d 618 (6th Cir. zooo).
95 Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc;, 186 F. Supp.zd 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
96 Hall, 215 F3d at 627.
97 Id.
98 Pedreira, 186 E Supp.zd at 761.
99 Dorr v. First Ky. Nat'l Corp., 796 E2d 179 (6th Cir.), withdrawn bypublisher; reh'g grant-
ed, en banc, No. 84-5067, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 33065 (6th Cir. Oct. io, 1986).
1oo Id.
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about the financial repercussions of defendant's church-related activity, not
a religious or moral objection to his sexual conduct.
It has been argued that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes
sex discrimination.101 This arument has been rejected in the context of
employment discrimination.
3. Private Service and Housing Providers.-Some laws forbid discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in the commercial provision of services.
In North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego
County,'0 3 doctors refused on religious grounds to inseminate the plaintiff,
a lesbian who had a registered domestic partner. The plaintiff sued under
a state statute that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The court held that defendants were entitled to a trial on their defense
that they had not discriminated because plaintiff was a lesbian; they would
not inseminate any unmarried woman. However, the court noted that the
legislature had later amended the statute to forbid discrimination based
on marital status. Accordingly, doctors are now required to inseminate any
woman, married or single, heterosexual or homosexual."°
The case for religious freedom here is even stronger than it is for em-
ployment by private businesses. Employment of homosexuals does not di-
rectly condone homosexuality, which is why most traditional faiths eschew
employment discrimination against homosexuals. Medical care is a per-
sonal service, which the law often treats differently from other commercial105
transactions. It may entail commission of what the provider considers a
grave sin; that is why medical workers are not required to perform abor-
• 106
tions.
ioi Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.ad 44,6o-63 (Haw. 1993), overruledby constitutional amendment,
HAW. CONST. art. I, § z3; Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men
Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the
Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 5, 8
(1992).
102 See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 876 F.d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989);
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 6o8 F.2d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 569 F2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978).
103 N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 40
Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Ct. App. 2oo6).
1o4 Id. at647-48.
105 "A court of equity generally will not order specific performance of a personal service
contract." HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 13.17 (2004). "A promise to ren-
der personal service will not be specifically enforced." RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONTRACTS
§ 3670) (1981).
io6 See 42 U.S.C. § 3ooa-7 (2000) (forbidding recipients of federal medical care funds to
discriminate against anyone who performs or refuses to perform sterilizations or abortions);
AM. MED. Ass'N CODE OF MED. ETHICS § E-9.12 ("Generally, both the physician and the pa-
tient are free to enter into or decline the relationship.").
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Medical workers do not have unfettered discretion; they may not, for
instance, refuse treatment because of the patient's race.'07 Race, though,108
is a special case in our society. Further, the Benitez case would arguably
be different if the doctor refused to give the plaintiff any treatment; or if
it involved an emergency in which the patient had no opportunity to go to
another provider; or if it did not involve reproduction, a matter of special
ethical concern.
Indeed, since the plaintiff could easily have obtained treatment else-
where and eventually did so, this suit seems motivated by publicity rather
than medical need; the goal seems to be to discredit and silence religious
disapproval of homosexuality. This inference is supported by the fact that
plaintiff is represented by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
which devotes much of its efforts to publicity promoting homosexuality.'I
In a sense, defendant has already lost since she is forced to argue that her
refusal was based on plaintiff's marital status, not her sexual orientation.
The interest in sexual orientation should not override religious freedom.
The Arlington (Virginia) Human Rights Commission has ordered Bono
Film and Video to duplicate pro-homosexual videos presented by lesbian
activist Lilli Vincenz. The company has contested the order, claiming a
right not to process material that is obscene, could embarrass employees,
hurt the company's reputation, or violates the company's Christian and
ethical values, including material that promotes homosexuality. The law
should concede this right. The company's refusal imposes no great burden
on customers; they can easily get the requested service elsewhere. Busi-
nesses should not be required to deal with materials containing controver-
sial sexual content. Fortunately, shortly after Bono filed his suit the Com-
mission withdrew its complaint.
In Doe v. California Lutheran High School Association," the school was
sued for expelling two girls involved in a lesbian relationship. The trial
court denied defendant's motion to dismiss claims for violation of statutes
forbidding sexual orientation discrimination against customers by business
establishments, invasion of privacy, and unfair business practices, and of
107 See id. ("[Pihysicians who offer their services to the public may not decline to accept
patients because of race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or any other basis
that would constitute invidious discrimination.").
IO8 See infra notes 513-23 and accompanying text.
1o9 See ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 37, 40, 50-55, 94, 140, 179-80, 214-15
(zoo5) (documenting Lambda's publicity activities).
11o See Press Release, Liberty Counsel, Human Rights Commission Dismisses Complaint
Against Christian Businessman After Liberty Counsel Files Suit (June 13, zoo6), http://www.
lc.org/pressrelease/2oo6/nro6l3o6.htm. The company denied that it discriminated against Ms.
Vincenz because she is a lesbian.
I l I Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Doe
v. Cal. Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n, No. RIC 441819 (Super. Ct. Cal. Apr. 19, 2005).
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the state's constitutional right of privacy despite the court's recognition
that the school is a religious corporation and despite plaintiffs' conces-
sion that it does not receive state assistance or enroll students who receive
state financial aid." 3 Evidently the case later settled, so the trial court's
denial of the motion to dismiss is not an important precedent. Nonethe-
less, it is disturbing to think that a religious school taking no public funds
could be barred from applying the tenets of its faith to its students, and
even more disturbing to note that in the same state a public school student
can be punished for wearing a T-shirt referring to the Bible's position of
homosexuality.
In Wisconsin ex rel. Sprague v. City of Madison, defendants leased a four-
bedroom house and subleased some of the rooms to others.1 4 Petitioner
Caryl Sprague sought to rent one of these rooms and inquired "whether the
household would respect her sexual orientation." ' Defendants refused to
rent a room to Sprague and another lesbian because defendants "were not
comfortable living with a person of her sexual orientation.1 1 6 Defendants
were held to have violated a Madison ordinance banning discrimination
based on "sexual orientation." 
1 7
The court held that applying the ordinance here did not violate de-
fendants' "right to privacy in the home or family or the right to engage in
first amendment activity free of governmental intrusion." The court said
simply: "Appellants gave up their unqualified right to such constitutional
protection when they rented housing for profit. The restrictions placed by
the Madison City Council on persons who rent housing for profit are not
unreasonable and do not encroach upon appellant's constitutional protec-
tions."'' 9 The absolute denial of privacy and association rights when there
is any element of commercial activity is troubling. The ordinance recog-
nized privacy concerns by permitting the limitation of rentals "to solely
male or female persons if such housing... is rented with the understanding
that toilet and bath facilities must be shared with the landlord or with other
tenants."l12 Thus the ordinance validates some privacy desires but not oth-
ers.
112 Id. at 3.
113 First Amended Complaint '1 17, Doe v. Cal. Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n, No. RIC
441819 (Super. Ct. Cal. Feb. 3, 2006).
114 State ex re/. Sprague v. City of Madison, 555 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (table).
The unpublished opinion is reported at 1996 WL 544099.
115 Id. at 4.
i16 Id. at I.
117 Id. at 2 (quoting MADISON, Wis., GEN. ORDINANCES § 3.23(4)(a) (1989)).
118 Id. at 3.
119 Id.
12o Id. at 2 (quoting MADISON, Wis., GEN. ORDINANCES § 3.23(4)(b) (1989)).
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This was not housing offered by a large, impersonal real estate corpora-
tion; it was a four-bedroom home occupied by defendants themselves. Fur-
ther, Sprague's inquiry "whether the household would respect her sexual
orientation" could have given defendants concern that Sprague might cause
trouble in the home if she felt that others disliked her sexual activities. The
court found that this was just "a prudent inquiry about the environment
in which one will live. .. .""' This finding suggests either that defendants
were legally obliged not only to rent to Sprague but also to suppress any
disapproval of her sexual conduct, or at least that defendants were required
to accept conflict in their home with Sprague over her sexual behavior. In
these circumstances, most people would consider the defendants' privacy
concerns valid.
Some housing antidiscrimination laws exempt small complexes or units
within the owner's own home."' A few courts have recognized a further
free exercise or hybrid exemption from these laws, but most have not."'
4. Business Entities as Expressive or Religious Organizations.-Many people
want to maintain their religion at work in a for-profit business. Many
business firms have an overt religious commitment that influences their
hiring and conduct of the workplace. So far, however, legislators have de-
nied these firms exemption from laws that would compel them to violate
their faith. Courts have also refused an exemption under federal and state
constitutional provisions for free exercise. These cases do not involve dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation, but presumably they also cover
such discrimination where it is illegal.
In State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.,J" the corporation operated sev-
eral fitness centers. It asked job applicants about their religion and marital
status and refused to employ "individuals living with but not married to a
person of the opposite sex." The state charged the company under a law
barring employment discrimination based on, inter alia, religion or marital
121 Id. at 4.
122 See Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, andSef-Realizaion: FirstAmendment
Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 229 nn. 184-86 (1999).
123 Recognizing an exemption: Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F3d
692 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd on procedural grounds, 2zo E3 d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Cooper
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-jo (Minn. 199o). Denying an exemption: Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (per curiam); Smith v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.zd 909 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531 (1997). See Battaglia, supra
note 122, at 289-98; Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Landlord's Refusalto Rent to Unmarried Couple
as Protected by Landlord's Religious Beliefs, o A.L.R. 6th 513 (2006).
124 The desire may be growing. See Nichols, supra note 58, at 145-46 (giving anecdotal
evidence).
125 State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed,
478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
126 Id. at 847.
[Vol. 95
GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
status. Because the company was not a religious organization but a "busi-
ness corporation engaged in business for profit" and "engaging in a secular
endeavor," 127 the court denied the company a free exercise exemption from
the law despite its application of the pre-Smith "compelling state interest"
standard.
EEOCv. PreferredManagement Corp.," presented an even stronger claim
for a religious exemption. The company there provided home health care.
Its owners were born-again Christians who believed they had a duty to.129 _
practice their faith in their work. "To that end, they wanted to share their
faith with the people they served, and wanted to hire only co-religionists
who would further this mission. The firm's pervasive religious objective
differentiates it from Sports & Health Club, Inc., which did not carry a
religious message to its clients. Nonetheless, the court denied the "reli-
gious corporation" exemption from Title VII. No other case has granted130
this exemption to a for-profit business corporation. These decisions are
consistent with the free exercise test of Employment Division v. Smith.
Although the issue seems not to have been addressed in case law, it also
seems unlikely that a for-profit business corporation would qualify as an
expressive association under Hurley and Dale. However, to deny accommo-
dation to for-profit companies with a strong religious mission is disturbing.
First, that policy restricts individual freedom. Of course, every law barring
private discrimination limits freedom. Where the problem of discrimina-
tion is severe and intractable, as with race, we accept that restriction, but
in most cases we do not. In particular, discrimination based on an ideologi-
cal commitment is perfectly legal. An environmental protection organiza-
tion can discriminate by hiring only environmentalists, and a civil liberties
organization can hire only people committed to free speech."' It seems
consistent that an organization with a religious commitment should be al-
lowed to hire only people who share that commitment. In both cases the
discrimination is a bonafide occupational qualification. This allowance does
not discriminate against atheists since an organization could have a mission
to advance atheism.
Prohibiting religious employment requirements does expand the job
options of workers who do not meet those requirements, but the benefit
to them is small. Neither Health & Sports Club, Inc. nor Preferred Man-
agement Corp. dominated its local market; workers they rejected had al-
ternatives in the same field and locale. Further, the small benefit of the
prohibition to these workers comes at substantial cost to others; forbidding
127 Id. at 853.
128 EEOC v. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 216 F. Supp.zd 763 (S.D. Ind. zooz).
129 Id. at 772-73.
130 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
131 See 3 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW §57.02 (Matthew Bender 2005).
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business corporations to adhere to a religious commitment denies millions
of Americans their wish to practice their faith at work.
Because of Title VII, companies that allow employees to practice a par-
ticular faith may face problems. Special treatment of one faith may trigger
demands for equal treatment for other faiths and atheism. Accommodating
these demands could be unbearably costly. Also, religious practice often
requires group activity. For instance, for Jews, prayer takes on a different
character when a minyan (a group often or more adult men) is present. Few
companies could regularly convene a minyan unless they could discrimi-
nate in hiring. Finally, faith often requires shunning improper behavior by
others. The faithful may be enjoined to avoid others who dress immoder-
ately or speak profanely. To accommodate such practice requires imposing
rules on all employees, which would at least generate conflict and might
itself violate antidiscrimination laws.
Although the Founders refrained from the establishment of religion, by
the Free Exercise Clause, they acknowledged the unique importance of
religious practice. As Kent Greenawalt says, "people should not lose their
capacity to carry out a religious vision simply because they want to do so
in commercial affairs."' 13 ' Thomas Berg adds, "[t]he very existence of the
religious discrimination provisions in Title VII ... reflects our legal tradi-
tion's judgment that citizens legitimately carry their religious beliefs into
the commercial marketplace and should be protected in doing so." 3 The
denial of an exemption from antidiscrimination laws for religiously com-
mitted business firms elevates the pecuniary interests of one group over
the freedom of conscience of another group. That is not a policy we should
endorse.' 34
Allowing businesses to discriminate on the basis of a religious commit-
ment creates little incentive to feign such a commitment because discrimi-
nation is costly; it means rejecting the best person for a job.A company might
accept that cost to satisfy a personal taste and use religious commitment as
a pretext, but to sustain the burden of proving a religious commitment adds
further cost. A company would have to show substantial evidence of a com-
mitment "to integrate religion into all aspects of the business," 135 including
its hiring practices and management of the workplace. The cost of doing
all this as a pretext is so high that few would bear it. Although there should
be no size limit for corporations that claim religious status, large firms are
less likely to meet this test. Also, the larger the corporation, the more likely
132 Kent Greenawalt, Title VII and Religious Liberty, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 37 (2001).
133 Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected Speech?, 22
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POI'Y 959, 964 (1999).
134 The case for an exemption is persuasively argued in Berg, supra note 133; Julie
Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associational Freedoms of Business
Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMp. L. 191 (2005); Nichols, supra note 58.
135 Berg, supra note 133, at 1003.
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that those excluded by it would have difficulty finding equivalent alterna-
tive employment, which should further tilt analysis against an exemption.
Likewise, although there should be no limit on the type of business done
by a religious corporation, the weaker the connection of the business to
religion, the less likely that it has a pervasive commitment to religion.
B. Government Employment
1. Discrimination Against Homosexuals.-A claim by a government employ-
ee of having been illegally discriminated against because of his homosexu-
ality should never clash with religious freedom because the government
employer has no right to exercise religion at all; by virtue of the Estab-
lishment Clause, the government must be religiously neutral. Such claims
still deserve brief discussion here because such discrimination could raise
questions about the legal relevance of objections to homosexuality among
fellow employees or the public and because the legal standards for govern-
ment employment may sometimes be relevant to private employment.
In 1990 Michael Bowers, the attorney general of Georgia, offered Robin
Joy Shahar a job as staff attorney to begin after she graduated from law
school; she accepted.1 36 In 1991 Shahar "married" another woman. When
the attorney general learned of this, he rescinded the job offer. Shahar sued.
The district court granted the attorney general summary judgment, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.'37
The court "assume[d], for argument's sake, that either the right to in-
timate association or the right to expressive association or both are pres-
ent." 38 It ruled that for government employees these rights do not invoke
strict scrutiny but the Pickering test: "to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees."' 139 In Elrodv. Burns, the Court held that this right does not extend to
"policymaking" positions. 4 ° However, in Rankin v. McPherson, the Court
stressed that "vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not
use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers
public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of
employees' speech." 14'
In Shahar the court did not invoke the Elrod standard for policymaking
positions. However, it did say that "the government employer's interest
136 Shahar v. Bowers, i 14 E3d 1097, 11 OO (I ith Cir. 1997).
137 Id. at io99.
138 Id. at 11o2.
139 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
14o Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
141 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,384 (1987).
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in staffing its offices with persons the employer fully trusts is given great
weight when the pertinent employee helps make policy, handles confiden-
tial information or must speak or act-for others to see-on the employer's
behalf." 142 Such employees "are in a special class ... and might seldom
prevail under the First Amendment in keeping their jobs when they are
in conflict with their employers." 14' The position of staff attorney here was
such a position.144
Finally, the court concluded that it:
cannot say that [Bowers] was unreasonable to think that Shahar's acts were
likely to cause the public to be confused and to question the Law Depart-
ment's credibility; to interfere with the Law Department's ability to handle
certain controversial matters, including enforcing the laws against homo-
sexual sodomy; and to endanger working relationships inside the Depart-
ment. We also cannot say that the Attorney General was unreasonable to
lose confidence in Shahar's ability to make good judgments as a lawyer for
the Law Department.1
45
Two points in Shahar deserve notice. First, the decision depends on its
unique facts with respect both to the job in question and to Shahar's con-
duct. Shahar staged a widely publicized "marriage" ceremony with another
woman after she accepted the job offer at a time when the status of same-
sex "marriage" was being hotly disputed in the courts and in public. 146 She
was also less than candid about this "marriage" with her prospective em-
ployer.141
Second, the court relied on the fact that homosexual sodomy violated a
Georgia criminal law that had been upheld by the Supreme Court in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick. 48 Shahar's "marriage" "could undermine confidence about
the attorney general's commitment to enforce [this] law... (or laws limiting
marriage and marriage benefits to traditional marriages)." '49 Bowers has now
been overruled. 5 0 Future cases will have to determine the significance of
that overruling to cases like Shahar.
142 Shahar, 114 E3d at 1103-04.
143 Id. at Hio3.
144 Id. at 11o4.
145 Id. at 1 i io. In an opinion by Judge Godbold four judges dissented because they
believed Bowers "did not act reasonably." Id. at i 118 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 1104-05 (majority opinion).
147 "Shahar misled Deputy Attorney General J. Robert Coleman into believing that she
was going to marry a male." Id. at ii 16 n.9 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
148 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), cited inShahar, 114 E3d at 1105 n.17.
149 Shahar, 1 14 E3d at 1 105 n.17.
15o Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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2. The Religious Freedom of Government Employees.-In Pickering v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court held that in deciding the free speech rights
of public employees the court must "arrive at a balance between the in-
terests of the [government employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promotinI the efficiency of the public services it performs through its em-
ployees." The Supreme Court has never discussed the religious freedom
of government employees and whether it is subject to the Pickering test
or to a higher standard of review. Several lower courts have addressed the
issue.
a. Lumpkin v. Brown. -Plaintiff Reverend Eugene Lumpkin was
pastor of a Baptist church and an appointed member of the San Francisco
Human Rights Commission ("HRC"). In several public statements Lump-
kin affirmed his belief in the biblical tenets that homosexual acts are sins
and that a man who sleeps with a man should be put to death. However,
he said these norms must be viewed in the context of liberation of the
Israelites from Egypt.153 When later called by the mayor, Lumpkin made
clear that he did not advocate, and never had advocated, violence against154
gays. Further, he was never alleged to have discriminated against gays as
a member of the HRC. Nonetheless, the mayor removed Lumpkin from
the Commission. He sued, claiming violation of his freedom of expres-
sion. l" s
The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment against Lumpkin.
Applying the Elrod dichotomy, the court held that Lumpkin had a policy-
making position and could be removed even on the basis of political affili-
ation. Although this finding sufficed to dispose of the case, the court went
on to apply the Pickering balancing test and found that the test weighed
in favor of the City because Lumpkin had preached "homophobia" and
his "statements explicitly condemning homosexuality as a sin and implic-
itly endorsing violence against homosexuals are not simply hostile to the
151 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968). This standard applies only
when "employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern." Garcetti v.
Caballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1958 (2oo6). When they "make statements pursuant to their official
duties ... the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline."
Id. at 196o.
152 Lumpkin v. Brown, io9 F3d 1498 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 995 (1997). For
an able discussion of Lumpkin see Steven H. Alden, A Tale of Two Cities in the Gay Rights
Kulturkampf: Are the Federal Courts Presiding Over the Cultural Balkanization of America?, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295 (2000).
153 Lumpkin, 109 E3d at 1499 n. i.
154 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-48, A-49, Lumpkin v. Brown, 522 U.S. 995
(1997) (No. 97-367).
155 Lumpkin, 109 F3d at 1499-1500
156 Id. at I5OO.
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Commission's charge, they are at war with it." ' Although these comments
could be dismissed as dictum, they warrant fear even in non-policymak-
ing employees that they could be fired for confessing the traditional Ju-
deo-Christian view of homosexuality. The court seems eager to ignore the
warning in Rankin that courts should not let government employers silence
speech simply because they disagree with it.
b. Good News Employee Association v. Hicks.-Suppression of re-
ligious expression was also upheld in Good News Employee Association v.
Hicks.5 8 Plaintiffs, two employees of the Community and Economic Devel-
opment Office ("CEDA") of Oakland, California, posted in their workplace,
notices about Good News Employee Association ("GNEA") to which they
belonged. The flyer described GNEA as "'a forum for people of Faith to
express their views on contemporary issues of the day. With respect for the
Natural Family, Marriage and Family values."'' 9
After complaints by a lesbian co-worker CEDA removed the flyers un-
der the city's "Equal Employment Opportunity/Anti-Discrimination/Non-
Harassment Policy and Complaint Procedure. Plaintiffs were also told
they could announce their group through the city's e-mail system only if
they deleted "verbiage that could be offensive to gay people." An of-
ficer sent all employees a memorandum referring to "recent... incidents"
where "flyers were placed in public view which contained statements of
a homophobic nature and were determined to promote sexual orientation
based harassment."'
162
Applying the Pickering balancing test, the court concluded that plaintiffs'
interest in speaking was "slight, as the restriction placed on their speech ...
was quite limited." CEDA did not limit "their speech outside of work" and
let them "discuss their views with co-workers as they wish at appropriate
times (at lunch, on a break)." They were also allowed to "broadcast the ex-
istence of their group, subject to certain editorial restrictions."16 The court
did not enumerate these restrictions; presumably it meant the condition
requiring removal of "verbiage that could be offensive to gay people." 161
157 Id.
158 Good News Employee Ass'n v. Hicks, No. C-03-3542 VRW, 2005 WL 351743 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2005)
159 Id. at *i.
16o Id. at *2. Not included in the flyers was GNEA's Statement of Faith, which defined
marriage as "a union between a man and a woman according to California state law" and the
"Natural Family" as "a man and a woman their children by birth or adoption, or the surviving
remnant thereof (including single parents)." Id. at * i.
161 Id.at *2.
162 Id. at *3.
I63 Id. at *7-8.
164 Id. at *2.
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The court conceded that "[diefendants' countervailing interest is also
modest .... [W]orkplace disruption is the touchstone of the employer's
interest in the Pickering balance." Here, a co-worker was "disturbed by
the flyer .... But whether the particular sensitivity of a single coworker
amounts to a cognizable workplace disruption under Pickering is far from
clear." 165 Further, "the suppressed speech was not patently inflammatory
'fighting words."'
' 166
Nonetheless, the court ruled in favor of the city for two reasons. "First,
plaintiffs' interest in this particular channel of communication is vanishing-
ly small .... Plaintiffs do not have a privileged First Amendment interest in
communicating their message to the officemates, for their First Amendment. ,167
rights derive from their status as citizens, not their status as employees."
Second, the defendants' action "was a narrowly tailored and proportionate
response to the actual workplace disruption or, perhaps better described,• ,168
distraction." Plaintiffs objected to the employer's viewpoint discrimina-
tion, which silenced their message while leaving others free to disparage
them as "homophobes." The court denied that such treatment is barred
under Pickering- to entertain such complaints "would remit the disciplinary.... ,, 169
operations of public agencies to the micromanagement of the courts.
The court's reasoning carries some weight. The employer need not al-
low posting of flyers at all, so removing them did not a priori violate the
First Amendment. However, if the employer permits postings, it is ques-
tionable whether it can then limit their content beyond the mere exclusion
of "fighting words." Here, the words "Natural Family, Marriage and Fam-
ily values" were forbidden because they were deemed "homophobic" and
"were determined to promote sexual orientation based harassment." On
its face, that claim seems dubious, and the employer offered no evidence
to support it. Most people would not even realize that the flyer implied
a message about homosexuality. The context made the flyer particularly
innocuous. It was not imposed on unwilling listeners; those who so chose
could ignore it. The court's concern about "micromanagement" of public
agencies is understandable, but a balancing test like Pickering contemplates
just that. Otherwise, government employers are free to facilitate messages
on one side of a public debate while suppressing the other side.
Further, the employer's determination that plaintiffs' language was
"homophobic" and would "promote sexual orientation based harassment"
must raise fears among government employees about all expressions of
traditional Judeo-Christian views on the family in the workplace. If the
employer can ban these flyers as disruptive, presumably it can bar any ex-
I65 Id. at *8.
i66 Id. at *9.
167 Id.
I68 Id.
169 Id.
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pression of such views, at least if any employee objects to them. The state
may promote certain views in its own speech, but it does not follow that it
should be able to suppress the personal expression of different views by
its employees.
c. Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District.I7 ---Here, a public
school teacher wanted to post materials disapproving of homosexuality on
a school bulletin board in response to materials distributed by the school
district as part of its Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month. The court held
that displays on the bulletin board were controlled by the school and there-
fore were school-sponsored speech; it was not an open forum on which
members of the school community could post their own views.
In the classroom, the authority of school boards to set the curriculum
generally trumps teachers' free speech rights."' This makes some sense;
what children are taught should not depend on the whim of each teacher.
There must be some limit, though, on a school's power to favor one side in
matters of public debate. Should a school, for instance, be able to compel
teachers to tell students that abortion is homicide? The school's discretion
should be even more limited for a bulletin board, which children may dis-
regard and where messages can be labeled as expressing individual rather
than official views.
d. Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson.1 73-
Judge Wilkerson sent The George County Times a letter, later published, that
did not identify him as a judge and that stated that homosexuals "should
.... ,,174
be put in some kind of mental institute. Wilkerson repeated these views
when called by a radio reporter. Lambda Legal filed a complaint with the
Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance ("MCJP") who in turn
charged Wilkerson with "willful misconduct in office and conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into
disrepute" and with violations of several provisions of the state Code of
Judicial Conduct ("CJC"). 175
The MCJP found that the statement violated a canon of the CJC, but
the state Supreme Court found that this canon was not in effect when the
I7o Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., zz8 E3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).
171 For a discussion of school-sponsored speech see infra notes 270-372 and accompany-
ing text.
172 See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 E3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc);
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989). ButseeCockrel v. Shelby
County Sch. Dist., 27o F3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001).
173 Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1oo6 (Miss. 2004).
174 Id. at oo9.
175 Id. at oo8-o9
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letter was published.176 Nonetheless, the court went on to consider whether
Wilkerson violated Canon 2(A) of the CJC which was in effect and which
provided: "A judge should respect and comply with the law and should
conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 1 7  178
In interpreting this canon, the court followed Scottv. Flowers in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit "recognized that
the state may restrict the speech of elected judges in ways that it may not
restrict the speech of other elected officials.' ' " However, the state may not
"infringe upon the right 'to make statements . .. on public issues outside
a campaign context"' unless it can "carry a very difficult burden in order to
demonstrate that its concededly legitimate interest in protecting the effi-
ciency and impartiality of the state judicial system outweighs [the judge's]
first amendment rights." 18
Here, the court said Judge Wilkerson had spoken on a matter of pub-
lic concern and therefore could not be punished unless the restraint "is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest." The MCJP
claimed a compelling interest in maintaining the "impartiality of the ju-
diciary," meaning "'the lack of bias for or against (sic) either party to theS ,,182 ...
proceeding."' While conceding that this is a compelling state interest,
the court found "no compelling state interest in requiring a partial judge to
keep quiet about his prejudice so that he or she will appear impartial." ' 83
The court conceded that Judge Wilkerson's statements cast doubt on his
ability to treat homosexuals fairly and that he might have to withdraw
from cases in which they are parties but that this was a separate issue from
forbidding him to air his opinions. 184 Accordingly, the court dismissed the
Commission's complaint against Judge Wilkerson.
Two justices dissented. They thought Judge Wilkerson's comments
violated a judicial canon because his comments "cast doubt on his abil-
ity to act impartially."' " Further, the canon "plainly serves a compelling
interest in promoting impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in our
176 ld. at ioio.
177 Miss. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2006).
178 Scott v. Flowers, 910 F2d 201 (5 th Cir. 199o).
179 Id. at 212.
18o Id. (quoting Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 565 Fd 295, 301 (5th Cir. 1977)
(emphasis added)). The court also followed In reSanders, 955 P.2d 369, 375 (Wash. 1998), in
which the court upheld the right of a judge to make a speech at a pro-life rally. Wilkerson, 876
So. 2d at 1013.
181 Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1013 (internal quotes omitted).
182 Id. at 1l1 5 .
183 Id.
184 Id. at 1015-16.
185 Id. at Ilo2 (Carlson, J., dissenting).
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courts."' 116 The judge had a right under the canons to "express his views on
statutes concerning same-sex partners and legislation regulating their ac-
tivities or their rights," but that when he said homosexuals "were sick and
that they all needed to be indiscriminately placed in mental institutions, he
crossed over the line!"' 87
On the First Amendment issue, the dissent found Scottv. Flowers distin-
guishable because Judge Wilkerson did not hide his views on his opinions
of the homosexual population as a whole.
I do not agree that this type of speech-the judge's personal views regard-
ing all homosexuals-relates to political and social community concerns.
However, even if the judge's speech is found to relate to political and social
community concerns, this type of speech fails the second prong [of Scott] by
"impeding the performance of the speaker's duties." 188
Judge Wilkerson's comments failed the second prong, in the dissenters'
view, by "clearly and convincingly leading the public to conclude that he
entertains a bias against an entire class of individuals and precipitating a
reasonable fear that their pleas, arguments, and testimony before his court
will not be considered with the impartiality demanded of a judge."' 9
Both the majority and the dissent recognize that Judge Wilkerson's
comments cast doubt on his impartiality. The dissent seems clearly wrong
in saying that the comments do not "relate ... to political and community
social concerns." It is an open question whether homosexuality is normal•190
or disordered, and this question is relevant to the legal treatment of ho-
mosexuality, just as questions about innate cognitive differences between
the sexes are relevant to legal issues. It is hard to imagine a judge being
punished for saying that those who oppose gay rights are homophobic,
although that statement might cause such people to doubt whether they
would be treated impartially by the judge. In that case, as in Judge Wilk-
erson's, the majority's approach seems wisest-to desist from punishment
but to recognize that the judge may have to recuse himself when those he
has disparaged so request. His comments did not allude to religion and do
not seem to have been religiously inspired, but they addressed a matter of
public concern on which a judge should be free to speak.
186 Id. at 1022.
187 Id. at 1023.
188 Id. at 1025.
189 Id.
19o "There are millions of citizens who believe Judge Wilkerson's religious views are
exactly correct. There are still millions more who find his views insulting." Id. at 1014 (major-
ity opinion)
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e. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles.'9'-Robert Vernon was the assistant
chief of police in the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"). A 1991
magazine article quoted from audiotapes of Vernon speaking as an elder of
the Grace Community Church fifteen years earlier. The article said Ver-
non "condemns homosexuality, depicts cops as 'ministers of God,' instructs
churchgoers that 'the woman is to be submissive to the man' and adjures
men to 'recognize the concept of disciplining followers, whether it be your
son, employees or anyone under your control-your wife."'
' 9
The article triggered demands to investigate whether Vernon's views
"interfere with [his] ability to perform official duties fairly and without
bias," specifically with respect to the "treatment of gays and lesbians." 193
The chief of police did investigate and found that the fears about Vernon
were not substantiated. No action was taken against him.
Vernon then sued the city and those involved in the investigation for
violations of the Free Exercise, Establishment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection clauses of the Constitution. He alleged that the investigation
and accompanying publicity caused him emotional distress, interfered
with his personal and professional activities, and damaged his personal and
professional reputation. The district court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed. 9 s
The court applied the compelling interest test to Vernon's free exercise
claim. 196 The court found that Vernon "failed to demonstrate a substantial197
burden" on his religious exercise. To prevail, Vernon had to show gov-
ernment action; pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden by the
religion or preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a
religious experience which the faith mandates. This interference must be
more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an inter-
ference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.98 ,,It is
thus inadequate for a plaintiff merely to allege that government action sub-
191 Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F3d 1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000
(1994).
192 Id. at 1388 (quoting The Dan Quaye Pnciple Strikes Again, L.A. MAG., May 2 1, 199 1,
at 28).
193 Id. at 1389 (quoting a letter from Councilman Zev Yaroslavsky to the President of the
Board of Police Commissioners ("BCP")). In response, the BCP asked the Chief of Police to
investigate Vernon.
194 Id. at 1390.
195 Id. at 1402.
196 Id. at 1392. The court did so in part because of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § zooobb (2000), which was subsequently held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
197 Vernon, 27 F3d at 1393.
198 Id.
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jectively "chills" his religious behavior, especially where the government
action is neither regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.' ' 9
Vernon failed to make an adequate showing: "There is simply no evi-
dence that the City ever monitored Vernon's private religious activities..
. [T]he investigation was restricted ... to consideration only of Vernon's
on-duty activities and ...it resulted in no disciplinary action" against
him. Thus he "failed to show any concrete and demonstrable injury."' '
"[Cihilling effects are simply not objectively discernable and are therefore
not constitutionally cognizable."
The court also rejected the Establishment Clause claim under the
three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.'O' As to the second prong of the
test-whether the government act has the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion-the court concluded that although one might "infer
possible city disapproval of Vernon's religious beliefs from the direction of
the investigation, this could not objectively be construed as the primary
• . . 203
focus or effect of the investigation." If plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing perceptions of the public and of Los Angeles municipal employees and
failed to do so here, the court's determination may be correct. It would
be interesting, though, to have a survey of those perceptions; perhaps the
public did see the investigation as manifesting hostility to Vernon's faith.
Vernon seems to apply precedent accurately,20" but the decision is still
troubling. Over six months elapsed between publication of the magazine
article and completion of the investigation. The investigation concerned
only statements outside of work that should probably be protected free
speech; it is all the more disturbing that they were statements of religious
beliefs made in church. These gave no indication that Vernon had or would
205
mistreat homosexuals, and there were no allegations that he had done so.
The LAPD did not ask him to explain his views or to confirm that he did
not, and would not, mistreat gays or women.
Employees often hide attitudes, including religious views, that they
fear their superiors dislike. It would create chaos if an employee could sue
every time she felt pressure to disguise her religious beliefs from superiors.
When an employee is subjected to a lengthy formal investigation solely
I99 Id. at 1394 (quoting the district court opinion).
200 Id. at 1395.
201 Id.
202 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-1 3 (1970.
203 Vernon, 27 E3d at 1398-99.
204 On the free exercise question, the court followed Lairdv. Tatum, 408 U.S. I, 13-14
(1972) and Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989). See
Vernon, 27 F3d at 1394.
205 The article said Vernon "condemns homosexuality, depicts cops as 'ministers of
God,' instructs churchgoers that 'the woman is to be submissive to the man' and adjures men
'to recognize the concept of disciplining followers, whether it be your son, employees or any-
one under your control-your wife."' Vernon, 27 F3d at 1388.
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because of religious beliefs expressed in church, however, a due concern
for religious freedom would offer relief.
f. Altman v. Minnesota Department of Corrections. 21--Minnesota
state employees were required to attend classes that some employees be-
lieved were "state-sponsored indoctrination designed to sanction, condone,
promote, and otherwise approve behavior and a style of life that Appellants
believe to be immoral, sinful, perverse, and contrary to the teachings of the
Bible." ' 7 They brought Bibles and read them silently during classes. They
received reprimands that disqualified some for promotion. They sued. Ap-
plying Pickering, the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs had a valid com-
plaint that the state had violated their freedoms of speech and religion. 08
It therefore reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant and remanded for further proceedings.'09
Although this decision is a welcome exception to the previous cases
denying religious freedom to government employees, the ruling is limited;
it seems to fault the state only for singling out plaintiffs' silent reading
while other inattentive employees were not disciplined. Had the state in-
sisted that all employees pay attention to indoctrination, evidently plain-
tiffs would have lost. That the state was teaching plaintiffs that their reli-
gion is wrong would not have violated their rights under Smith. The state
may, of course, demand that its employees treat homosexuals equally, but
to impose indoctrination about the propriety of homosexuality constitutes
thought control incompatible with a free society.
g. Akridge v. Wilkinson. 10-William Akridge, a full-time chaplain in
the Ohio prison system, was fined and reassigned because he refused to let
an active homosexual lead a band to play at religious services. Conceding
that Akridge's act might constitute speech or expressive conduct concern-
ing matters of public concern, the Court of Appeals applied the Pickering
balancing test and upheld the state's action on the ground that it had an
"interest in preventing discrimination." ''
2o6 Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 251 E3d 1199 (8th Cir. 2001).
207 Id. at 12o.
2o8 The state argued that the appellants were disciplined not for their nonverbal speech
but for refusing to accept mandatory training. The court found this claim subject to dispute
because "other employees have been similarly inattentive at... training sessions, but none
has ever been disciplined." Id. at 1203. Thus the state's motive was a disputed issue of fact.
Id.
2o9 However, the court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' free exercise claim on the ground
that being denied the opportunity to read the Bible during this one session did not substan-
tially burden the exercise of religion. Id. at I 203-04.
zlo Akridge v. Wilkinson, 178 F. App'x 474 (6th Cir. zoo6).
211 Id. at 480.
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The decision is troubling because it lets the state overrule an ordained
minister in the conduct of a religious service. Nonetheless, the result is
defensible. Because prisoners are always in state custody, including during
religious services, the state must be able to impose rules to maintain order
and fair treatment of prisoners during such services. The state could decide
that inclusion of homosexuals in religious services is preferable to exclud-
ing them. It could then hire a chaplain who would follow such a policy, and
it did not have to allow a chaplain who favored a contrary policy to have
his way. As Akridge argued, and the court apparently agreed, he was not re-
quired to implement a policy he considered sinful; he could have excluded
the band from the services altogether."' 2 Further, it is not possible for the
state to offer religious services reflecting the faith of every clergyman or
inmate; choices must be made. One can question the wisdom of the choice
made here, but the state had constitutional authority to make the choice.
h. Speech Codes.-In some government workplaces rules forbid negative
comments by employees about homosexuality. It is appropriate for gov-
ernment employers to forbid severe or persistent harassment, but some of
these codes go much too far, especially given the public debate about the
nature and propriety of homosexuality.
i. Religious Judges.-Some efforts have been made to disqualify judges
because of their religious beliefs. 14 So far these efforts have failed, but
undoubtedly they will be made again, sometimes with claims that a judge
with traditional religious beliefs about homosexuality should be barred
from cases involving homosexuals. Of course, judges must always apply the
law even when it clashes with their private beliefs. There is no reason to
think judges cannot set aside their religious beliefs as much as any other.
212 Id.
213 See CITY OF Los ANGELES, SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION PROCEDURE, avail-
able at http://www.lacity.org/per/eeo/sexual%zoorientation%2ocomplaint%2oprocedure.pdf
(prohibiting "derogatory... comments ... or jokes respecting sexual orientation"); State Univ.
of N.Y. (Albany), Office of Diversity & Affirmative Action, Sexual Orientation Discrimination
and Harassment or Intolerance, http://www.albany.edu/affirmative-action/sexual-orientation.
html (forbidding, e.g., "'jokes' that reinforce the false stereotypes related to lesbians, gays,
transgendered persons, or bisexuals").
214 See Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F3d 399, 400 (9th Cit. 1995) (de-
nying plaintiff's petition for removal of Catholic judges despite plaintiff's assertion that the
judge's "fervently-held religious beliefs would compromise [his] ability to apply the law");
Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979) (seeking recusal of judge because he was a
Mormon); see also Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So.2d 1oo6 (Miss.
2004), discussed supra at notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
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3. Governance of the Workplace.-Boy Scouts v. Wyman."'5 In 2000 the Con-
necticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO")
removed the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA') from the state's workplace
charitable campaign because the BSA discriminated against homosexuals
in violation of the state's Gay Rights Law. The BSA challenged the remov-
al under the First Amendment and state law. In Wyman, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed summary judgment for defendants. It found that the Gay
Rights Law was "viewpoint neutral" because it governs conduct that is not
"primarily expressive" and its differential impact on viewpoints was coinci-
dental, not intentional.2 7 The law's purpose was to deter harmful conduct,
so the exclusion did not violate the First Amendment.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale21s confirms the Scouts' constitutional right
as an expressive association to exclude gays from leadership positions.
Wyman does not directly disturb the BSA's policy but does subject it to a
heavy penalty. The Scouts rely on donations, and public employee charity
campaigns are an important resource because they raise substantial funds
at little cost to the recipients. As the court acknowledged, the state law "has
a foreseeably adverse impact on the expressive abilities" and "will to some
extent restrict the message" of the BSA.219 Moreover, despite the CHRO's
claim that excluding the BSA from the campaign did not violate the state
law's prohibition against "condon[ing] homosexuality," "0 the exclusion
conveys endorsement of homosexuality and condemnation of disapproval
of homosexuality. As the court concedes, the purpose of the law "is to dis-)221
courage harmful conduct." In other words, the state has used the expres-
sive function of the law to label the Boy Scouts' policy, based on traditional
Judeo-Christian beliefs, as "harmful conduct."
The decision here is even more objectionable than that in Hicks. On
one side, the harm to gays from the BSA's policy is minor. Few gays want
to be scout leaders, and the position is voluntary, so the policy has almost
no economic effect. Opponents of the Scouts' policy are free to set up their
own children's organizations. On the other side, the BSA is an expressive
organization, and scout leaders are the primary vehicles through which its
beliefs are taught. By officially disdaining and imposing a financial penalty
on the Boy Scouts' choice of its representatives, the state strikes at the
heart of the BSA's ability to perform its mission.
215 Boy Scouts v. Wyman, 335 E3d 8o (2d Cir. 2003), ceti. denied, 541 U.S. 903 (2004).
216 See id.
2 7 Id. at 92-95.
z18 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (zooo). For a discussion on Dale see supra
notes 41-5o and accompanying text.
219 Dale, 335 F3d at 93.
220 Id. at 98.
2 21 Id. at 95.
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C. Government Contractors
Government has broad discretion to impose conditions on the grant of
government contracts, but this discretion is not unlimited, especially when
it affects basic constitutional freedom. Government need not forbid acts
by its contractors that would violate the Equal Protection Clause if done
by the government itself."' In Board of County Commissioners, Waubansee
County v. Umbehr"3 the Supreme Court held that government contractors
224have some free speech protections and that the Pickering balancing test
determines whether government rules are constitutionally permissible. In
general, conditions attached to federal spending must be related to the
enactment's purpose.225
Applying this balancing test can be difficult. The Supreme Court has
126
upheld laws forbidding discrimination by recipients of public funds, but
a balancing test requires consideration of the unique facts of each case. In
some cases the Supreme Court has found that the intrusion of the law in
227question on the recipient's constitutional rights was slight.
Gauging the severity of the intrusion on a government contractor's con-
stitutional freedoms should entail an inquiry like those in Dale and Hurley.
That is, the court should ask whether the restriction seriously interferes
with constitutional freedom and, if the contractor is an expressive asso-
ciation, with its ability to convey its message. Employment rules, for ex-
ample, might be valid for a contractor's lower-level employees but not for
policymaking or leadership positions. Of course, the balancing will differ
from that in Hurley and Dale because those cases did not involve receipt
of government money, which makes it harder to sustain the constitutional
claim. However, as Umbehr holds, a recipient of government funds does not
forfeit all constitutional rights; a balancing is still necessary. Moreover, it is
arguable that the balancing formula should be more generous to the private
128party when it asserts religious freedom rather than free speech alone.
222 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, io02 (1982). In any case, homosexuality is not a
suspect class for purposes of the equal protection clause. See infra note 432.
223 Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
224 See supra notes 151 and accompanying text.
225 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); see also New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (requiring that conditions "bear some relationship to the purpose of
the federal spending").
226 See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (199o) (upholding application of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to faculty hiring against claim that this violated the faculty's free-
dom of speech); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (upholding application of Title
IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to college whose students received federal aid); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 329-31 (1978).
227 See, e.g., Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (199o) (finding that any restriction
on faculty's First Amendment rights was "remote and attenuated").
228 See infra notes 579-81 and accompanying text.
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1. Okwedy v. Molinari.32 -In February 2000, plaintiffs Keyword Minis-
tries, a Christian church, and its pastor Kristopher Okwedy contracted with
PNE Media to display on a Staten Island, New York, billboard the Bible
verse, "Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind: it is abomina-
,,230
tion, and three other translations of the same passage. Soon after the
billboards went up, PNE got a letter from Staten Island Borough President
Guy Molinari stating that:
IT]his message conveys an atmosphere of intolerance which is not wel-
come in our borough.
P.N.E. Media owns a number of billboards on Staten Island and de-
rives substantial economic benefits from them. I call on you as a responsible
member of the business community to please contact Daniel L. Master, my
legal counsel and Chair of my Anti-Bias Task Force ... to discuss further the
issues I have raised in this letter.1
31
The same day PNE removed the signs. Plaintiffs then sued Molinari
and PNE for violations of the First Amendment and other laws. The dis-
trict court dismissed the First Amendment claims on the grounds that Mo-
linari did not have regulatory or decision-making authority over PNE and
that his letter was "not reasonably susceptible to interpretation as threaten-
ing economic harm;" the letter merely "called for a dialogue" and could not
"reasonably be viewed as designed to intimidate." '
The court of appeals reversed. It said a First Amendment violation could
be shown not only by "threatened use of official power by defendants...
but also the threatened use of other coercive means" such as urging a boy-233
cott. In finding that Molinari's letter could not "reasonably be viewed as
designed to intimidate," the lower court failed to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, as it must do on a motion to dismiss; "a
jury could find that Molinari's letter contained an implicit threat of retalia-
tion if PNE failed to accede to Molinari's requests."
This conclusion is clearly correct. Molinari's letter, sent by him "As
Borough President of Staten Island," said the billboard "conveys an at-
mosphere of intolerance that is not welcome in our borough," referred to
PNE's substantial business on Staten Island, and urged PNE to call Moli-
nari's legal counsel and chair of his Anti-Bias Task Force. Molinari was also
clearly able, in his official position, to injure PNE by a legal investigation
that would be expensive to defend, by withholding government business
229 Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 E3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003).
23o Leviticus 18:22 (King James).
231 Okwedy, 333 F3d at 342.
232 Okwedy v. Molinari, 15o F Supp. zd 508, 518 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
233 Okwedy, 333 F3d at 343.
234 Id. at 344.
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from PNE, and by exhorting private entities to do likewise. PNE would be
foolish to ignore this danger.
2. Catholic Charities of Maine, Inc. v. City of Portland.3S-The City of
Portland has a law requiring any entity taking Housing and Community
Development ("HCD") funds from the city to give the same health and
fringe benefits to employees with domestic partners as to employees with
spouses. The city withheld HCD funds slated for Catholic Charities of
Maine ("CCM"), an organization with close ties to the Catholic Church,
because CCM refused to obey that law.z36 CCM sued the city, claiming
violations, inter alia, of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA")117 and the United States Constitution.2
38
The court first held that application of the law to CCM was preempted
by ERISA after CCM elected to be covered by ERISA in 2003.39 It then
rejected CCM's free exercise claim under Smith on the ground that the law
was generally applicable and neutral.240 The court also questioned whether
the law "substantially burdened" CCM since it had actually provided the
intended service programs without HCD funds4
CCM also argued that the ordinance violated its free speech because
"by not providing domestic partner benefits, [CCM] sends a message about
Roman Catholic teaching on non-family relationships." The court said that
"[clonduct constitutes protected expression if'it evinces an intent to con-
vey a particularized message ... and the likelihood is great that the message
..242would be understood by those [to whom it is addressed].' Here, "[tihere
simply is no 'particularized message' in the provision of employee benefits,
let alone a message that would be understood by the public." The court
then denied CCM's claim that the ordinance imposed an unconstitutional
condition because the condition "must implicate a constitutional right"
235 Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Me. 2004).
236 Id. at 83.
237 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
238 Similar issues arise in Titus Construction v. City of Minneapolis, a challenge to a
Minneapolis law requiring city contractors to give unmarried employees and their partners
the same benefits as married couples. See Alliance Defense Fund, Will Minneapolis Require
Companies to Subsidize Unmarried Partners?, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/story/
?id=393.
239 City of Portland, 304 F Supp. 2d at 84-93.
240 Id. at 94-95.
241 Id. at 94.
242 Id. at 95 (quoting Gun Owners' Action League v. Swift, 284 E3d 210, 211 (ist Cir.
2002) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989))).
243 Id. For the same reason, the court said that compelling CCM to provide domestic
partner benefits did not "compel" it "to endorse any particular message." Id.
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and CCM "does not have a constitutional right to administer its employee
benefit plans in the manner it chooses.
The decision is troubling on several grounds. Its conclusion that denial
of HCD funds did not "substantially burden" CCM because it "was able to
provide the service programs without the benefit of HCD funds" is ridicu-
lous. The court said CCM carried out the programs "at least in part ...... 145
There was no finding that CCM completed the programs. More important,
a charitable organization like CCM does all the good it can; it can never
meet all needs. If CCM carried out HCD programs with its own funds, it
would have lost the ability to pursue its mission elsewhere.
Second, the court failed td consider whether Smith applies not only to
individuals but to organizations, for which the constitutional analysis is ar-
guably different. 246 If Smith does not apply, the court would have to ask
whether the law imposed an unconstitutional condition. As the court said,
"[wihen the benefit is discretionary, the condition attached to receipt of
the benefit must bear some connection to the rationale the government2 47
would employ in denying the benefit outright." It is hard to see any con-
nection between the law's requirement of domestic partner benefits and the
provision of aid to the needy for which HCD funds are intended.
3. Catholic Adoption Agencies in Massachusetts.-Massachusetts decided not
to fund adoption agencies that discriminate against homosexual couples
seeking to adopt. For many years Catholic Charities of Massachusetts (an-
other "CCM") received state funds to arrange adoptions, but it could not
comply with the new policy and ceased operations. Since the policy con-
cerns the very activity for which state funds are given, it is hard to argue
that the state is constitutionally required to grant the exemption. As a pol-
icy matter, however, CCM should have been granted an exemption. There
are many adoption agencies in Massachusetts; an exemption for CCM still
leaves many agencies that will serve gay couples. Gay couples are a very
244 Id. at 95-96.
245 Id. at 84.
246 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. The decision is arguably supported
by recent cases holding that a state may require employers to include contraception in any
employee health coverage. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3 d 67
(Cal.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio,
8o8 N.Y.S. 2d 447 (2oo6). Apart from the possibility that these cases are wrong, there are two
possible differences between them and Catholic Charities of Maine. The government's need
to require contraceptive care coverage may be greater than its need to mandate benefits for
homosexual domestic partners. Second, in Catholic Charities of Maine, the claim for such a need
is undermined by the application of the law only to government contractors.
247 City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
248 See Patricia Wen, They Cared for the Children: Amid Shifting Social Winds, Catholic
Charities Prepares to End Its t03 Years of Finding Homes for Foster Children and Evolving Families,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, zoo6, at Ai.
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small percentage of those seeking to adopt. Moreover, CCM has concen-
trated on the most difficult adoptive children, such as those with physical or
behavioral problems. Denying funding to CCM will seriously harm these
children without creating any substantial benefit for gays.
4. The Salvation Army in San Francisco.-In 1996, the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors froze federal grants slated for a local emergency shelter run
by the Salvation Army because a letter from an Army officer published in a
local newspaper said that homosexuality "is contrary to the teachings of the
Bible and presents a serious threat to the integrity, quality and solidarity of
society as a whole." 49 The funds were restored when the Salvation Army
agreed to give homosexual sensitivity training to its officers and to add two
homosexuals to its advisory council. 20
This case is particularly disturbing because there were no allegations
that the Salvation Army discriminated against homosexuals;"' it was pun-
ished merely because of its declared principles. The Salvation Army is
an expressive association so it might have won had it fought the Board in
court, but that would at least have entailed expensive litigation and prob-
ably suspension of care for the homeless. Political power can infringe reli-
gious freedom even when its use may be illegal.
D. Use of Public Facilities
Since 1957 the City of San Diego leased certain park lands to the Boy
Scouts of America ("BSA"). Because of the Scouts' exclusion of open ho-
mosexuals, agnostics, and atheists from leadership positions, some citizens
of San Diego sued the city and the BSA alleging several constitutional vio-
lations. In Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of America, the court held that the
leases violated the Establishment Clause because the BSA is a religious
organization and the city did not use a religion-neutral process in deciding
to lease the land to the BSA.25
Although the city leases public land to other non-profit entities, the
leases here resulted from exclusive negotiations with the BSA; other orga-
nizations were not allowed to compete for them."' No other organization
ever showed interest in replacing the BSA in these leases, but the court
249 Letter from Capt. Samuel Southard (date omitted) (quoted in Catherine Bowman,
S.F Freezes Funds forSalvation Army, S.F CHRON., Jan. 3, 1996, at A13).
250 See Steven A. Chin, Shelter OK'dAfter No-Gay Bias Pledge, S.E EXAMINER, Jan. 17, 1996,
at A3; Editorial, Fund The Salvation Army, S.F CHRON., Jan. 5, 1996, at A22.
251 See Editorial, Fund the Salvation Army, S.F CHRON., Jan. 5, 1996, at A2z.
252 Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of Am., 275 E Supp. 2d 1259, 1266-76 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
The court found no violation of the equal protection clause or of state common law. Id. at
128o-87.
253 Id. at 1274.
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found that fact insufficient to make the leasing process religion-neutral be-
cause "[t]he burden ... was on the City to take affirmative steps to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation by making the lease available to the reli-
gious, areligious and irreligious on a neutral basis."1 4 The court concluded
that "[a] reasonable observer would most naturally view" these actions "as
the City's endorsement of the [BSA] because of its inherently religious
• ,,255
program and practices.
This conclusion is astonishing. Although religion is part of the Scouts'
program, it is better known, and rightly so, for promoting outdoor activi-
ties, practical skills, personal responsibility, and teamwork. The city never
refused similar treatment to an organization that supported these activities
but eschewed the Scouts' religious attitudes. Rather, the city leased other
tracts to a variety of organizations. The city also required the BSA to ad-
mit others to the leased land, except when the BSA was using it, without
discrimination based on, among other things, religion and sexual orienta-
tion."' For all these reasons, no one could reasonably construe the city's
leases as endorsing the Scouts' religious beliefs.
The court in Barnes-Wallace also rejected the BSA's claim that cancella-
tion of its leases would constitute viewpoint discrimination forbidden by
the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia."' The court said Rosenberger requires viewpoint neutrality only for
a general program supporting expressive activity, which San Diego did not
have. 5 The court added in dictum:
Defendants' argument would fail even if the City decided not to lease the
parkland to the [BSA] because of its discriminatory membership policy. The
government's decision to exclude organizations with discriminatory mem-
bership policies is viewpoint neutral when the purpose for the decision is
to protect persons from the effects of discrimination and not to exact a price
for the organization's protected expression.Z9
This position is so extreme that one wonders whether the judges gave any
thought to what they said. Almost all religions have moral standards that
members are exhorted to follow. If Barnes-Wallace means what it says, all
these religions are guilty of heinous discrimination. Must the city then bar
all from its facilities if it bars any, or can it indulge in its own discrimina-
tion, deciding which faiths are good and which are evil? Can (or must) it,
254 Id. at 1275.
255 Id. at 1276.
256 Id. at 1264.
257 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
258 Barnes-Wallace, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-88.
259 Id. at 1288. On this point the court relied on Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Wyman, discussed
supra at notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
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for example, bar Jews because they believe they are God's chosen people
and others are not?
The question whether Scouts' have a constitutional right to access to
government facilities was directly presented in Evans v. City of Berkeley,' 60
in which the Sea Scouts challenged the city's termination of their use of
a city marina because the Scouts' discriminate against homosexuals and
atheists. The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the suit. It held that Berkeley's requirement that a group receiving free
marina berths agree "to administer its program without invidious discrimi-
nation did not infringe on plaintiffs' speech or associational rights."' 6' The
court noted that the city had not forbidden the Scouts to discriminate but
had merely denied a subsidy, and that the Supreme Court "has generally
approved against First Amendment challenges programs of governmental
financial assistance that limit the expressive activities for which the funds
may be used."
' 2
62
This decision may correctly interpret Supreme Court rulings, but it is
still disturbing. Although the city's policy technically applies to conduct,
not speech, it clearly puts the city on record as materially assisting one side
in a major cultural dispute-a dispute involving religion. By the court's
reasoning, the city could presumably deny benefits to religious organiza-
tions that admit only men into the priesthood. In effect, the city officially
denounced traditional Judaism and Christianity.
The court also rejected the Scouts' claim that they met the city's rule
because in fact they did not discriminate against gays and promised to
obey all applicable laws; they resisted only the city's demand that they
explcitly "state a policy that the group would not, in the future, discrimi-
nate." Again, the decision may properly apply Supreme Court precedent.
Although the state cannot compel speech by criminal sanctions, under Ev-
ans it can condition a benefit on an oath to ignore the tenets of one's reli-
264gion.
This case involves no monopoly or unique resource; the Scouts and
groups with different principles could all use the city's marina. By virtue
of Dale, the city could not fine the Scouts' $100 for their practices, but the
city could lavish subsidies worth thousands of dollars on competing groups
while denying that benefit to the Scouts. This allows government to wound
or destroy viewpoints it dislikes. Accordingly, these cases differ from those
in which the state deploys its own speech to favor one side of a debate.
26o Evans v. City of Berkeley, 129 P.3d 394 (Cal. 2oo6).
z61 Id. at 400. The Scouts were free to use the marina if they paid the fee charged to
other users who did not qualify for the subsidy. Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 398.
264 For this principle the court cited Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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Even if the Constitution permits such material discrimination, it is unfor-
tunate that governments engage in it.
A more reasonable decision is Boy Scouts of America v. Till. The Bro-
ward (Florida) County School Board denied the Scouts after-hours use
of public school facilities that are routinely granted to non-profit groups
under a rule barring discrimination based on, inter alia, sexual orientation.
In granting the Scouts a preliminary injunction the court noted that the
school board "concedes that ... it has created a limited public forum"2 66 in
which the Board could not "discriminate against speech on the basis of its
viewpoint." ' The court denied the Board's claim that this was not a "lim-
ited public forum" because the Scouts draw their members partly from the
168
school's student body and its leaders partly from the school's teachers.
The Scouts are now assured equal access to public schools by the Boy
Scouts of America Equal Access Act. 69 Congress and state legislatures
should enact more such laws to protect expressive associations from dis-
crimination by local governments.
E. Students in Public Educational Institutions
No terrain is more eagerly sought by gay activists than public schools and
universities.70 In many cases they have instituted programs to condone
homosexuality even for the youngest students."' In some cases these pro-
grams expressly disapprove traditional religious attitudes toward homo-
sexuality. One university department issued a policy statement that "[ilt
265 Boy Scouts of America v. Till, 136 F Supp. zd 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
266 Id. at 13o8.
267 Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 5o8 U.S. 384, 392-
93(1993)).
268 Id. at 1310. In Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority ("PSTA"), 344
E3d 1263 (i ith Cir. 2003), the PSTA refused to sell advertising space to Focus on the Family,
an evangelical organization, to announce its forthcoming convention with the words "Love
Won Out: Addressing, Understanding and Preventing Homosexuality in Youth." The trial
court dismissed on standing grounds; the court of appeals reversed. The parties then settled,
with PSTA agreeing to post an amended ad. See Press Release, Liberty Counsel, Focus on the
Family Settles Lawsuit Allowing it to Advertise Pro-Family Conference on Bus Shelters (Oct.
13, 2004), http://www.lc.org/pressrelease/2oo4/nrIo13o4.htm. This case should be governed
by the principle that government cannot discriminate based on viewpoint when it creates a
limited open forum. See infra note z82 and accompanying text.
269 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7905 (West 2006).
270 See STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS (1993); Midge Decter, Homosexuality
and the Schools, COMMENT., Mar. 1993, at 19.
271 A New York City Board of Education manual instructs first grade teachers to give
children "actual experiences via creative play, books, visitors, etc." so that they will "appreci-
ate" gays. BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF N.Y., CHILDREN OF THE RAINBOw: FIRST GRADE 372
(i991) (quoted in Duncan, supra note 7, at 414 n.78).
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
is simply not acceptable for social workers to view homosexual people as
perverse or as sinners .... It is not OK in this case to 'love the sinner and
hate the sin."'" Some policies virtually promote homosexuality to teenag-
ers, who are often baffled about their own sexuality. 73 Some religious rights
grou s are appealing to allow the voicing of traditional views of homosexu-
ality. The following discusses some specific issues that have arisen in
public schools and colleges.
1. Student Organizations.-Courts have divided on whether faith-based stu-
dent organizations may exclude from leadership positions, or from mem-
bership altogether, students who reject the organization's religion. In Alpha
Iota Omea Christian Fraternity v. Moeser 75 and in Christian Legal Society v.276. ... ..
Walker, courts preliminarily enjoined universities from enforcing similar
rules against Christian fraternities. A suit by the Christian Legal Society
challenging a similar rule was rendered moot when the school agreed to
change its rule and recognize the CLS chapter.177 In Christian Legal Soci-
ety Chapter of the University of California v. Kane,17 the court rejected the
Society's Establishment Clause, due process, and equal protection claims
against a similar rule. However, the court did not address the Society's
charge that the rule violated its freedoms of speech and expressive associa-
tion.
Under Dale these should be easy cases.279 The student groups are clear-
ly expressive associations. Admitting people who reject the faith that is
the organization's raison d'etre would distort its message at least as much as
272 Maura Lerner, St. Cloud State's Department Statement on Gays Causes Backlash,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 1, 1993, at 9A. Criticism of this statement resulted in only a
minor change. Id.
273 In a "role reversal" exercise, tenth graders at Framingham (Ma.) High School were
asked: "Is it possible you are heterosexual because you fear the same sex? If you have never
slept with someone of the same sex, how do you know you wouldn't prefer that? Is it possible
you merely need a good gay experience?" Richard E Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the
Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor a "Homophobe"?, Io NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
PoL'Y 587, 600 n. 68 (1996) (citation omitted).
274 Liberty Counsel is one of these groups. Its activities are described at its web site,
http://www.lc.org.
275 Alpha Iota Omega Christian Fraternity v. Moeser, No. Civ. 1:o4CVoo765, 2005 WL
1720903 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2005).
276 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 E3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
277 See Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Victory for Religious Freedom at
Ohio State, Oct. 4, 2004, available at http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/4895.html.
278 Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-4484 JSW, 2005
WL 850864 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2005).
279 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972),
in which the Supreme Court held that a public university's refusal to grant student organiza-
tion status to Students for a Democratic Society violated the members' First Amendment
right of association.
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would the appointment of a gay assistant scoutmaster in Dale. These are
not mass organizations like AARP or AAA with thousands of uninvolved
members whose identities and beliefs are largely irrelevant. Frequent fel-
lowship in a small group based on shared faith is a central purpose of most
of these societies. Admitting members who deny their creed would largely
destroy this activity.
Rules forbidding discrimination based on religion or sexual orientation
may be proper for most nonreligious school groups since these character-
istics are irrelevant to the purposes of these groups."" To apply such rules
to religious groups, though, imposes an orthodoxy of thought; the school
declares that forming a group based on religious belief is wrong. This is
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by university officials, who
should celebrate diversity of thought."] Other student organizations may
exclude those who reject their beliefs; a vegetarian society may exclude
carnivores. Only religious groups are forbidden to limit their membership.
Public universities may not so discriminate."' Although unnecessary to
the constitutional analysis, note that rules against religious discrimination
are especially threatening to minority beliefs. If compelled to admit those
who reject their faith, societies of religious minorities could be disrupted or
overwhelmed by outsiders.28
3
Rules barring discrimination based on sexual conduct generate the same
problems since sexual morality is integral to most religious faiths. Again, if
the vegetarian society may exclude carnivores, a faith-based group commit-
ted to marital fidelity should be able to exclude adulterers and those who
condone adultery.'84
z8o An exception would be a society with a secular purpose that is incompatible with cer-
tain religious beliefs. A temperance group, for example, might legitimately exclude members
of faiths that make ceremonial use of alcohol.
z8I See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 578 (1995) (forbidding imposition of antidiscrimination law where "the ultimate
point of forbidding acts of discrimination toward certain classes is to produce a society free
of the corresponding biases."); Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University
Antidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations, I 8 H~Av. L. REV. 2882, 2892
(2005) (hereinafter "Leaving Religious Students Speechless").
282 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that
university could not exclude journals discussing issues from a religious perspective from a
system of subsidies for student journals to discuss public issues).
283 Although I am not aware of any case where this has happened to a religious group,
republicans once seized control of the Young Democrats at the University of Nebraska. See
Leaving Religious Students Speechless, supra note 281, at 2885 n.20 (citing Wendy Mott, College
Republicans Elected to Young Democrats' Offices, DAILY NEBRASKAN, Apr. 16, 1993, at i).
284 Rules against discrimination based on sexual orientation but not on sexual conduct
are acceptable to the many denominations that distinguish between the two. See infra notes
527-29.
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2. Individual Students.-In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, the Supreme Court decreed that public school students do
not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate." However, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,
the Court said "the constitutional rights of students in public schools are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."
'Z86
In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, the Court said students "cannot be punished
merely for expressing their personal views on the school premises ... un-
less school authorities have reason to believe that such expression will
'substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students."'" "The determination of what manner of speech
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with
the school board. '88 The Ninth Circuit has construed Hazelwood to allow
school officials to "suppress speech that is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly
offensive without a showing that such speech occurred during a school-
sponsored event or threatened to 'substantially interfere with the school's
work.'.. Other courts of appeals have limited suppression to speech that
is indecent.'9g
K-12 public schools have more leeway to restrict speech than do public
•. 291
universities. This makes sense; school attendance is mandatory at the
K-12 level, and K-12 students are less mature and less able to avoid or to
cope with unwanted or offensive speech than are university students. The
precise boundaries of the schools' authority and, correspondingly, of the
rights of students and teachers, is worked out in individual cases.
Poway (California) School District decreed a Day of Silence, which stu-
dent Tyler Harper believed "endorsed, encouraged, subsidized and promot-
ed" homosexual activity.29 The court did not find that belief unreasonable.
285 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
286 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,682 (1986).
287 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. z6o, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
288 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
289 Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.zd 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
29o See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'l Bd., 307 F3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2002); Saxe v.
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 E3d zoo, zI6 (3d Cir. 2001).
291 In Fraser the Court said that public schools may bar "lewd, indecent, or offensive
speech and conduct ..." Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. The Court upheld the suspension of a stu-
dent who used "an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" in a student assembly.
Id. at 678. In Kuhlmeier the Court upheld suppression from a student newspaper of stories in
a journalism class about a student's pregnancy and divorce of a student's parents. The Court
said these were "school-sponsored expressive activities" and the actions were "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273. See generally HARVEY A.
SILVERGLATE ET AL., GUIDE TO FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 44-49 (zoo5).
292 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 E Supp.2d io96, i1OO (S.D. Cal. 2004)
(Harper I) (quoting plaintiff's complaint), aff'd, 445 F 3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (Harper II). A
school official said the purpose of the Day of Silence is to "'teach tolerance of others, particu-
larly those of a different sexual orientation."' Harper 1I, 445 F3d at 1171.
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Wishing to express his religious belief about "the Biblical condemnation
of homosexual behavior to others in his school and his community" on
that day, Harper wore a T-shirt with the words "I WILL NOT ACCEPT
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front and "HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY IS SHAMEFUL 'Romans 1:27"' on the back.193 The next day he wore
a T-shirt that read "BE ASHAMED" and "OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front and the same quote
from Romans on the back. Harper was sent to several school officials and,
finally, to the school's principal, who told him the T-shirt was "inflamma-
tory" and "too 'aggressive' and that wearing it would not be tolerated" at
the school.' 94 Harper refused to remove the shirt, so he was confined to the
principal's office for the rest of the school day.
Several school and government officials later spoke to Harper. A deputy
sheriff sporting a gun went "to determine if [plaintiff] was a dangerous stu-
dent." He "suggested plaintiff should 'not be offensive to others' because
the Christian faith is not based on hate and ... that the T-shirt was 'in-
flammatory' and 'could encourage uprising and violence against homosexu-
als."'' 95 A school vice principal told Harper that when he came to school he
must "leave his faith in the car."' 96 Harper refused, so he was ordered to
leave the school. 297
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. On
Harper's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 2-1, on different grounds.
It held that the school could bar Harper's t-shirt because it would "impinge
upon the rights of other students"'  and was "[s]peech that attacks high
school students who are members of minority groups that have historically
been oppressed."'299 The majority denied that the school could ban all "de-
rogatory" speech; it could not, for example, forbid the statement "'Young
Republicans Suck....,,,300 But it could bar statements critical of homosexu-
ality, which it characterized as "a core characteristic of particularly vulner-
able students ....
293 Harper!, 345 E Supp. 2d at i iop.
294 Id.
295 Id. at i o10 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
296 Id.
297 Id. at IO99.
298 HarperH, 445 F3d at 1177-78 (quoting Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F2d
524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch, Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969))).
299 Id. at 1 78. The trial court had denied Harper's motion because it could not decide
without extrinsic evidence whether his T-shirts were "plainly offensive" or disruptive. Harper
1, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1 105-o6.
300 Id. at 182.
301 Id.
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The majority conceded that the school's action was viewpoint discrimi-
nation but said it was not unconstitutional because schools may "'inculcat[e]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic politi-
cal system,"' 3 02 including tolerance, 303 "even if the message conflicts with
the views of a particular religion."'3 The majority maintained that schools
may not "restrict the non-invasive, non-disruptive expression of political
viewpoints . . ."3' but, as Judge Kozinski noted in dissent, it is unclear
how Harper could have expressed his view while satisfying the court in306...
that regard. Harper believes homosexuality is immoral and sinful. The
offending T-shirts said "Homosexuality is shameful." It does not seem that
any different phrase could have communicated his message and still meet
the majority's approval.
As Judge Kozinski noted further, the decision is more disturbing be-
cause Harper's action was not taken sua sponte but in response to the school's
sponsoring of the Day of Silence, a national effort to promote acceptance307
of homosexuality. Thus the school did not simply forbid all expression-
positive or negative-regarding homosexuality, nor did it simply suppress
one side of the debate. Rather it gagged one side while actively supporting
the other. Judge Kozinski noted the hypocrisy of taking such action in theS 308
name of promoting tolerance. Presumably, then, the school could also
actively condemn Christianity, Judaism, and Islam because of their stands
on homosexuality.
Other cases have barred school officials from banning student apparel
just because it bears a provocative message. In Tinker itself, the Supreme
Court upheld the right of a student to wear a black armband to protest
the war in Vietnam. Castorina v. Madison County School Board upheld the
right of a student to wear a T-shirt displaying Confederate flags and read-
.. ,310
ing "Southern Thunder." And Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools upheld
a student's right to wear a T-shirt with a photograph of President George
W Bush and the caption "International Terrorist." ' Again, Harper only
denied summary judgment because the threat of disruption depended on
specific facts. However, Harper's case is so strong on its face as to suggest
that the court denied relief simply because it disapproved of Harper's mes-
sage.
302 Id. at 19o, (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
303 Harper 11, 445 E3d at i 185.
304 Id. at I19o.
305 Id. at i 185.
306 Id. at 12o6.
307 Id. at I 196.
308 Id. at 1197.
309 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
310 Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F3d 536,539 (6th Cir. 2001).
311 Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., z86 E Supp.2d 847,849 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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A more sympathetic view of First Amendment rights prevailed in Han-
sen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools.31 In 2002 Pioneer (Michigan) High School
held a Diversity Week, as it had for at least ten years. The event included
several assemblies with panel discussions. The school's Gay/Straight Alli-
ance ("GSA') was authorized to present a panel on Religion and Homo-
sexuality. The GSA, wanting a panel that was "gay friendly, ' 31 3 chose "six
pro-homosexual adult clergy and religious leaders"31 4 despite the pleas of
plaintiff Betsy Hansen and several other students to include at least one
speaker to present an opposing view.
Instead Hansen was invited to give a two-minute speech at an assem-
bly beginning Diversity Week. However, she had to submit her speech in
advance for review by school officials who disapproved a statement that
"[slexuality implies an action, and there are people who have been straight,
then gay, then straight again. I completely and whole-heartedly support
racial diversity, but I can't accept religious and sexual ideas or actions that
,315
are wrong." School officials found this speech "objectionable because it
targeted an individual and groups, specifically homosexuals."
316
The court said that because the context was a school assembly, this was
not a case of individual freedom of speech controlled by Tinker. However,
since students were presented as stating their own opinions, neither was it
a case of "'government speech"' in which "it may make viewpoint-based
choices and choose what to say and what not to say., 317 Rather it was school-
sponsored speech, i.e., "[e]xpressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school."' 318 Therefore, the case was governed by Hazelwood School Dis-
trct v. Kuhlmeier.319 Under Hazelwood school officials may "exercis[e] edito-
rial control over the style and content of student speech ... so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. ' ' 3" This
standard still requires school officials to be "viewpoint-neutral."' 3Z, The Su-
preme Court has said that a school "may not discriminate based on the
11322
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates ....
312 Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F Supp.2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
313 Id. at 785.
314 Id. at 790-91.
315 Id. at 792.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 793. For a discussion of government-sponsored speech see infra notes 373-403
and accompanying text.
318 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 26o, 270-71 (1988).
319 Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 795.
32o Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
321 Hansen, 293 E Supp. zd at 797.
322 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
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The school officers in Hansen failed that standard both by restricting
Hansen's speech and by excluding traditional Judeo-Christian views from
the homosexuality and religion panel:
That Defendants can say with apparent sincerity that they were advanc-
ing the goal of promoting "acceptance and tolerance for minority points
of view" by their demonstrated in tolerance for a viewpoint that was not
consistent with their own is hardly worthy of serious comment. Suffice it to
say that inherent in this rationale is the premise that the [plaintiffs'] view
of homosexuality as a religious sin is not a minority view, or at least not a
minority view which should be tolerated. It strikes the Court that neither of
these premises are pedagogical concerns, but rather are political, cultural or• . 323
religious, or all three.
The court added that "the record is quite clear that Defendants' [motive]
was ... to insure that only one viewpoint was presented by the [homosexu-
.. . . . . 324
ality and religion] panel."
The court properly rejected defendants' argument that tolerating Han-
sen's statements would have frustrated their effort "'to provide a safe and
supportive environment for gay and lesbian students.•" Although a school
may foster a "safe" environment for all students, the court doubted it is
valid to foster a "supportive environment" for homosexual students. The
school may foster an equally "supportive environment" for all students, but
here the school promoted the view "that homosexuality and religion were
not incompatible" and overtly suppressed the view that "homosexuality was
sinful. ' This position is no more legitimate for public school officials than
taking sides in an election,"" or, since this case involves religion, endorsing
one religion over others.
The court held that defendants had violated plaintiffs' rights under the
Free Speech, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clauses. 318 It also de-
nied defendants' claims of qualified immunity from liability because "a
reasonable education official in their position would ... have understood
323 Hansen, 293 E Supp. 2d at 8O1-o2.
324 Id. at 803.
325 Id. at 802.
326 Id. at 8oi.
327 In Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.zd 628 (Mass. 1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.
o6o (1979), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court enjoined the city of Boston from
spending government money to influence voters to vote for a state constitutional amendment,
even though the city argued that it was acting to counter corporate spending on the other
side. There seem to be no Supreme Court cases on this issue, but that is only because there
have no cases presenting "a clear need for the Court to intervene to establish precise limits on
propaganda efforts by government agencies. JOHN NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.11, at 1 160 (7th ed. 2004).
328 Hansen, 293 F Supp.2d at 815.
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,329 . . .that their actions were unlawful. ... "." Plaintiffs sought only nominal dam-
ages, fees and costs, which the court awarded.
In the past, schools have denied claims of parental rights that would330
impede pro-homosexual school programs. In one case, the court denied
parents access to public schools to witness or record these activities. 331 This
is troubling. In effect, the school not only tells children their parents are
wrong if they hold traditional views about homosexuality; it also tells chil-
dren their religion is wrong if it holds such views. This activity probablyr
does not violate the parents' constitutional rights under current doctrine,
but it does violate our prevailing social norms about parental control.
One recent court decision may herald a change in the law here. Mont-
gomery County (Maryland) public schools adopted a curriculum stating:
"Religion has often been used to justify hatred and oppression .... Early
Christians were not hostile to homosexuals. Intolerance became the domi-
nant attitude only after the Twelfth Century."33 The federal district court
enjoined use of this curriculum, saying: "[t]he Court does not understand
why it is necessary, in attempting to achieve the goal of advocating tol-
erance and providing health-related information, that defendants must
offer up their opinions on such controversial topics as whether homo-
sexuality is a sin, whether AIDS is God's judgment on homosexuals, and
whether churches that condemn homosexuality are on theologically solid
ground.
334
3. University Speech Codes and Thought Control.33 -Most American universi-
ties now have codes that bar harassment based on, inter alia, race, sex, or
sexual orientation. These codes pose no problem if the term "harassment"
is properly defined. Unfortunately, most codes are so broad and vague that
they can be, and in some cases have been, wielded to punish constitution-
ally protected speech. When these prosecutions are challenged in court,
329 Id. at 814.
330 One school district denied parents' request for advance notice when the school as-
signed lessons promoting homosexuality. See Tracy Jan, Parents Rip School over Gay Storybook;
Lesson Reignites Clash in Lexington, BosToN GLOBE, Apr. 20, 2006, available at http://www.boston.
com/news/local/articles/2oo6/o4/2o/parents-rip-school-over-gay-storybookl.
331 See Jessica Fargen, Mom Ousted For Taping Gay Acceptance 'Lies', BOSTON HERALD, Dec.
16, 2004.
332 Parents generally have no right to withdraw their children from school activities that
teach children that their religion is wrong. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827
E2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), certdenied, 525 U.S. 1o66 (1988).
333 David French, Expelling God from the University, AcpA. QUESTIONS, Summer 2006, at
75, 82.
334 Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., No. Civ.A.
AW-o5-1 194, 2oo5 WL 1075634 (D. Md. May 5, 2005)
335 For an excellent discussion of university speech codes see SILVERGLATE ET AL., supra
note 291.
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the victims almost always prevail, but most of these codes remain on the
books and exert a chilling effect on students and faculty who might ques-
tion the politically correct creed on homosexuality.336
Some schools claim that they bar only "fighting words," which are not
constitutionally protected. However, "fighting words" are narrowly defined
not "in terms of what a particular addressee thinks," but as "words likely
to cause an average addressee to fight," words that "have [the] characteris-
",337tic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace.
They must be words that would objectively tend to provoke a fight and
be directed at an individual who reasonably might fight. Speech cannot
be forbidden as "intimidation" unless it conveys a clear threat of bodily
harm."'
In UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, the
university argued in defense of its ban on "racist" speech that it is "un-
derstandable to expect a violent response to discriminatory harassment,
because such harassment demeans an immutable characteristic which is
central to the person's identity. '340 The court struck down the code. It con-
ceded that some racist statements are fighting words, but not all; the code
was unconstitutionally broad.34' The "fighting words" justification for aca-
demic speech codes has failed in every court in which it has been made.34'
"Discriminatory harassment" is also not protected by the First Amend-
ment. Indeed federal law requires colleges and universities to prohibit
such conduct. 4 However, many schools cynically distort this law to impose
codes that are unnecessarily broad and infringe free speech. Like "fighting
words," "discriminatory harassment" is narrowly defined by the Supreme
Court. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Court said that, in
the academic context, harassment must be so "objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or ben-
efit."3"
336 See infra note 353-61 and accompanying text.
337 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,573 (1942).
338 See infra note 359 (discussing Brandenburg v. Ohio).
339 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
340 UWM Post v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1173 (E.D.
Wis. i99 I) (quoting Defendant's Combined Brief).
341 Id.
342 See id.; see also Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F3d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995);
Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853,872 (N.D. Tex. 2oo4) (finding that university's speech
code "would suppress substantially more than threats, 'fighting words,' or libelous statements
that may be considered constitutionally unprotected speech").
343 20 U.S.C. § j681(a) prohibits sex discrimination in higher education and in public
schools. Moreover, discriminatory harassment on any ground is not protected by the First
Amendment, so schools may constitutionally forbid harassment on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.
344 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,633 (1999).
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The requirement that the conduct be "objectively" offensive is crucial;
it means that harassment does not occur simply because a hypersensitive
person takes offense, or claims to do So. Conduct that is merely rude
or unpleasant does not meet this test; the "conduct must be extreme...
346 In academia rough debate is allowed, even encouraged. To constitute
harassment, speech must be intended solely to harass someone, not to ad-
dress an academic issue. Even deliberate ridicule of someone's public be-
havior cannot be treated as harassment. 4 7 The Department of Education's
Office of Civil Rights has said:
Harassment .... to be prohibited by the statutes within OCR's jurisdic-
tion, must include something beyond the mere expression of views, words,
symbols or thoughts that some person finds offensive. Under OCR's stan-
dard, the conduct must also be considered sufficiently serious to deny or
limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the educational345
program.
The demand that conduct "effectively bar ... the victim's access to
an educational opportunity or benefit" is significant. Rarely does a single
statement satisfy this condition. Also, to constitute harassment, speech
must be directed at an individual, not at a wider group. Even in the more
restrictive workplace context, "'mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epi-
thet which engenders offensive feelings' is not harassment. 49 Conduct
that is "merely offensive" is not enough if not severe or pervasive)5 0 In
academia, conduct must be "serious enough to have the systemic effect of
denying the victim equal access to an educational program or activity.
3 sl
Because many schools improperly claimed that federal law demands
broad speech codes, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") for the Depart-
ment of Education, which administers laws against discriminatory harass-
ment, distributed a letter stating that "OCR's regulations and policies do
not require or prescribe speech, conduct, or harassment codes that impair
the exercise of rights protected under the First Amendment .... ." These
345 The Office of Civil Rights says its "standards require that the conduct be evaluated
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the alleged victim's position." Letter from
Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary, United States Department of Education's Office for
Civil Rights, Department of Education, July 28, 2003, at 2 [hereinafter "OCR Letter"], avail-
able at http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/5o46.hml.
346 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
347 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987) (holding a ribald parody consti-
tutionally protected).
348 OCR Letter, supra note 345, at 1-2.
349 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.zd 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1970).
350 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
351 Davis v. Monroe Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,652 (1999) (emphasis added).
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rules must be applied "in a manner that respects the legal rights of students
and faculty, including those court precedents interpreting the concept of
free speech." '
Virtually every university speech code subjected to judicial review has
been held unconstitutional. Some, like UWM Post,353 found the code too
broad in that it forbade protected speech as well as harassment. Others
cases found codes to be too vague; one could not determine with reason-
able precision what conduct these codes prohibit. As a result, these codes
"chilled" free speech; students and scholars had to refrain from protected
speech for fear they might be punished. Thus, in Doe v. University of Michi-354
gan, the court struck down a code that prohibited "discrimination and
discriminatory harassment" and speech "that stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual" or has the "effect of interfering with an individual's academic
efforts. 355
Speech codes have been wielded to silence criticism of homosexuality.
William Paterson University, a state school, found a student guilty of dis-
crimination and harassment and punished him for calling homosexuality
a "perversion" in a private response to a message from a faculty member
announcing the screening and discussion of a film described as "a lesbian
,356
relationship story." The university's action was unconstitutional. Fortu-
nately, it later rescinded the penalty.
Some schools have tried two other ploys to circumvent the First Amend-
ment. One is to label disfavored expression "hate speech." There is no
"hate speech" exception to the First Amendment. Unless they constitute
fighting words or discriminatory harassment, even explicit expressions of
hatred for a person or group are protected speech."' Nor can speech be
352 OCR Letter, supra note 345, at I.
353 See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
354 Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
355 See also Cohen v. San Bernardino Comm. Coll., 92 E3d 968 (9th Cit. 1996); Dambrot
v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., z8o E Supp.2d
357 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Booher v. Bd. of Regents, 2:96-CV-13 5 , 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404
(E.D. Ky. July 22, 1998); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Corry v.
Stanford Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Feb. 27, 1995). Cf. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist.,
24o F3d 200 (3d Cir. 2ooi) (high school case).
356 See Press Release, Foundation for Individual Rights in Education ("FIRE"), William
Paterson University Tramples Student's Constitutional Rights (July zo, 2oo5), http://www.the-
fire.org/index.php/article/61i19.html. The student's message to the professor asked that he not
be sent "any mail about 'Connie and Sally' and 'Adam and Steve....'These are perversions.
The absence of God in higher education brings on confusion. That is why in these classes the
Creator of the heavens and the earth is never mentioned." The professor said that the mes-
sage "sound[ed] threatening." FIRE is assisting the student.
357 See Wayne Parry, 'Harassment' Reprimand Dropped Against College Worker, AsSOcIATED
PRESS, Dec. 7, 2005, available at http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6555.html.
358 See SILVERGLATE ET AL., supra note 291, at 97-98. The same would be true of treating
protected speech as creating an intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 41-43.
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forbidden for inciting violence "except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."
The other ploy is to add a clause to a speech code stating that it does
not apply to speech protected by the First Amendment.3 These "savings"
clauses are intended to abort allegations of overbreadth on the theory that a
code cannot infringe protected speech if it specifically says that it does not
do so. These savings clauses are fatally vague.3 6 ' Affected persons can't be
sure how the First Amendment will apply in many situations, so to avoid
trouble, they must refrain from a broad range of speech.
The First Amendment also protects citizens from compelled speech or
..... 362-
submission to indoctrination. Some colleges force students to undergo
"diversity" or "sensitivity" training; this has become common in freshman
orientation programs. These programs are permitted if they merely inform
students about (constitutionally valid) campus rules on harassment. They
may be unconstitutional, however, if they "are aimed at forcing students to
change their minds or adopt officially sanctioned attitudes." Also invalid
is any requirement that a student approve some statement of beliefs or
agree to refrain from constitutionally protected speech.3
Speech in the university classroom is treated differently than speech
outside it. Colleges may demand a higher degree of civility in the class-
room, especially from instructors.36 This makes sense. Students in class are
a more captive audience than they are outside the classroom. Instructors
are paid to teach, which reasonably includes treating students civilly in
class. Accordingly, faculty may be held to a higher standard than students,
at least in the classroom. Here too, however, a school's power to restrict
speech is limited. Hardy v. Jefferson Community College366 ruled that a college
could not fire a professor for making offensive statements about women
and minorities that were germane to the subject of the course. And Silva v.
UniVersity of New Hampshire held that a university writing teacher could
not be fired for sexual harassment simply because he used sexually sugges-
tive phrases in the classroom.
359 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
360 See Silvergate et. al., supra note 291, at 72.
361 See LAURENCEIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § § 12-29 (2d ed. 1988).
362 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that public
school may not compel students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
363 SILVERGLATE ET AL., supra note 291, at 69.
364 See id. at 142.
365 See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F3d 8oo (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding discipline of profes-
sor who made offensive classroom remarks about women that were not pertinent to the topic
of the course).
366 Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 26o E3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001).
367 Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 E Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
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All these principles apply to both sides in the clash between religion
and the homosexual movement. Comments for and against religion and
comments for and against homosexuality must be treated alike.
4. Use of University Facilities and School-Subsidized Activities.-In Rosenberger368
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the university had a sys-
tem of funding student journals that discussed issues of public interest.
The university denied funds to a journal that discussed such issues from
religious perspectives, claiming that the denial was mandated by the Es-
tablishment Clause or, at least, was within the discretion of the university
in deciding what activities to fund. The Supreme Court rejected both ar-
guments. It said a school "may not discriminate based on the viewpoint
of private persons whose speech it facilitates .... 369 Accordingly, colleges
may not discriminate against student groups or activities because they are
religiously oriented or take a position on homosexuality of which the ad-
ministration disapproves. The same is true for the allocation of funds from
student activity fees.37°
Enforcing religious neutrality is difficult, though; administrators and
student governments disbursing school funds and student activity fees
have broad discretion in choosing which.activities to fund and how much
to give them so long as they are not shown to discriminate on the basis of
religion or of viewpoint. Even if those distributing funds have a discrimi-
natory motive, proving that motive may be impossible if they are clever
enough to offer a legitimate pretext for their discrimination."'
Access to facilities presents an easier case. So long as a facility is com-
monly available for student use and is not already committed, a student
group cannot be barred from using the facility on the same terms that apply
372
to other groups.
F Government Endorsement of Homosexuality
373
In the 1998 case of American Family Association, Inc. v. San Francisco, sev-
eral religious groups, including plaintiffs, placed a full-page ad in the San
Francisco Chronicle as part of a campaign called "Truth in Love." The ad de-
368 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-26 (I995).
369 Id. at 834.
370 See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2ooo).
371 Prior to Rosenberger, one lower court case had upheld a claim of non-neutral funding.
Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 Fzd 361 (8th Cir. 1988). In that case, however,
"the record [was] replete with evidence that the [funding body's] action was based on view-
point discrimination... " Id. at 366. Since Rosenberger and Southworth, funding bodies have
apparently been more careful either to be neutral or to disguise their motives.
372 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
373 Am. Family Ass'n v. San Francisco, 277 F3 d 1114, I 118-19 (9th Cir. 2002).
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clared that "Christians love homosexuals, but that 'God abhors any form of
sexual sin,' whether it is homosexuality, premarital sex or adultery." It said
further "we've had a hand extended [,] ... an open hand that offers healing
for homosexuals, not harassment," and that Christian groups want to help
people to reject self-destructive behavior.3 74
Soon after, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors sent plaintiffs a let-
ter that read:
Supervisor Leslie Katz denounces your hateful rhetoric against gays, les-
bians and transgendered people. What happened to Matthew Shepard is
in part due to the message being espoused by your groups that gays and
lesbians are not worthy of the most basic equal rights and treatment. It is
not an exaggeration to say that there is a direct correlation between these
acts of discrimination, such as when gays and lesbians are called sinful and
when major religious organizations say they can change if they tried, and the
horrible crimes committed against gays and lesbians.375
The City and County of San Francisco also adopted two resolutions. One
condemned the murder of a gay man, Billy Jack Gaither, and "call[ed] for
the Religious Right to take accountability for the impact of their long-
standing rhetoric denouncing gays and lesbians, which leads to a climate of
mistrust and discrimination that can open the door to horrible crimes such
as those committed against Mr. Gaither."
376
The second resolution condemned "anti-gay" television advertise-
ments, specifically mentioning plaintiffs. The resolution said this campaign
"promote[s] an agenda which denies basic equal rights for gays and lesbi-
ans and routinely state[s] their opposition to toleration of gay and lesbian
citizens." Further, "the vast majority of medical, psychological and socio-
logical evidence supports the conclusion that sexual orientation can not be
changed" and that contrary statements like those in the Chronicle ad are
"erroneous and full of lies." The resolution also said that suggestions that
gays or lesbians are "immoral and undesirable create an atmosphere which
validates oppression of gays and lesbians" and abets their mistreatment. It
then exhorted "local television stations not to broadcast advertising cam-, , ,377
paigns aimed at 'converting' homosexuals."
Plaintiffs sued, claiming violations of the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses and a hybrid free exercise-free speech claim. The district
court dismissed all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. Applying the378
Lemon test to the Establishment Clause claim, the court found that:
374 Id. at i i 19.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 1120.
378 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61 2-13 (1971).
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although the letter and resolutions may appear to contain attacks on the
Plaintiffs' religious views, in particular that homosexuality is sinful, there is
also a plausible secular purpose in the Defendants' action-protecting gays
and lesbians from violence-and that therefore the Plaintiffs could not state
319
a claim under the secular purpose prong.
As to the "primary effect" prong of Lemon, the court said that the state-
ment in the first resolution "calling 'for the Religious Right to take ac-
countability for the impact of their long-standing rhetoric denouncing gays
and lesbians' . . . appears to be more of an afterthought and any disparage-
ment of the Religious Right is not the primary effect of the resolution.
38 0
However:
The other resolution and the letter to the Plaintiffs present a closer question.
These documents are directly aimed at the Plaintiffs and both documents
contain statements from which it may be inferred that the Defendants are
hostile towards the religious view that homosexuality is sinful or immoral.
Nonetheless, we believe the district court properly concluded that this was
not the principal effect of the Defendants' action. The documents, read in
context as a whole, are primarily geared toward promoting equality for gays
and discouraging violence against them .... [O]ur job is not to question the
validity of the Defendants' assumptions or the wisdom of their correspond-
ing actions; rather, it is to determine the constitutionality of those actions.
We believe a reasonable, objective observer would view the primary effect
of these documents as encouraging equal rights for gays and discouraging
hate crimes, and any statements from which disapproval can be inferred
only incidental and ancillary.31
The court is right that it should not "question the validity of the De-
fendants' assumptions or the wisdom of their corresponding actions," but
it can and should question whether the facts show defendants' sincerity. 382
The letter and resolutions repeatedly accuse plaintiffs of abetting discrimi-
nation and violence against gays even though their ad proclaimed love for
homosexuals and called for "healing for homosexuals, not harassment." 383
The ad also expressed a desire to relieve homosexuals from the sexually
transmitted diseases (including AIDS) and alcohol and drug abuse that are
widespread among them.
3 4
379 Am. Family Ass'n, 277 F3d at 1121.
380 Id. at 1122.
381 Id. at 1122-23. The court found that the defendants' action did not create excessive
entanglement with religion. Id. at 1123.
382 Id. at 1122.
383 Id. at i i 19.
384 Id.
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Since defendants' characterization of the plaintiffs is totally at odds
with plaintiffs' statements, it is hard to believe that defendants' primary
purpose was to protect gays from violence and other harm. Plaintiffs' ads
also called adultery a sin, yet defendants did not accuse them of fomenting
violence against adulterers, as they presumably would have done if their
concern were to protect from violence those whose acts are called sinful.
More likely defendants intended to promote the homosexual lifestyle, to
curry favor with those who share that goal, and to demonize and intimidate
those who disapprove of homosexuality.
American Family Association also raises questions about the meaning of
primary purpose and primary effect under Lemon. Virtually any government
action intended and effective to promote or inhibit religion will also have a
plausible secular purpose and effect. Many atheists concede, for example,
that religion has desirable secular effects, like promoting obedience to law.
When government is accused of promoting religion, courts often seize on
any evidence of an intent to promote religion, or any effect to advance re-
ligion, as fatal. 385 Even assuming that protecting gays from violence and
other harm was one goal of defendants in American Family Association, de-
fendants were clearly hostile to plaintiffs' religion and sought to achieve that
goal by injuring plaintiffs' reputation and effectiveness. As Judge Noonan
said in dissent, a pronouncement by the city simply criticizing violence
against gays in general would not have conflicted with the plaintiffs' mes-
sage of "love for homosexuals." Thus, he continued:
To reach the plaintiffs, to strike at what the city perceived as a danger, the
city had to strike at the heart of the plaintiffs' religious belief, to focus on
their belief that the conduct they were trying to change was an offense to
God and to make that belief responsible for murder.386
Defendants denounced plaintiffs for treating homosexuality as "sin-
ful" and exhorted "the Religious Right" to "take accountability" for abet-
ting violence against gays. The majority's characterization of this attack on
plaintiffs' faith as "an afterthought" is incredible. As Judge Noonan said,
"It is difficult to think of a more direct attack., 387 The "First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and be-
385 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (finding that legislature's pur-
pose in creating separate school district was to promote the religion of a small sect dominant in
the new district, not to ease intergroup tensions; Court refused to credit claim that legislature
would have done the same for a non-religious group); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 47-49
(1985) (finding that legislature's purpose in mandating a moment of silence in public schools
was to promote religion); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (finding that legislature's
purpose in banning teaching of evolution in public schools was not to avoid strife but to pro-
mote religion).
386 Am. Family Ass'n, 277 E3d at 1127.
387 ld. at i i26.
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tween religion and nonreligion."3 8 But there is "no neutrality when the
government's ostensible object is to take sides."38 9 "[L]iberty and social
stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of
all citizens . . . ."90 By singling out plaintiffs and "the Religious Right" in
its statements, defendants scorned neutrality and took sides on the issue of
whether homosexuality is sinful. It is alarming that a government body can
wage such a campaign against a religion with impunity.
In their free exercise claim plaintiffs invoked the principle of Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v. City of Hialeah that "a law targeting religious
beliefs as such is never permissible., 39 The court in American Family As-
sociation found that principle inapplicable because "in this case, there is no
, , ,,32 .393
actual 'law' at issue." 92 As in Vernon, any chilling effect from defendants'
actions was insufficient to constitute a violation of free exercise. Limiting
the protection of free exercise to formal "laws," however, invites public of-
ficials to harass a disfavored faith by other means, as happened here.
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs' hybrid free exercise and free
speech claim. "[T]o make out a hybrid claim, a 'Free Exercise plaintiff must
make out a colorable claim that a companion right has been violated.
' '
,
394
The court denied that defendants had violated plaintiffs' free speech by
"prescrib[ing] an orthodoxy of belief on the subject of homosexuality ....
[P]ublic officials may criticize practices that they would have no constitu-
tional ability to regulate, so long as there is no actual or threatened imposi-
tion of government power or sanction." 95 Similarly, the court denied that
defendants had engaged in improper viewpoint discrimination because
they "have not imposed or even threatened any prohibitions or sanctions
for the Plaintiffs' viewpoint.
'
,
396
The court's finding of no "threatened imposition of government power
or sanction" is factually dubious. 397 Defendants urged "local television sta-
tions not to broadcast advertising campaigns aimed at 'converting' homo-
388 McCreary County. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at
104); see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 53; Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
389 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 86o; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 335 (1987) ("Lemon's 'purpose' requirement aims at preventing [government] ... from
abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in
religious matters.").
390 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 86o (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
718 (zooz) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
391 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
392 Am. Family Ass'n, 277 E3d at 1124.
393 See supra notes 19 1-205 and accompanying test.
394 Am.Family Ass'n, 277 F3d at 1124 (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F3d 1202, 1207 (9th
Cir. 1999)).
395 Id. at 1124-25.
396 Id. at 1125.
397 Id.
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,39839
sexuals." As in Okwedy v. Molinari,3" television stations would be rash not
to treat defendants' statement as a threat to withhold government busi-
ness and to encourage private entities to do likewise to stations that aired
the condemned message. Plaintiffs alleged that stations actually did reject
their ads "at least in part because of the resolution of the Defendants."
The majority ignored this allegation. Had it not done so, it could hardly
have upheld summary judgment.
The court's insistence on such a threat is also doctrinally questionable.
The court said all the cases plaintiffs cited "involve conduct beyond mere
criticism of speech by a governmental authority,"41 but the Supreme Court
has never said a threat of sanctions is necessary to a free speech claim.
Moreover, the court ignored that this case involves religion. Under this
court's standard, a government body can freely denounce a particular re-
ligion as false and evil. This certainly flouts the Supreme Court's declara-
tion that "the command of the First Amendment [is] that the Government
.. . ,,403
maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing rehgion.
This free exercise decision is even more troubling than Vernon. Assum-
ing there was real cause for concern about Vernon's job performance, defen-
dants were the only ones who could deal with it. By contrast, defendants'
action in American Family Association was unnecessary, even gratuitous; they
could have left the response to plaintiffs' campaign to private actions, which
the individual defendants could have supported in their individual capaci-
ties. Further, defendants in Vernon claimed to care only about Vernon's job
performance, not his religious beliefs. By contrast, defendants' action in
American Family Association specifically referred to plaintiffs' statements of
their beliefs about sin and morality.
Indeed, defendants' resolutions echo such odious vilifications of religion
as calling Judaism a "gutter religion." Those who spew such hate speech
can embroider their screeds with claims of secular relevance, like charges
that Islam is hostile to America and American values. In the Ninth Cir-
cuit, it seems, that is enough to constitutionally justify official hate speech
against a disfavored group.
398 Id. at i i 2o.
399 See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
400 AmFamily Ass'n, 277 F.3 d at I i27 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (quoting plaintiffs' com-
plaint).
401 Id. at i i24 (majority opinion).
402 Only one case cited by the court involved religion, and in that case the Supreme
Court upheld the claim that government had violated the First Amendment. Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (995).
403 Sch. Dist. ofAbington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
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G. Regulation of Expressive Associations
As shown by Dale and Hurley,404 "expressive associations" have a right to
communicate their message that may trump laws that hinder that right.
There are several questions about the scope of this right. First, what is an
"expressive association"? Dale and Hurley were easy cases on this point.
The sole purpose of the organization in Hurley was to conduct a parade
which the Court recognized was clearly expressive activity.405 As for Dale,
the Scouts' purpose is to cultivate the habits and morality of children-also
clearly expressive activity. The Court gave no general definition of "ex-
pressive association." The earlier case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees also
406
offers little guidance. As one scholar says, "[a]s the doctrine of freedom of
association has developed the examples are all the rules we have." 40 7
Some lower court cases address the issue. Circle School v. Pipper 8 held
that two private schools with an advertised mission to give students wide
freedom of choice in their education were expressive associations. Howev-
er, Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v. University of Pittsburgh409 held that a fraternity
was primarily a social club; it did not qualify as an expressive association by
a few minor acts of community service. A subsidiary question is whether
a for-profit entity can qualify as an expressive association. Supreme Court
decisions do not preclude such status, but so far no court has granted it.
A second question is when a law unconstitutionally interferes with the
message of an expressive association. In Board of Directors of Rotary Interna-
tionalv. Rotary Club of Duarte, the Supreme Court found that "the evidence
fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in
any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their various410
purposes." By contrast, in Dale the Court found that the forced inclusion
of Dale would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' message, but it did not
explain why the two cases were different. Presumably the difference is that
the position Dale sought as assistant scoutmaster was a leadership position
while mere membership in the Jaycees was not.411
404 See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
405 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
406 The Court simply noted that a "'not insubstantial part' of the Jaycees' activities con-
stitutes protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs." Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
407 James Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 68o (2002).
408 Circle Sch. v. Pippert, 381 E3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
409 Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3 d 435 (3d Cir. 2000).
41o Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) (internal
citations omitted). Similarly, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees the Court determined that the
Jaycees had "failed to demonstrate ... any serious burden on the male members' freedom of
expressive association" from having to comply with the relevant law by admitting women to
its membership.. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
411 The Court in Dale did not expressly say that Dale sought a leadership position, but it
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In Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of America v. City of Chicago Com-
mission on Human Relations, the BSA denied G. Keith Richardson a job
because he was an avowed homosexual. The court reversed and remanded
the Commission's finding that the BSA had violated an ordinance barring
discrimination based on sexual orientation because "the Commission has
made no specific factual finding as to whether Richardson was seeking a
nonexpressive position that does not abridge the Dale decision., 413 This
seems a sensible synthesis of Dale and Roberts, but it still leaves the difficult
line-drawing question of what is an expressive position.
In Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown
University, a gay student group denied use of school funds and school
facilities by Georgetown University, a Catholic institution, sued the school
under a law forbidding discrimination by educational institutions on the
basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation.4 1  Acknowledging that the university
was an expressive association, the court held that the university must grant
the gay group equal benefits but need not grant it official recognition since
the former did not constitute expression but the latter did.
Neither Hurley nor Dale involved distribution of funds, so Gay Rights Co-
alition may still be good law despite those later Supreme Court decisions.
However, both Hurley and Dale held that the mere inclusion of avowed
gays in defendants' activities would impair their message. Granting the
Gay Rights Coalition school funds and facilities seems at least as great an
intrusion on expression, so the better view is that Gay Rights Coalition is now
overruled.
If a law substantially trammels the message of an expressive association,
the law cannot apply unless the government shows a compelling interest in
its imposition that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. 41 6 Hurley
and Dale do not define compelling interest, but they give short shrift to the
states' claims, which suggests that the Court did not believe that the state
had a plausible case. That seems right if consideration is limited to the tan-
gible stakes; participation in the holiday parade and service as an assistant
scoutmaster involved no money and no other apparent material benefits.
referred to the BSA's policy regarding "Scout leaders," Dale, 530 U.S. at 655; and to the "mes-
sage" sent by "[tihe presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant
scoutmaster's uniform," id. at 655-56.
412 Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. City of Chicago Comm'n on Human
Relations, 748 N.E.2d 759 (III. App. Ct. 2001).
413 Id. at 768.
414 Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.zd I
(D.C. 1987) (en banc).
415 The ordinance did not exempt religious institutions. Georgetown is not a public uni-
versity so it is not subject to a First Amendment duty of viewpoint neutrality under Rosenberger
and Southworth. See supra notes 368-72 and accompanying text.
416 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The symbolic importance of those stakes may be high. Irish ethnic-
ity is valued in Boston, and the Boy Scouts are one of America's most re-
vered institutions. Their symbolic importance understandably attracts the
government's interest, but government regulation could interfere with the
expressive association's very purpose for existing. Forbidding discrimina-
tion against homosexuals in a large, lucrative company might be a compel-
ling state interest, but such a company would be unlikely to qualify as an
expressive association whose message would be substantially impaired by
having to treat homosexuals equally. In other words, it seems unlikely that
forbidding discrimination against homosexuals by expressive associations
could ever be a compelling state interest.
In Boy Scouts of America v. District of Columbia Commission on Human
Rights,4 ' the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("HRA") forbid dis-
crimination based on, inter alia, sexual orientation in "any place of public
accommodation. 41 8 In 1992 Roland Pool and Michael Geller were denied
positions as scout leaders in the Boy Scouts ("BSA").
Pool and Geller complained to the District of Columbia Department
of Human Rights and Minority Business Development, which was later
renamed the Office of Human Rights ("OHR"), accusing the BSA of vio-
lating the HRA. The OHR upheld these complaints. It distinguished Boy
Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale41 9 on the ground that:
admitting Geller and Pool as leaders would not significantly burden [the
BSA's] expression because-unlike the respondent in Dale-neither [Geller
nor Pool] was "a gay activist": no evidence suggested that either "would ad-
vocate homosexuality as a BSA adult leader" or "would ... send messages
about homosexuality or its lifestyle" just by occupying such a position. "Be-
cause Mr. Geller and Mr. Pool are not advocating any particular message,"
the [Commission] concluded, "their inclusion into an adult leadership posi-
tion would not infringe upon BSA's core message. 4 0
Further, rejecting the BSA's own professions, the OHR held that "opposi-
tion to homosexuality is not 'the [BSA's] viewpoint.'
41 1
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that this
case could not be distinguished from Dale and that application of the HRA
here would violate the BSA's right of expressive association. First, the Su-
preme Court in Dale accepted the BSA's assertion "that it does not want
to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior., 42 The
417 Boy Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192 (D.C. zooz).
418 D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(a) (2oo6).
419 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (zooo).
42o D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 809 A.zd at 1196.
421 Id. at i 2oo.
422 Dale, 530 U.S. at 641.
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court here said that "[aibsent a demonstrated change in the Boy Scouts'
'official position'... nothing in Dale suggests that a different tribunal may
consider other evidence and define the [BSA's] viewpoint differently
S.,,43 As to alleged personal differences between complainants here and
the respondent in Dale, the court said that the Supreme Court's meaning
in calling the latter a "gay activist" was unclear but, "[aIpplying whatever
measure of 'activism' the Supreme Court fairly can be said to have intend-
ed, Geller and Pool cannot meaningfully be distinguished from Dale.
42 4
Although the court reached the right decision, it is unfortunate that it
did not issue a more categorical statement about the scope of the right of
expressive association. The Supreme Court in Dale demanded "deference
to an association's view of what would impair its expression .... That is not
to say that an expressive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimi-
nation laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a
particular group would impair its message."425 The Court apparently means
that an association's claim of impaired expression may be rejected only if it
is clearly insincere, an obvious sham, a transparent pretext. Otherwise, its
own characterization of its viewpoint must be accepted.
Religious organizations and non-profit colleges are generally exempt
from federal income taxes. However, in Bob Jones University v. UnitedS 426
States, the Supreme Court upheld revocation of the tax exemption of a
religious university because it discriminated on the basis of race in contra-
vention of public policy. The school did not discriminate in its admissions
or academic program, but it forbade interracial dating.47 Most Americans
would not endorse this policy, and the school later retracted the rule. The
state could certainly deny the school public funds because of this rule.
However, the impact of the dating rule is minor. There is little interracial
dating on most campuses, and African-American students have sought and
obtained separate housing and social institutions at many colleges. None-
theless, the Supreme Court found the rule so heinous as to merit denial of
a tax exemption, which might threaten the school's survival.418
No religious organization or school has lost a tax exemption because of
discrimination against homosexuals, but gay activists will push such action
if they get a sympathetic White House. In that case, Bob Jones could be
distinguished. The Court there found the school's claim for an exemption
based on sincere religious beliefs was outweighed by the Government's
"fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
423 D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 8o9 A.2d at 1202.
424 Id. at 1202
425 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
426 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
427 Id. at 58o-8i
428 Id. at 603, 605
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education ....,,4'9 This conclusion is supported by the unique enormity
of racial discrimination in American history and its specific tie to educa-
tion; keeping African-Americans ignorant was central to their subordina-
tion. Discrimination against homosexuals is not of equal magnitude, and it
has little to do with discrimination by schools or other tax-exempt institu-
430
tions. Accordingly, the balancing that warranted denial of the tax exemp-
tion in Bob Jones should favor retention of the exemption in cases involving
homosexuality rather than race.
The Supreme Court also construes the Equal Protection Clause to
forbid state governments to render "tangible financial aid [which] has a
significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private [racial]
discrimination. 4 11 Homosexuality is not a suspect class under the Equal
431Protection Clause, so this principle does not apply to government aid to
organizations that discriminate on that basis.
433
H. Criminal Law
1. Federal Law.-Federal law does not define any crime in terms of sexual
orientation. Howeverm the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Preven-
434
tion Act of 2007 is currently pending in the House of Representatives.
429 Id. at 604. The necessity for such a balancing should survive Employment Division
v. Smith because the school makes a hybrid claim entailing not only free exercise of religion
but also freedom of association. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing hybrid
claims).
430 The theological treatment of homosexuality by traditional religions is socially sig-
nificant. See infra notes 520-22 and accompanying text. However, in Bob Jones the issue was
the school's behavior, not its theology, and presumably that would also be true in future cases.
Even Smith protects a church's right to maintain its theology:
[T]he First Amendment obviously excludes all "governmental regula-
tion of beliefs as such." The government may not compel affirmation of
religious belief, punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes
to be false, impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or
religious status, or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies
over religious authority or dogma.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (199 o ) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
402 (1963)) (citations omitted).
431 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,466 (1973).
432 See Rich v. Sec'y of Army, 735 Fzd i220, 1229 (ioth Cir. 1984); Hatheway v. Sec'y of
Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 6o8 Ead 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1979); NOWAK ET AL., supra note 327, § 14.3, at 702 ("The
Court has not found homosexual persons to be a group of persons who require special consti-
tutional protection.").
433 See Under 21 v. Koch, 65 N.Y.zd 344,364 (1985).
434 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 1 ioth
Cong. Identical legislation passed the House of Representatives in September 2005. See
Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, S. 1145, 1O9th Cong. (2005)
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If it becomes law, this act will allow federal prosecution for crimes based
on "actual or perceived" sexual orientation.435 It would also affect 4 36 the
Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, which requires the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to report statistics on hate crimes, including "intimidation. 437
If that happens, the FBI could treat a public religious statement calling
homosexuality a sin as an act of "intimidation." "Intimidate" means to
"make fearful, ' 438 and one purpose in calling conduct sinful is to deter that
conduct by instilling fear that the conduct displeases God. Unless such
statements constitute fighting words, they should be protected by the First
Amendment.439 However, the law could still have a serious chilling effect
since few people are willing to endure a criminal prosecution even if they
feel confident of final exoneration. Further, one can never be certain about
litigation, so there is always some risk of incurring criminal penalties.
Moreover, for government to declare statements about sin criminal hate
speech is important even if no indictment is sought. The homosexual move-
ment seeks to ostracize traditional religion, and government treatment of
religious doctrine as hate speech furthers that goal. However, gay activists
should consider that hate speech laws can easily be turned against them.
Gay activists often vilify traditional religionists as bigots and hate-mon-
gers. Such condemnations are meant to intimidate, and could be treated
as intimidation by law enforcement officials. In this and all culture battles
government should not denounce either side as "hate speech" except for
specific threats of pending violence.
2. State Law.-In Commonwealth v. Marcavage,44 five members of Repent
America, a Christian group, were arrested after a scuffle with gay activ-
ists during Outfest, a homosexual street fair in Philadelphia." They were
charged with misdemeanors for riot, criminal conspiracy, reckless endan-
germent, possessing an instrument of crime, highway obstruction, failure to
disperse, and disorderly conduct. 443 They were also charged with a felony
(passed as an amendment to Childrens' Safety Act of 2005, H.R. 3132, Io9th Cong. (2005)).
435 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 § 7.
436 Id. § 8.
437 Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 534 (zooo)).
438 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 605 (1975)
439 See supra note 335.
44o Seesupra notes 375-77 and accompanying text.
441 Commonwealth v. Marcavage, CP: 51-CR-o0131 1-2005 (Ct. Com. Pl., Crim. Div.,
Philadelphia County, Pa. Feb. 17, 2005).
442 Jason McKee, Judge Tosses Charges Against Marcavage, DELAWARE CouNTry DAILY
TIMES (Philadelphia, Pa.), Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://www.delcotimes.com/site/news.
cfm?BRD= 1675&dept-id= 18171&newsid= 1398 7075&PAG=461&rf:=9.
443 Commonwealth v. Marcavage, MC: 5 1-CR-1012661-200 4 (Philadelphia County
Mun. Ct., Pa. Oct. 11, 2004).
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under Pennsylvania's Ethnic Intimidation Law, which adds penalties to a
criminal act deemed a "hate crime." They faced sentences of up to forty-
seven years in prison. After seeing a videotape of the arrests, a trial judge
dismissed all charges. She said, "We are one of the very few countries that
protects unpopular speech .... We cannot stifle speech because we don't
want to hear it, or we don't want to hear it now.
The case breaks no new legal ground; it is a routine application of the
First Amendment. It is disturbing, however, that if the alleged crimes had
not been filmed, defendants might have been convicted and sentenced
to draconian jail terms. Moreover, although charges were finally dropped,
defendants incurred substantial costs and emotional distress for over four
months. They have now sued the authorities who caused their ordeal, 54
but these suits are hard to win, and even success there would not fully
compensate them for all they have suffered. Many civil libertarians oppose
hate crime laws precisely because they inevitably lead to such misguided
prosecutions. Again, if we are to have laws punishing "hate speech" at all,
they must be narrowly drafted to punish only specific threats of pending
violence.
L Raising Children
The Constitution gives parents a right to direct the raising of their children
. ~446 ..
so long as the children are not harmed. Laws that infringe this right are
subject to strict scrutiny and upheld only if "narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."4 7 Gay rights and religious freedom can clash
when persons with parental responsibilities disagree about the religious
training of the child concerning homosexuality. In In re E.L.M.C., an adop-
tive, custodial mother was sued by her former lesbian lover, who obtained
an order from the trial court against exposing the child to "religious up-
bringing or teaching... that can be considered homophobic."' 44s The appel-
late court vacated this order and directed the trial court to restrict the custo-
dial parent's control only to the extent that otherwise "the child's physical
health would be endangered or the child's emotional development signifi-
cantly impaired," as provided by the relevant state statute. Emotional
444 McKee, supra note 442.
445 Complaint, Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-05287 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
446 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (zooo); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-
33(972).
447 Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 214 (N.J. 2003); seealso In fr E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546,
552 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 441 (Conn. 2002); Blixt v. Blixt, 774
N.E.zd 1052, 1059 (Mass. 2002).
448 In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3 d at 548
449 Id. at 563-65 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-130(0) (Zoo6)).
[Woi. 95
GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
harm could include alienating the child from the non-custodial person with•.. 450
parental responsibilities.
The verbal standard enunciated by the court is wise. Problems arise
when, as here, the religious training would be critical of the sexuality of
the non-custodial person. Courts need to draw a fine line by allowing such
training in general terms while forbidding the personal vilification of the
non-custodial person. That distinction is consistent with traditional Chris-
tian and Jewish beliefs.451
III. RELIGIoUs FREEDOM IN PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
A. The Private Workplace
Title VII and statutes in most states forbid religious discrimination in em-
ployment. These laws generally require employers to "reasonably accom-4s2
modate" employees' religious practice or observance. Under Title VII,
this duty does not require employers to incur more than de minimis cost,453
but several states require more. These statutes may be invoked when
an employer demands behavior toward homosexuality that violates an em-
ployee's religious beliefs.
1. Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc.4 5-Evelyn Bodett supervised thirteen employ-
ees, including Kelly Carson, for Coxcom, Inc. in Phoenix. Carson was open-
ly gay, as Bodett knew. When they began working together Bodett told
Carson that homosexuality was against her Christian beliefs. Carson later
456
testified that she did not feel threatened or harassed by this comment.
Bodett later reiterated and expanded on these views, and she and Carson
prayed together in Bodett's office. Carson said this event "made [her] born
again." Carson also attended church with Bodett at least once and attended
a Women of Faith Conference with a ticket bought by Bodett.457
450 In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 563-64.
451 Related issues are adoption by and child custody with homosexuals and gay couples.
Although many people take positions on these issues based on their religious beliefs, adop-
tion and custody decisions are made by courts on the basis of the best interests of the child.
Consistent with the Establishment Clause, courts should be religiously neutral when making
these decisions. These issues are outside the scope of this Article.
452 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § zoooe(j) (2ooo).
453 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
454 See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Necessity of, and What Constitutes, Employer's
Reasonable Accommodation of Employee's Religious Preference Under State Law, 107 A.L. R.5th 623,
§ 5(b) (2003).
455 Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 E3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004).
456 Id. at 740
457 Id. at 741.
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In 2000, Carson accepted a job offer from Coxcom's Omaha office. Bo-
dett helped Carson get this job by coaching her on interview skills and giv-
ing her an excellent review. The new job was a promotion; Carson deemed• ,458
it "a good opportunity." Carson then told Mireille DeBryucker, Vice
President for Customer Care, she was leaving "because she was uncomfort-
able with the way Bodett had treated her sexuality." She claimed that in a
recent performance review Bodett had said "she would be disappointed if
Carson were dating another woman, but happy if she were dating a man.
She did not tell Bodett these comments made her uncomfortable or file a
complaint because "Bodett was her boss and she could not afford to lose
her job."46
DeBryucker discussed this matter with other officers and agreed that
the alleged statement violated Coxcom's Harassment Policy, which stated:
"No employee shall harass another employee on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability or veteran status."
At a meeting Bodett acknowledged the statements and was fired on the
461
spot.
The district court granted Coxcom summary judgment in Bodett's suit
alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. The court of ap-
peals affirmed. It noted that a Title VII claim of religious discrimination can
be substantiated by showing that other similarly situated employees were
treated more favorably. Bodett made no such showing. 46' Further, Coxcom
had a valid nondiscriminatory reason for firing Bodett because her state-
ments that she would be disappointed if Carson were dating another wom-
an "clearly fall within the gambit [sic] of harassment." 463 Bodett's claim of
discrimination because she was fired without first receiving a warning was
also rejected; "under Cox's policy there are circumstances where an em-
ployee could be fired without prior warning even though the usual process
involved a warning." 464
The decision is troubling in several respects. First, Coxcom's policy
did not forbid all harassment, only harassment on certain bases. Most of
the listed bases are not problematic, but the inclusion of sexual orienta-
tion gives pause. In the court's account, Bodett never said a word about
Carson's sexual orientation; she only commented on Carson's sexual con-
duct. 46 If Coxcom construed its policy to include sexual conduct, Bodett at
458 Id. at 741 n.6.
459 Id. at 741.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 741-42.
462 Id. at 743-44.
463 Id. at 744.
464 Id. at 745.
465 Most Christians do not view a homosexual orientation itself as sinful because it is
"not freely chosen." Set infra note 528.
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least deserved notice of that fact. Second, if the policy is so construed, that
is cause for concern. Most religions have moral codes that include sexual
conduct. Thus Coxcom's policy, while tolerating most forms of harassment,
forbids one form of harassment that has religious connections. This raises a
question whether such a policy in practice discriminates against religion.
Third, the case raises questions about the meaning of harassment. Nei-
ther Coxcom nor the court offered a definition. Bodett said she could tell
that one of her comments in the performance review made Carson "un-
comfortable," but surely that is not enough. Reasonable comments in or-
dinary discourse often make someone "uncomfortable." The court's opin-
ion here makes me uncomfortable on the basis of religion, but that does
not make it an act of harassment. Further, Bodett and Carson had prayed
and attended church together and Bodett had paid for Carson to attend
a conference and helped her get a promotion. Bodett reasonably thought
that she and Carson were friends. This also puts the instance of Carson's
discomfort in perspective; one element of friendship is the freedom to say
things that a stranger cannot say because they make the friend uncomfort-
able. Bodett had no reason to think her comments were harassment.
Fourth, Carson said she did not tell Bodett of her discomfort or file a
complaint because "Bodett was her boss and she could not afford to lose
her job." However, Carson never alleged that Bodett had ever mistreated
or discriminated against her or even hinted at doing so. On the contrary, she
admitted that Bodett had helped her win the promotion and was friendly
to her.468 This suggests that Carson merely feigned friendship with her
supervisor Bodett until she had wheedled from Bodett all she could get,
then maliciously charged her with harassment because she hated Bodett,
Bodett's faith, or both. In short, Carson's only possible basis for fear of mis-
treatment was her knowledge of Bodett's religious faith. But she and others
could have known of that without any comments by Bodett. Thus the case
raises the disturbing prospect that adherence to a faith that disapproves of
homosexuality may itself constitute harassment. Thus employees of firms
with policies like Coxcom's might feel constrained to hide their faith in
order to avoid termination for harassment.
Also troubling is the court's curt dismissal of Bodett's objection to being
fired without first getting a warning. The court conceded that a warning
was the "usual" practice but said there were exceptions to this practice. 46
Given the uncertainty about the meaning of "harassment" in Coxcom's
policy; Bodett's unblemished record as a Coxcom employee for eighteen
years; and the total lack of notice to Bodett that Carson felt harassed by
Bodett's statements, Bodett deserved a warning if Coxcom's officers had
466 Bodett, 366 F.3d at 745.
467 Id. at 741.
468 See supra note 458 and accompanying text.
469 See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
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acted in good faith. Their failure to issue a warning evinces callousness if
not animosity which may have been directed at Bodett's religious faith, as
her suit contended.
2. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard. 47 -- Hewlett-Packard Co. ("HP") dis-
played five "diversity posters" in its Boise facility. Each poster showed
an HP employee above the caption "Black," "Blonde," "Old," "Gay," or
"Hispanic."A second set of posters showed the same five employees and
gave a profile of the person and the slogan "Diversity is Our Strength."
Richard Peterson, an HP employee in Boise and a devout Christian, re-
sponded to this campaign by posting in his work cubicle three passages
from the Bible, some of which condemned homosexuality. These postings
were visible to persons walking in the adjacent corridor.
HP officers removed these passages under HP's harassment policy,
which said: "Any comments or conduct relating to a person's race, gender,
religion, disability, age, sexual orientation or ethnic background that fail to
respect the dignity and feeling [sic] of the individual are unacceptable."
When Peterson put the passages back up and refused to remove them,
he was fired.473 Peterson sued HP under Title VII, claiming religious dis-
crimination both by disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. The
district court granted HP summary judgment,474 and the court of appeals
affirmed. 475
Peterson claimed disparate treatment because HP's posters made him
as "uncomfortable" as the biblical passages made some others feel. 476 The
court said HP's posters were different because they were "intended to pro-
,477mote tolerance of diversity .... " Peterson also noted that others were
allowed to post religious and secular messages and symbols in their work
spaces and that a network group of homosexual employees were permit-
ted to advertise in HP's email and newsletter. The court said these were
. 478
different because they were not intended to be "hurtful." Peterson, by
470 Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
471 Id. at 6oi. The passages were from 2 Corinthians 10:12 (which does not refer spe-
cifically to homosexuality); Isaiah 3:9 ("[Tlhey declare their sin as Sodom, they hide it not.
Woe unto their soul! For they have rewarded evil unto themselves."); and Leviticus 2o:I3
("If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an
abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be put upon them."). Peterson,
358 F3d at 6oi-o2.
472 Id. at 602.
473 Id.
474 Id.
475 Id. at 6o8
476 Id. at 604.
477 Id. at 605.
478 Id.
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contrast, was "attempting to generate a hostile and intolerant work envi-
ronment," and his postings were "demeaning and degrading.
47 9
The court also denied Peterson's claim of failure to accommodate. He
refused to remove the biblical passages unless HP removed its "Gay" post-
er. An employer need not grant an accommodation that imposes "an undue
hardship." Removing the "diversity posters" would have created an "un-
due hardship" for HP "because it would have inhibited its efforts to attract
and retain a qualified, diverse workforce, which the company reasonably
views as vital to its commercial success .... [Ilt would have infringed upon
the company's right to promote diversity and encourage tolerance and good
will among its workforce." Letting Peterson post Bible passages "would
result in discrimination against his co-workers or deprive them of contrac-1 . ,482
tual or other statutory rights." The court added that an accommodation
does not create undue hardship "merely because the employee's co-work-
,413ers find his conduct irritating or unwelcome, but the employer need not
allow actions "that demean or degrade ... *,41
The opinion in Peterson is as deplorable as that in Bodett. As in Bodett,
despite its references to discrimination and to Peterson as "attempting to
generate a hostile and intolerant work environment," 48 s the court never says
Peterson actually discriminated against or was hostile or intolerant to any
co-worker. As a devout Christian, he probably tried to treat all fellow hu-
mans with love. In a poor choice of words, Peterson said the Bible passages
were "intended to be hurtful., 486 The court seized upon this statement but
ignored its context. Peterson promptly added, "the reason [they were] in-
tended to be hurtful is you cannot have correction unless people are faced
with the truth., 487 Like Evelyn Bodett, Peterson sought not to injure fellow
workers but, as he saw it, to help them to the path of salvation.
There are some differences in the two cases, though. First, the court
in Peterson did not even acknowledge the contradiction in HP's policy "to
promote diversity and encourage tolerance and good will among its em-
ployees" by silencing and tacitly condemning the many Americans who
are traditional Christians, Jews, and Moslems. Second, Peterson's acts were
arguably lower key and, therefore, less objectionable than Evelyn Bodett's.
Peterson was not a supervisor; he had no control he could wield to intimi-
date fellow workers. And he did not voice his views to anyone but merely
479 Id.
480 Id. at 606-07.
481 Id. at 607-08.
482 Id. at 607
483 Id.
484 Id. at 607-08.
485 See supra note 479 and accompanying text.
486 Peterson, 358 F3d at 602.
487 Id.
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posted them in his own cubicle; they could be completely ignored by oth-
ers.
Third, unlike the employer in Bodett, HP forbade not only harassment
but "[a]ny comments or conduct relating to a person's race, gender, religion,
or ethnic background that fail to respect the dignity and feeling of the indi-
vidual., 48 8 A duty to "respect" goes far beyond a duty to tolerate. Further,
Peterson posted biblical passages in his cubicle in response to HP's "Gay"
poster. The court said that "an employee's opposition to a policy of his
employer or his advocacy regarding a controversial public issue invokes
different considerations than his expressive activity intended to demean or
degrade co-workers."'489 This suggests that an employer may forbid workers
to reveal in any way that they are traditional Jews, Moslems, or Christians
since those faiths do not "respect" homosexuality. An employee might fear
that posting the Ten Commandments in his personal area could be taken
to "demean and degrade" atheists and polytheists (like Hindus) because of
the commandment "Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
3. Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband. 49 -AT&T Broadband fired Albert Bu-
onanno when he refused to pledge to comply with the employer's diversity
policy, which stated a "goal to build an environment that ... respects and
values individual differences. '49 Buonanno agreed not to discriminate, but
"he believed that some behavior and beliefs were deemed sinful by Scrip-
ture, and thus, that he could not 'value' that is hold in esteem or ascribe
worth to such behavior or beliefs without compromising his own religious
beliefs. ' 493 Unsure of the meaning of the policy, he asked for clarification
whether it "would require him to value, for example, a 'neo-Nazi skinhead's'• ,494 ,,
beliefs." The company's Human Resources Manager "refused to engage
in what she characterized as a 'philosophical debate"' and fired 
him.
Buonanno sued, claiming that AT&T Broadband failed to reasonably
accommodate his religious beliefs as required by Title VII. The court
acknowledged that an employer need not grant an accommodation that
causes "undue hardship." Here, though, "requiring all employees com-
pany-wide to 'fully recognize, respect and value that there are differences
488 Id. (emphasis added). A similar policy was imposed in Buonanno v. AT&TBroadband.
See infra notes 491-97 and accompanying text.
489 Peterson, 358 F 3 d at 605 n.5.
490 Exodus 20:3 (King James Version).
491 Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 313 F. Supp. 2d io69 (D. Colo. 2004).
492 Id. at 1074.
493 Id. at 1075.
494 Id. at 1076.
495 Id.
496 Id. at io8o (citing Thomas v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 255 F3d 1 149, 1156 (loth
Cir. 2000)).
[Voi. 95
2oo6-2007] GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
among all of us' would have 'accomplished [AT&T's] goals' as set forth
in the Diversity Philosophy, without imposing any apparent hardship on
AT&T". 7 Accordingly, the court ruled for Buonanno. This result is reason-
able both as public policy and as an interpretation of Title VII. It is only
disturbing that a branch of AT&T, a large, sophisticated company that does
business with millions of Americans, had to be dragged into a federal court
and told that it is legally obliged to offer such a minimal accommodation.
4. Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services, Inc. ("NMHS"). 498-Sandra
Bruff, a counselor for NMHS, refused to counsel a lesbian on her relation-
ship with her female partner because to do so would violate her religious
beliefs. She asked not to be assigned cases involving homosexuals or in-
dividuals having extramarital affairs. The defendant refused and offered
her a transfer, which she declined. She was then fired. The court affirmed
dismissal of her claim that NMHS violated its duty under Title VII to ac-
commodate her religion. The court accepted the claim of NMHS that ac-
commodating Bruff would "involve more than de minimis cost,"4 9 which is
all Title VII requires. The court cited as relevant facts the plaintiff's lack
of flexibility, "the [small] size of the [employer's] staff, the area covered
by the program and the travel involved, and the nature of psychological
counseling incorporating trust relationships developed over time. Given
these facts, the holding seems correct. However, it is troubling that reli-
gious discrimination can be excused by de minimis cost when other forms of
discrimination require much higher standards of justification.0 1
B. Private Colleges and Universities
The First Amendment governs only state action; it does not cover private
colleges and universities. There are, however, some limits on their ability
to suppress speech. First, tort and contract principles may require them
to honor representations in, for instance, policy statements or recruitment• 502
materials that the school respects free expression. Second, California has
497 Id. at 1o83.
498 Bruffv. N. Miss. Health Ser's., Inc., z44 E3d 495 (5th Cir. zooi).
499 Id. at 501.
500 Id.
501 An employer may use practices that have a "disparate impact" on a protected group
only if "the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k)(i)(A)(i) (2ooo). The employer's defense that
accommodation would impose more than de minimis cost and, thus, "undue hardship," ap-
plies only to practices having a disparate impact on religion. Id. § 2oooe(j).
5o2 See SILVERGLATE ET AL., supra note 291, at 54-57; Rehor v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 331
N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ohio 1975) ("a university's policies, rules and regulations relating to faculty
members become a part of the employment contract as a matter of law").
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
enacted the Leonard Law,03 which extends the First Amendment right of
free speech to private colleges and universities. Free speech is essential to
every institution of higher education. Congress has imposed many rules on
educational institutions that receive federal money. It should also require
those institutions to respect free speech.
IV RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
A. General Principles
Liberal principles demand some tolerance for both religion and homosexu-
ality. Both entail behavior that inflicts no immediate, direct, conventional
harm to others. Both sides, then, should be deemed "worthy of respect."
50 4
However, general liberal principles cannot resolve the conflict between the
gay movement and religious freedom. Comprehensive norms like "do unto
others as you would have them do unto you,"' 5 Kant's categorical impera-• 506 507
tive, and Rawls's social contract, are too vague to strike a precise bal-
ance between valid competing interests.
Nor does the principle of equality help. It requires that likes be treated
alike, but it does not tell us what things are alike.08 Some sexual acts (like
rape and pederasty) deserve no respect. Even if homosexuality warrants
some respect, it may be less worthy than some other conditions and con-
duct that our society protects. For example, many people believe that race
generally or African-Americans specifically are a category entitled to spe-
cial treatment.5 The principle of equality also cannot resolve conflicts be-
503 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2oo6).
504 Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean to Have a "First Amendment"for Sexual
Orientation?, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
234, 235 (Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998).
505 See Matthew 7:12 ("Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to
you, do ye even so to them .... ).
5o6 "The general formula of the categorical imperative is to act only according to those
maxims that can be consistently willed as a universal law .... THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY
OF PHILOSOPHY 403 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).This requires that we "respect and fulfill the
freedom of all rational beings." Id.
507 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971 ).
508 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982): see also
NOWAK ET AL., supra note 327, at 526 ("Equal protection is the guarantee that similar people
will be dealt with in a similar manner .... In reviewing any classification it must be deter-
mined whether or not the persons classified by the law for different treatment are in fact
'dissimilar."').
509 See Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability,
SexualOrientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 160, 188-89 (zooz). Race is treated specially
under the Equal Protection Clause. See NowA ET AL., supra note 327, § 14.8, at 580 (stating
that racial discrimination by government "run[s] counter to the fundamental goal of racial
equality, which the Supreme Court has come to recognize as a core value of both the equal
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tween one group's desire for freedom of action and another group's desire
for freedom from discrimination or offense. To reconcile this clash, then,
requires weighing the relative merits of religious freedom and homosexual
conduct.510
B. The Case For (and Against) Laws Supporting Homosexuality
For nearly 3,000 years, Western civilization generally condemned homo-511
sexual acts. Sodomy was often a crime, sometimes a capital offense. In
the United States, criminal sodomy laws disapeared only with the recent
Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas.-" Many people now consider
homosexuality morally equal to heterosexuality, and many American juris-
dictions and institutions forbid discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Still, there are valid reasons for caution about gay rights.
Some equate disapproval of homosexuality with racism and predict
that, like racism, it will soon dissipate, but race and homosexuality are very
different. Racial segregation and discrimination have for some time been
513
condemned (at least officially, if not in practice) in most of the world s.
Because of America's history of slavery and Jim Crow racial oppression,
race has long been considered a special category in American law. 4 Some
Americans still do not believe in racial equality, but few are willing to voice
their disbelief openly.
By contrast, many thoughtful people still consider homosexuality im-
moral or psychologically disordered. Homosexuality is not condoned in
much of the world; indeed, it is severely condemned and punished in many
nations.1 Although homosexuals have often been, and still are, abused in
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment due process clause").
510 See Feldblum, supra note 509, at 188-89 (stating that resolving demands for accom-
modation and freedom from discrimination requires moral judgment calls).
511 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
512 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
513 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2 17A (III), Article z, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8io (Dec. iz, 1948), states: "Everyone is entitled to all
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race
514 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967) (noting that race is the evil that
prompted adoption of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that
race is its primary concern).
515 See Clare Nullis, South Africans OK Bill Recognizing Gay Unions, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 15,
2O06, at A4 (stating that homosexuality is illegal in most of sub-Saharan Africa). Sexual orien-
tation is not a forbidden basis of discrimination in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly refused even to discuss
such discrimination. See Andrew Osborn, Muslim Alliance Derails UN' Gay Rights Resolution,
GuARDIAN (London), Apr. 25, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/gayrights/story/o,,9432z2,oo.
html. The refusal came despite reports of widespread discrimination against homosexuals. See
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America, this mistreatment does not approach the cruelty done to African-
Americans.! I6 While most Americans now agree that sodomy should not be
a crime, recent elections show that most Americans do not consider homo-
sexuality morally equal to heterosexuality."'
Racism violates Christian and Jewish tenets that molded Western phi-
losophy.""8 The Abolition and Civil Rights Movements appealed above all
to Americans' religious beliefs. 19 By contrast, Christianity and Judaism
have long censured homosexual acts. The African-American clergy, which
spearheaded the Civil Rights Movement, opposes much of the gay move-
ment.52 0 Some Christian and Jewish organizations now condone homosex-
uality, but many others do not and are unlikely to do so in this century,
if ever. Moreover, traditionalist congregations are growing while liberal
congregations are shrinking.52 Religious and foreign opposition to the gay
movement can combine to influence American events. When the American
Episcopal Church installed an actively gay bishop, African churches led the
international Anglican Communion to criticize this act and to induce the
American bishops to modify their position.5"'
International Commission of Jurists and International Federation for Human Rights Leagues,
Joint Oral Statement Mar. 21, 2005. The Supreme Court has noted that "[piroscriptions
against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots" and that "[slodomy was a criminal offense
at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States." Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In his concur-
rence in Bowers, Chief Justice Burger added that "[hiomosexual sodomy was a capital crime
under Roman law" and had long been a serious crime in English law. Id. at 196-97 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
516 For example, African-Americans have below average incomes, which is not true of
homosexuals. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
517 See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 72-76 (1998) (noting that seventy percent
of those questioned in a survey condemned homosexuality). Wolfe found the dominant at-
titude to be: "if what they're asking for is for me, Mr. Average American, to say yes, your life
style is the moral equivalent of mine, that I'm not willing to do." Carey Goldberg, Acceptance
of Gay Men and Lesbians Is Growing, Study Says, N.Y TIMES, May 31, 1998, at A15. The National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force found that "disapproval of homosexuality.., was still 56 percent
in 1996." Id.
518 For example, St. Paul said that in Christianity "there is neither Greek nor Jew,...
Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all, and in all." Colossians 3:11.
519 See RODNEY STARK, FOR THE GLORY OF GOD: How MONOTHEISM LED TO REFORMATIONS,
SCIENCE, WITCH-HUNTS, AND THE END OF SLAVERY 338-59 (2003) (chronicling the role of re-
ligion in the abolition movement); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS THIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 227-29 (1993) (describing the
importance of religion in the civil rights movement).
520 See Lena Williams, Blacks Rejecting Gay Rights As a Battle Equal to Theirs, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1993, atAi.
521 See, e.g., DAVID SHIFLETT, EXODUS: WHY AMERICANS ARE FLEEING LIBERAL CHURCHES
FOR CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY (2OO5).
522 See Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Anglican Leaders Warn of a Schism, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2003, at AI 2.
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Disapproval of homosexuality is not irrational bigotry. Most adults are
instinctively sexually attracted to members of the other sex and not to
members of their own sex. Because of reproduction, there are compelling
evolutionary reasons for this attitude. Some heterosexual acts are also non-
reproductive, but few heterosexuals completely eschew heterosexual in-
tercourse, as homosexuals do. Most people are repelled by homosexuality.
Given its propensity to transmit disease, this revulsion, too, makes biologi-
cal sense. This makes it unlikely that distaste for homosexuality will soon
vanish.
Laws promoting acceptance of homosexuality are also less needed than
laws promoting racial harmony. Discrimination against gays is not uncom-523
mon, but it is hardly pervasive; it varies by location and industry and is
rare in many places and fields where gays live and work.
There is disagreement about whether homosexuality is voluntary.2 4
Some believe it is determined at birth or in early childhood and that, as
with race or gender, it is wrong to discriminate against people for a status
over which they have no control."' There is strong evidence that homo-
sexual inclinations are deeply ingrained in many gays, but the causes of526
homosexuality are uncertain and some people are more bisexual; their
sexual choices are more voluntary. And, even if sexual preference cannot
523 See Duncan, supra note 7, at 409 n.55 (citing studies showing fairly low rates of com-
plaints by gays of employment discrimination); William B. Turner, "The Gay Rights State":
Wisconsin's Pioneering Legislation to Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 2007 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 40 (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript, on file with the author) (stating that the
"total number of complaints claiming sexual-orientation discrimination has apparently always
been small" under Wisconsin's law broadly banning such discrimination).
524 Some believe that a homosexual orientation is mutable, at least in some cases where
the individual wants to change it. See Liberty Counsel and Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays and
Gays Launch the "Change Is Possible Campaign," available at www.lc.org. Some homosexual activ-
ists also believe that homosexuality can be chosen. See CHESHIRE CALHOUN, FEMINISM, THE
FAMILY, AND THE POLITICS OF THE CLOSET: LESBIAN AND GAY DISPLACEMENT (2000); CLAUDIA
CARD, LESBIAN CHOICES (1995). Moreover, many who experience homosexual desire can also
enjoy heterosexual activity. See JANET SHIBLEY HYDE & JOHN D. DELAMATER, UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN SEXUALITY 395-96 (7th ed. 2000) (stating that based on "identity" statistics, there
were roughly twice as many heterosexual males as bisexual males, but based upon past sexual
"partner" statistics since the age of eighteen, there were four times as many males with both
same- and opposite-sex partners as males with exclusively same-sex partners).
525 See supra notes 508-09 and accompanying text.
526 Sexual orientation is not bipolar but ranges from strong heterosexual orientation
through neutrality to strong homosexual orientation. See ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG,
HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 53-61 (1978); RICHARD C.
FRIEDMAN, MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 3 (1988);
ALFRED C. KINSEY ETAL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638-41 (1948). Further, "it is
certain that--often, if not always-the postnatal environment influences sexual orientation."
E.L. Pattullo, Straight Talk About Gays, COMMENT., Dec. 1992, at 23. Thus homosexual behavior
is more common in cultures that approve it than in those that do not. See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 578-80 (Wayne R. Dynes ed., 199o); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON
117(1992).
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be altered, public behavior can be; people can be encouraged to keep their
sex lives private.
Many religions hold that all are tempted to sin and all sometimes suc-
cumb to that temptation. 57 However, the temptation itself is not a sin, and
sins can be forgiven if one truly repents and atones. The National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, for example, declares that "homosexuality 'is not
freely chosen' and, therefore, 'is not sinful."'' 2 8 Homosexual acts, however,
are voluntary and are a sin. Homosexuality is not unique in this regard;
desire and action are treated the same way with respect to other sins, such
as adultery.5 9 If gays are exhorted to chastity, that is not unique. In many
religions, a married person whose spouse is absent or sexually incapacitated
is enjoined to chastity, possibly for life.
Although behavior-based discrimination is generally not illegal, gay ac-
tivists argue for special treatment of homosexuality because it is part of
one's core identity, the suppression of which inflicts terrible emotional
damage. William Eskridge says that "[in this century, sexual orientation
has replaced religion as a key element of personal identity that situates that
person within society." This claim is hard to test or even to categorize: is
it a scientific, a social, or a metaphysical claim? Traditional concepts of hu-
man nature, human personality, and human flourishing gave little weight to
sexual identity, either in the West or elsewhere. Homosexuality is not the
only sexual conduct that has been suppressed; divorce, adultery and incest
have often been and still are discouraged or forbidden despite the emotion-
al pain these taboos can exact. Further, whatever benefits are generated by
antidiscrimination laws and state approval must be balanced against their
detriments. 53'
527 See Romans 3:23 ("For all have sinned.").
528 See Don Lattin, U.S. Catholic Bishops Says Homosexuality Isn't a Sin, S.E CHRON., Nov.
15, 199o, at AI.
529 Some gays object that traditional sects discriminate against them because hetero-
sexuals can marry and have sex, but homosexual acts are never allowed. This is partly true.
First, the ban on homosexual acts is not unique. Some other sex acts are categorically forbid-
den, such as incest, masturbation, bestiality, and pederasty. Adultery is different because it
presumes one can enjoy sex within a lawful (i.e., heterosexual) marriage. However, that is cold
comfort to someone who is not sexually attracted to his or her spouse but to another person.
And many sects forbid or severely restrict divorce, so that a miserable (heterosexual) marriage
is a life sentence.
530 WILLIM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 293
(1999). The court in Harperv. Poway Unified School District upheld the school's ban on criticism
"on the basis of a core identifying characteristic,... such as race, religion, and sexual orienta-
tion." Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 E3d 1166, 1 182-83 (9th Cir. 2006). see supra
notes 292-308 and accompanying text.
531 See infra notes 523-53 and accompanying text.
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C. The Case For (and Against) Religious Freedom
If gay rights laws are enacted, does religious belief warrant some exemp-
tion from these laws? Many other types of antidiscrimination laws provide
some religious exemption. This accommodation reduces strife. Religion-
ists forbidden to act according to their faith may protest or defy authority,
verbally or physically. Such strife should be avoided unless the cost of ac-
commodation is high.
However, for the Founders, avoiding civil strife was not the only or
even the primary justification for religious freedom;5 z they deemed reli-
gious freedom intrinsically important. Thomas Jefferson called "the consti-
tutional freedom of religion the most inalienable and sacred of all human
• ,533
rights." James Madison declared:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such
only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in
order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society .... We
maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by
the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance.s34
Thus "the Founders granted religion a special status in the Constitution.
This status derived from a conviction that religious exercise, as opposed
to other personal and social forces, needed and deserved unique treat-
ment."535
The words of Jefferson and Madison may trouble secularists. Calling
religious freedom "sacred" and referring to "the Creator" posits the exis-
tence of God, which is to assume the answer to the question that divides
believers from agnostics and atheists. That assumption seems to violate
the taboo against establishing religion. 3 ' However, even most secularists
532 See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 163-65 (1991).
533 T OMAS JEFFERSON, Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia, in T"IE COMPLETE
JEFFERSON 957, 958 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1969).
534 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS,
reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 18-19 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988).
535 ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 91 (1990); see also JOHN
GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 49-57 (1996); TtIBE, supra note 361, § 14-7, at 1189 ("The
Framers ... clearly envisioned religion as something special; they enacted that vision into law
by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science.") (emphasis
in original).
536 See generally Smith, supra note 532.
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understand that belief in a transcendent God makes religious commands
compelling to believers in a way that secular beliefs rarely are.37
Modern science has identified what seems to be a human instinct for
spirituality. "The human brain appears to be organized to ask ultimate ques-
tions and seek ultimate answers." Although this instinct does not validate
religion, it means that denying religious freedom may do great violence to
the human personality. Some argue that religion should have "the same
rights in the public sphere as General Motors, no more and no less."S9At
the least, however, religion is one of several "deep commitments" that de-
serve special legal consideration. Others see religion as unique, "in part,
because it plays such a wide variety of roles in human life."
' ' 41
Religion is also crucial to society. The Founders considered religion es-
sential to public morality. Many modern social scientists agree. Reli-
537 See id. at 154.
538 COMM'N ON CHILDREN AT RISK, HARDWIRED TO CONNECT: TIE NEW SCIENTIFIC CASE
FOR AUTHORITATIVE COMMUNITIES 31 (2003). "The Commission on Children at Risk is a group
of 33 children's doctors, research scientists, and mental health and youth service professionals"
and is a "jointly sponsored initiative of the YMCA of the USA, Dartmouth Medical School,
and the Institute for American Values. Id. at 2; see also George W. Dent, Jr., Religion, Morality
and Democracy: New Learning, New Challenges, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 401, 431 (2004).
539 ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 15 (1996); see also Stephen Gey, Why Is Religion Special?:
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52
U. PIT. L. REV. 75, 182 (1990) (favoring an interpretation of the Establishment Clause as
"prohibiting accommodation of religiously mandated behavior beyond the scope of religious
expression").
540 See Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1285 (1994) (pro-
posing that "state treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers
with the same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally"). As con-
temporary Catholic philosopher John Finnis says, it is "peculiarly important to have thought
reasonably and (where possible) correctly about these questions of the origins of cosmic order
and of human freedom and reason-whatever the answer to those questions turns out to be,
and even if the answers have to be agnostic or negative." JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 89 (I980).
541 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. I, 42
(2000).
542 George Washington said "reason and experience both forbid us to expect that nation-
al morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principles." GEORGE WASHINGTON, FAREWELL
ADDRESS (Sept. 17, 1796), in ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 535, at 114. Thomas Jefferson
asked "can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only
firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God?"
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA (1784), reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS
OFT IOMAS JEFFERSON 187, 278 (Adrienne Koch &William Peden eds., 1944);see also RICHARD
VETTERLI & GARY BRYNNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLIC VIRTUE AND THE ROOTS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987) (describing the Founders' belief in religion as a source of civic
virtue).
543 See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, The Return of the Sacred? The Argument of the Future on Religion, in
THE WINDING PASSAGE 324-54 (1980); see generally Dent, supra note 538, at 419.
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gion can be divisive, but it can also be a source of unity, altruism, and social
trust, and has often been so in America.5 4 The Christian tenet of univer-
sal brotherhood helps to bridge racial gaps.14' Religion aids the economy
by promoting personal responsibility, industry, and thrift. 146 The personal
. .. .. 547
traits cultivated by religion are vital to democracy. Religion also encour-
ages civic activity. Religion has been central to major aspects of American
history, including the motives of many immigrants, the debate over slavery
and the Civil War, and the Civil Rights movement.59 The importance of
religion is not limited to America or to Western culture.50 The significance
of religion becomes evident when it is suppressed:
[Ilt has historically been replaced by other beliefs, such as the Nordic myth
of Aryan superiority and the ritual of Hitler worship; the anomie of the Sar-
trean; the complete cultural obsession with the tonality of the body, the
filling of the 'soul' with the hedonic; and the passion for violence that gives
rise to school killing sprees.ss5
Some gay activists hope to abolish religious disapproval of homosexu-
ality without impairing other aspects and the social benefits of religion.
They hope in vain. For most believers the tenets of their faith are not sepa-
rable-they must be taken entirely or not at all. That is why many sects
prescribe a creed and why members who defy an article of faith may be
declared heretics and excommunicated.
544 See Steinfels infra note 548.
545 See George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust, Altruism, and Reciprocity, 39 U. RICHMOND L. REV.
1001, 1035-36 (zoo5).
546 See Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McCleary, Religion and Economic Growth Across
Countries, 68 AM. Soc. REv. 760, 771 (2003) (stating that "religion affects economic outcomes
mainly by fostering religious beliefs that influence such traits as honesty, work ethic, thrift,
and openness to strangers") (citation omitted); Luigi Guiso, et al., People's Opium?: Religion and
Economic Attitudes, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 225 (2003) (stating that "religious beliefs are associ-
ated with ... higher per capita income").
547 Madison referred to the "qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of
esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities
in a higher degree than any other form." THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison).
548 See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1996, at Aio (referring to "studies
showing that two-thirds of those people active in social movements were religiously moti-
vated and that people active in churches and synagogues were more likely to vote and more
likely to give time and money not only to religious causes but to secular charities as well").
549 See Dent, supra note 538, at 427-28.
550 "[T]here are culturalcodes embedded in national cultures and ... those cultures, how-
ever transformed over time, are ultimately derived from religious belief." Robert N. Bellah,
The Protestant Structure of American Culture: Multiculture or Monoculture, 4 HEDGEHOG REV. 7, 13
(Spring zooz).
551 STEPHEN G. POST, HUMAN NATURE AND THE FREEDOM OF PUBLIC RELIGious EXPRESSION
152 (2003).
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Of course, the major faiths are not monolithic; some strains of Chris-
tianity and Judaism now condone homosexuality. Even conservative de-
nominations are not immutable; over 2,000 years the Catholic church has552
changed its stance on many issues. Still, traditionalist branches will not
approve homosexuality in this century, if ever. In some European countries
gay rights are ascendant because traditional sects have dwindled to insig-
nificance. That, too, will not happen in this century, if ever, in America.
Conservative sects are growing in numbers and political influence here, as
evidenced by their centrality in the success of the Republican Party since
1980 and in the passage of constitutional amendments to protect traditional
marriage in all eleven states where they were on the ballot in 2004. "1
In sum, religious freedom deserves to be taken seriously. If the gay
rights movement and traditional religion are to avoid an interminable war
devastating to America's social fabric, a truce must be sought.
D. Resolutions
1. Equal Rights Or Special Rights?-Gay activists claim that they seek only
equal rights. 5 4 Opponents charge that they seek special rights.55 Both
characterizations have an element of truth, but both are misleading. Anti-
discrimination laws restrict freedom to choose, a restriction American law
imposes only in special cases. Thus these laws have exceptions; even race
may be a basis for hiring discrimination. Aprison boot camp, for example,
may consider race when hiring instructors. Antidiscrimination laws cover
only certain activities so as to preserve a sphere of autonomy. They do not
intrude on what are deemed personal choices even in matters of commerce;
like where to shop, what records to buy, what lawyer to hire. For reasons
of personal freedom, religion is another common basis for exceptions to
antidiscrimination laws.
These laws generally protect immutable characteristics, especially race,
gender, and physical disability. Homosexual orientation may be immutable
but homosexual behavior is not. Discrimination based on behavior, even
on past behavior that cannot be changed, does not violate the principle
552 See generally JOHN T NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING (2OO5).
553 See James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2004, at 4.
554 See Stephen H. Miller, And 'Special Rights' For All, Indep. Gay Forum, May 1999,
http://www.indegayforum.org/news/show/z6818.html.
555 See Erin Blad, Colorado Contemplates Special Rights for Homosexuals, Citizenlink.com,
Mar. 17, 2005, http://www.citizenlink.org/CLFeatures/Aooooooz65.cfm
556 SeeWittmer v. Peters, 87 F3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding it constitutional for a prison
boot camp to hire drill instructors on the basis because race was crucial to their effectiveness);
see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 512 n.2 (1989) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
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557
of equal concern and respect and is generally not forbidden at all. An
employer may, for example, prefer alumnae of her alma mater, fellow fans
of her favorite sports team, or those who share her political views. The one
form of behavior on which discrimination is often prohibited is religion.
Thus the gay movement collides with religious freedom. The competing
interests must be balanced, but the process cannot be mathematical or me-
chanical. All antidiscrimination laws (indeed, all prohibitory laws) protect
some people by preventing others from acting as they wish; that is, they
comfort some by discomfiting others. Enacting antidiscrimination laws re-
quires a political judgment that the pain they prevent is more important,
more worthy of respect, than the pain they inflict.
In sum, although the gay movement does not seek unique treatment,
it does seek status that is conferred only in exceptional cases. There is no
general understanding in our law that a claim to freedom from discrimina-
tion should trump a claim for freedom to choose, especially when the basis
for choice is religion.
2. Equal Respect for Homosexuality?-American society is not morally
obliged to treat homosexuality and heterosexuality equally. Despite some
assertions that the liberal state must be morally neutral,' 58 all polities do,
and indeed must, promote some ways of living over others; no society can559
be morally neutral. Some societal moral preferences concern material
conditions: wealth is better than poverty; health is better than sickness.
Other preferences are metaphysical but considered part of human flour-
ishing. Even liberal states promote art, music, and natural beauty because
they are intrinsically good. In so doing, the state necessarily makes value
judgments about what is good or bad art and music and what in nature is
beautiful or desirable. Antidiscrimination laws are not morally neutral; they
557 See Gerald Dworkin, EqualRespect andthe Enforcement of Morality, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
18o, I93 (I99O); Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2oo6 ILL.
L. REV. 571, 581.
558 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 274 (1977) ("the liberal conception
of equality prohibits a government from relying on the claim that certain forms of life are
inherently more valuable then [sic] others"); Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5,
16-17 (1989) ("We should ... put the moral ideals that divide us off the conversational agenda
of the liberal state.").
559 For one thing, "the claim that the law ought to be morally neutral ... is itself a moral
claim." ROBERT P. GEORGE, "ThiE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES 75 (2001). To decide what interests
to protect, "we need to be able to make decisions about value." Koppelman, supra note 557,
at 581. "[Slome amount of discretion is unavoidable." Id. at 574. Charles Taylor speaks of
"discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered
valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and
offer standards by which they can be judged." CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: TIE
MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 4 (1989); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: T'YE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 11-15 (2OOO) (discussing the necessity of setting
priorities as to which interests are most important).
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evince a judgment that certain conditions or behavior warrant protection
while others do not, and that some personal choices regarding the protect-
ed categories are improper and should be forbidden.
Liberal societies should be cautious in making moral choice; we should
accept and even applaud reasonable variety. We should take particular care
as we move from promoting metaphysical goods through government sub-
sidies and the expressive use of law to coercing or punishing those who
transgress the official preferences. Thus it is fortunate that homosexual acts
are no longer crimes in America. All people deserve to be treated decently
and to be free from arbitrary, gratuitous restrictions. That does not mean,
however, that disapproval of homosexuality should be punished.
Society may prefer heterosexuality as intrinsically better than homo-
sexuality. Like the value of art, music, or beauty, this norm cannot be em-
pirically proved. Like art, music, and beauty, heterosexual love has been
valued by all cultures. This universality suggests that heterosexual love
accords with human nature and promotes individual and social well-be-
ing.5 6 Society may also decide that it is intrinsically good for adults to bear
children and raise them within (a necessarily heterosexual) marriage.61
Even some gay activists concede that heterosexuality is superior because562
of its reproductive capacity. Traditional marriage also promotes gender
and class equality.
Society may also promote traditional marriage for the benefit of chil-
dren. The benefits to a child of living with her or his biolo cal parents
who are in a stable, traditional marriage are well-documented. All society
560 This determination could rest in part on a judgment that monogamy is better than
promiscuity and that male homosexuals are prone to promiscuity. See infra note 572.
561 See Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal
Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 47 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds.,
zooI) ("Most people ... see the value of children ... without the need for explanation. It is
not merely an instinct but part of their vision of the good.").
562 Andrew Sullivan acknowledges
a difference that is inherent between homosexual and heterosexual
adults. The latter group is committed to the procreation of a new gen-
eration. The former simply isn't .... The timeless, necessary, procreative
unity of a man and a woman is inherently denied to homosexuals; and
the way in which ... parenthood transforms their relationship, is far less
common among homosexuals than among heterosexuals.
ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 196(1995).
563 See George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 19 BYU J. PUB. L.
419, 436-38 (2004) (describing the aspects of good citizenship learned by children in a good
homes).
564 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurturing
of Children, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 848,858-76 (zoo5) (reviewing recent studies); Blaine Harden,
2 Parent Families Rise After Change in Welfare Laws, N.Y. MEs, Aug. 12, 2001, at Ai ("[A] power-
ful consensus has emerged in recent years among social scientists .... From a child's point
of view, according to a growing body of social research, the most supportive household is one
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profits when children are well cared for.16 With fertility rates plummet-
ing in the United States and other industrialized countries, society may
favor traditional marriage to induce a higher birth rate.56 The breakdown. . 567
of close-knit families often heralds the decline of a civilization. Society
may promote traditional marriage and family to prevent this.
However, it is hard to deploy tangible benefits to promote traditional1 68
marriage. Society can best encourage traditional marriage through the ex-
pressive function of law-by making traditional marriage normative. End-
ing official preference for traditional marriage would not cause an upsurge
of homosexuality because people's sexual inclinations are largely immu-
table, but it could increase indifference to marriage. Although countries
that validate same-sex relationships have not witnessed a boom in gay mar-. 569 ... 7
riages, they have experienced a decline in traditional marriages. The
legal change seems to evince a social judgment that traditional marriage is
not particularly desirable. The result may be a loss of the benefits of tradi-
tional marriage for both children and adults.
Some gay activists argue that principles of equality demand that so-
ciety treat gay marriage the same as traditional marriage. Apart from the
legitimate policy concerns that favor traditional marriage, this argument
lacks consistency. If society must be neutral about marriage, it cannot favor
marriage over bachelorhood, nor monogamy over polygamy. Some scholars,
both gay and heterosexual, make this argument. This position has the
with two biological parents in a low-conflict marriage.").
565 See Dent, supra note 563, at 438-39.
566 For a discussion of the global decline in fertility rates and its likely repercussions, see
PHILLIP LONGMAN, THE EMPTY CRADLE (2004); BEN J. WATrENBERG, FEWER (2004).
567 Seegenerally CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN, FAMILY AND CIVILIZATION (1947).
568 See Wilson, supra note 564, at 878-80 (discussing the difficulty of formulating pro-
grams to promote marriage).
569 See id.
570 See Chris Crain, Editorial, Gays May Ruin "Traditional Marriage," N.Y. BLADE, Aug.
3, 2001, at I4 ("The effect on 'traditional marriage' has been dramatic. In France, where [do-
mestic partnerships] first became available in 1999, some 14,000 couples signed up the first
year, and almost half of them heterosexual."). This effect was predicted by some gay activists;
Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW i0i (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes, eds., 200i)
("recognition of same-sex marriage might lend new momentum to the long-running erosion of
the specialness of marriage"); see also id. at 103 (stating that recognizing domestic partnerships
"may render marriage a little bit less paradigmatic.").
571 See MARTHA FINEMAN, 'M lE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-30 (I995) (arguing for abolition of marriage as a legal
category); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 26
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (arguing for treating personal relationships through contract
rules modeled on corporate law); Tamar Lewin, For Better Or Worse: Marriage's Stormy Future,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at Di ("The most radical structural change being discussed these
days is taking the state out of the marriage business.").
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virtue of consistency, but most gay activists shun it because most people
see valid reasons for society to prefer monogamous marriage.
Several diseases are spread by the promiscuity common among gay572
man. Single men generally are more likely than married men to abuse
drugs and commit crimes and be less successful in the job market. Tra-
ditional (i.e., heterosexual monogamous) marriage civilizes people (espe-
cially men), discouragin7 their promiscuity and channeling their energies
in productive directions. Society can justly favor heterosexuality in order
to promote the benefits of traditional marriage-good health, obedience to
the law, and high job performance.
3. Freedom of Expression.-Gay activists appreciate the power of traditional
religion in America and understand that homosexuality will not attain legal
and social equality so long as many Americans freely express the disapprov-
al of homosexuality taught by traditional religions. Hence, the gay move-
ment seeks to suppress such expression. The First Amendment has often
572 See DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HoMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE AMERICANIZATION OF
THE HOMOSEXUAL 187 (1982) ("[Almong gay men a long-lasting monogamous relationship is
almost unknown."); BELL & WEINBERG, supra note 526, at 85 ("Almost one-half of the white
homosexual males ... and one-third of the black homosexual males ... said that they had
had at least five hundred different sexual partners .... "); Warren Winkelstein, Jr. et al, Sexual
Practices and Risk of Infection by Human Immuno-dfciency Virus: The San Francisco Men ' Health
Study, 257 JAMA 321,325 (1987) (linking the spread of AIDS to gay male promiscuity). Claims
that promiscuity among gay men is not natural but stems from its social stigmatization are
implausible. In the last decade, despite rapid growth in the social acceptance of gays, venereal
diseases proliferated among gay men, especially in urban areas where they are most accepted.
See Michael Specter, Higher Risk, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2005, at 38, 39. Gay men may not be
naturally more promiscuous than heterosexual men; in all societies men are more promiscuous
than women. See David P. Schmitt, Universal Sex Differences in the Desire for Sexual Variety: Tests
from52 Nations, 6 Continents, and13 Islands, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (2003). But
heterosexual marriage tends to curb promiscuity. The relative risk of contracting AIDS from
homosexual conduct has been estimated to be fifty times the risk from heterosexual conduct.
See Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155, 1199
n. 133 (2005) (using figures from the Centers for Disease Control).
573 Some believe gay marriage can do the same for gay men. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 85 (1996) (validating gay marriage would "civilize gay
men by making them more like lesbians"); JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT Is GOOD
FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA I9-21 (2004); SULLIVAN, supra note
562, at 112; Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay
Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567, 580 (1994-95)
(positing a "transformational potential of gay people's inclusion ... in marriage"). This is dubi-
ous. Where gay marriage is recognized, few gay men marry. See Symposium, Has the Supreme
Court Gone Too Far?, COMMENT., Oct. 2003, at 25,48 (comments of James Q. Wilson) ("In the
Netherlands, which legalized same-sex marriages in 2001, fewer than ten percent of an esti-
mated 50,000 same-sex couples have chosen marriage."). Gay relationships tend to be short-
lived. See Maria Xiridou, et al., The Contribution of Steady and Casual Partnerships to the Incidence
of HIV Infection Among Homosexual Men in Amsterdam, 17 AIDS 1029, 1031 (2003) (stating that
gay male partnerships lasted on average 1.5 years and that men in the partnerships had an
average of eight casual sexual partners per year).
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squelched these efforts. Ironically, unintended support for free speech
comes from gays who poignantly testify to the agony of having to conceal
one's identity: it "undermines the authenticity of one's life, disrupts re-
lationships with others and hurts those whom one marries or otherwise
implicates in the lie."
'M
Courts have been unanimous in striking down speech codes in public
universities despite claims that these codes forbid only "fighting words" or
harassment. 75 Unfortunately, many public universities retain speech codes
that chill protected speech; the costs of challenging such codes is so high
that few bother to sue, and the schools realize that their costs are small
even if they lose. Procedures and remedies should be improved so that
unconstitutional speech codes are strongly deterred. Although the First
Amendment governs only state action, Congress, state, and local lawmak-
ers and private organizations can protect speech in private contexts and
have sometimes done so. California's Leonard Law, for example, extends
576free speech to private colleges in that state. Congress should adopt a
similar law to cover all universities that receive federal funds.
For government employees, the Supreme Court in Pickering required a
balancing "between the interests of the [government employee] as a citi-
zen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees." This verbal formula is fine. Sadly,
lower courts often construe the test to allow government employers to si-
lence criticism (including religiously based criticisms) of homosexuality.578
Personal vilification should be forbidden, but general statements critical of
homosexuality should be permitted unless they exhort violence. The same
standard should apply to government contractors.
Some freedom of speech should also be mandated for many private
workplaces. Arguably, it already is for religiously inspired speech: the Civil
Rights Act forbids religious discrimination. 579 Employment rules that bar
criticism of homosexuality have a disparate impact on religious people.
Unfortunately, courts require only a de minimis burden on the employer580
to override an employee's religious expression. Admittedly, a workplace
differs from a college campus. The latter should be a marketplace of ideas;
in the former, the need for cooperation demands civility. Civility, however,
does not require suppression of all speech that someone dislikes. Congress
574 ESKRIDGE, supra note 530, at 307. To his credit, Eskridge argues that free expression
for gays will give "the majority ... an incentive to speak as well." Id. at 306.
575 See supra notes 335-67 and accompanying text.
576 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2oo6); see supra note 486 and accompanying text.
577 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
578 See supra part II-B-2.
579 See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
58o See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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should require a showing of substantial need to suppress religious expres-
sion. That requirement would dictate a different result in cases like Bodett,
Peterson, and Buonanno.58 1 Of course, the same freedom (and the same insis-
tence on civility) should also extend to assertions of gay rights and criticism
of its opponents.
4. Discrimination in Employment and Services.-Virtually all agree that dis-
crimination based on homosexuality should sometimes be allowed. Few
would forbid religious organizations to exclude homosexual clergy. Oth-
er cases are harder. The Catholic Church would permit discrimination in
"adoption and foster care, the employment of teachers and athletic coaches
. .... 582
and military recruitment." In many cases gays are accepted so long as
they keep their sexuality private. In effect, many employers follow the mil-
itary's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Some gays must forego their preferred
occupation or location or conceal their private lives in ways not required ofS . 583
others, but gays enjoy a higher average income than other Americans.
The scope of freedom to choose depends on the context in which the
freedom is claimed. One contextual distinction is between government and
private-sector activity. The state differs from private employers in several
ways. It holds a monopoly over many activities and thus over anyone who
seeks employment there. The state is also free of the discipline of the mar-
ket and of the cost that private employers pay for inefficient discrimination.
State action also has a unique social significance because of its expressive
power.
As an employer, government should ignore an individual's religion and
private behavior, including legal sexual activity, unless it is material to one's
ability to perform a job, which is rarely the case.58 Government should also
disregard religion and sexual orientation in selecting government contrac-
tors. Government contractors themselves, however, are private entities and
should be subject only to the same laws as other private employers.
The practical need to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion by private employers is unclear. Some gays experience discrimination,
581 These cases are discussed supra at notes 455-97 and accompanying text.
582 Robert Nugent, The U.S. Catholic Bishops and Gay Civil Rights: Four Case Studies, 38
CATH. LAW. 1, 5 (1998) (discussing Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative
Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons, a statement by the church's
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which is printed in full in VOICES OF HOPE: A
COLLECTION OF POSITIVE CATHOLIC WRITINGS ON GAY AND LESBIAN ISSUES 229-33 (Jeannine
Gramick & Robert Nugent eds., 1995)).
583 See supra note 7.
584 The major exception is the military. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(acknowledging the special character of, and deference afforded to, the military). The propri-
ety of this exception depends on military effectiveness and not on a balancing of gay rights
and religious freedom, so it is beyond the scope of this article.
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but many do not, and gays have a higher average income than others. 5.
The size of an organization is relevant. Even if the law does not forbid
private entities to discriminate against homosexuals, there is rarely any jus-
tification for large organizations to do so. Discrimination by a small entity
is of less concern because its jobs are less likely to be unique in its locale;
an individual it rejects can probably seek a similar job elsewhere. Also, a
small employer is more likely to sincerely cultivate a particular religious
and moral atmosphere in the workplace. The same considerations apply to
discrimination by private service and housing providers and users of public
586facilities. Government contractors should not be subject to special em-
ployment restrictions unrelated to the purpose of the contract.
In general, government should not discriminate on the basis of reli-
gion or of sexual orientation in providing services, whether through its own
agencies or through private contractors. Discrimination by government
contractors should be tolerated only if the burden on the group discrimi-
nated against would be small and the detriment of any discrimination is
outweighed by marginal benefit of using the contractor that discriminates
instead of other contractors that do not. This test will rarely be satisfied,
but there are some exceptions, such as the adoption services offered by
Catholic Charities of Massachusetts.587
Private employers should generally be able to forbid sexual orientation
discrimination by employees. Although the Civil Rights laws forbid reli-
gious discrimination, their protection is limited, almost ephemeral, because
the duty to accommodate religious practice is overridden by any minor588
need of the employer. Although employers should not be required to suf-
fer major financial costs to accommodate religious employees, they should
at least be required to show that accommodating an employee would cause
more than de minimis cost or disruption, as is required for accommodation of
physical and emotional disabilities.58 9 The required accommodation should
include tolerance of religious statements about homosexuality so long as
they meet reasonable time, place, and manner rules and do not slide into
harassment.
The freedom of expressive associations is now unclear.59 0 The decisions
in Hurley and Dale are welcome, but they leave crucial questions. First,
585 See supra note 7. In jurisdictions that have antidiscrimination laws, few suits have
been filed. See SULLIVAN, supra note 562, at 157.
586 See supra notes 103-35, 252-69, and accompanying text.
587 See supra note 235-47 and accompanying text.
588 See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
589 In such cases the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) requires
"reasonable accommodation" unless it would impose "undue hardship," which is defined to
mean "significant difficulty and expense." Thus the holding in Bruff seems right, but Bodett,
Peterson, and Buonanno seem wrong. See supra notes 444-8o and accompanying text.
590 See supra notes 455-501 and accompanying text.
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what is an expressive association or expressive event? Many non-profit
organizations are church-affiliated or embrace some religious principles.
Many of them do not cultivate moral values as the Boy Scouts do, but their
purpose is at least as "moral" as that of the Council in Hurley. Especially
because they are non-profit, these organizations should be treated as ex-
pressive associations. At the least, they should be exempt from employ9-
ment laws that would force them to violate their religious commitment.
Such an exemption recognizes that religion is not limited to worship and
preaching. A related question is the status of business firms that have a
religious commitment. A decent respect for religious freedom would allow
firms generally to pursue their religious commitment if they can show that
it is substantial and sincere, unless the exemption would severely burden
many people."'
Another issue is who defines the purpose of an expressive association.
It is appalling that in Dale, four Supreme Court justices rejected the Boy
Scouts' statement of its moral principles and substituted their own defini-
tion of those principles."9 True, the Scouts had not always said unequivo-
cally that homosexuality violates Scout values. Individuals and organiza-
tions are often unclear about their stand on certain issues; the Supreme
Court itself often fails to make its positions clear. Such a failure does not
mean that, when the individual or entity does take a stand, the position an-
nounced is less sincere or important than positions he or it have long made
clear. Indeed, that a stated position conflicts with prior statements does not
mean that it is not sincere or important to the speaker. Again, the Supreme
Court itself sometimes reverses itself.
595
Of course, courts should be wary of sham claims of religiosity, but there
was no reason to question the sincerity of the Boy Scouts' stand on ho-
mosexuality. It is hard to imagine that the dissenters in Dale would have
challenged a claim of a liberal entity like the ACLU about its own position
on some issue. It seems that the dissenters rejected the Scouts' asserted
position on homosexuality simply because they disliked that position.
An expressive group's claim that a law seriously impedes the expression
of its message merits less deference. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, for
example, the Court held that the Jaycees had "failed to demonstrate... any
591 Many statutory exemptions for religious organizations now are not so broad. See
Magid & Prenkert,supra note 134, at 3,3 n.46; Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion:
The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious
Employers, 28 HAxv. J.L. & Pul. P0L'Y 741, 748, 755 (2005).
592 See Stabile, supra note 591, at 755-64.
593 See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text; see also McConnell, supra note 504, at
254 (stating a similar position).
594 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (zooo) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J.,
and Breyer, J., dissenting.)
595 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986).
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serious burden on the male members' freedom of expressive association"
from a law requiring the admission of women to its membership. s96 How-
ever, if the claim of a serious impediment is found to be sincere, it deserves
considerable deference. The dissenters in Dale argued that the law there
only forbade the Scouts to discriminate in hiring; it did not stop them from
disseminating disapproval of homosexuality. This distinction ignores the
importance that philosophers and theologians have always given to acting
in accord with one's beliefs. 97
An expressive group's interests must be weighed against the state's in-
terest in imposing a law. In Dale, the Court eschewed the intermediate
O'Brien5 98 test which, it said, applies only when a law "has only an inciden-
tal effect of protected speech . . . ." Instead, it applied "traditional First
Amendment analysis," which presumably entails the compelling interest
standard. A subsidiary question is when a member's or employee's role in
an organization is such that overriding its selection criteria seriously inter-
feres with its message. In Dale, the Court found that the position of assistant
scoutmaster was sufficiently important, but in Roberts mere membership in
the Jaycees was not important enough. Subsequent lower court cases sug-
gest a line between "expressive" and "nonexpressive positions,"6' which
makes sense.
Again, all these principles should apply equally to both sides of the
debate over homosexuality. Some employees and organizations have a re-
ligious commitment to support the gay movement. They should enjoy the
same freedoms of expression and association as those who disapprove of
homosexuality on religious grounds. The dispute between the gay move-
ment and traditional religion should not be treated like the dispute be-
tween the civil rights movement and racism, but more like the competition
between political parties. Each side must allow the other to publicize its
message, but neither side is required to concede that the other side is right
or worthy of honor.
5. The Expressive Role of Law and Government.-Many gay activists care
more about the expressive function of antidiscrimination laws than about
their practical effect.62 Although most Americans now tolerate homosexu-
596 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
597 See Stabile, supra note 591, at 759-64.
598 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
599 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658 (zooo).
600 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
6oi See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text.
6o2 See McConnell, supra note 504, at 255 (suggesting that gay antidiscrimination laws
"may be desired largely as a symbolic measure: to convey government support for the notion
that the refusal to associate or contract with homosexuals is bigoted and immoral"). Advocates
of legal recognition of same-sex marriage often stress its symbolic function. See Halley, supra
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ality, most gays seek "not merely a grudging social toleration, but full so-
cial acceptance ...." As well as fixing tangible benefits and burdens,
law performs an expressive function by "expressing social values and in
encouraging social norms to move in particular directions." This is im-
portant because material sanctions often cannot change behavior and at-
titudes.6°5 Thus battles often rage over purely symbolic government acts,
like the recent resolution of the United States Senate apologizing for not
outlawing lynching many years ago.6°6 Observing an official Gay Pride Day,
for example, creates no legal rights, but it connotes social approval of gays.
Antidiscrimination laws serve both practical and symbolic purposes; they
impose penalties and also signify social acceptance of homosexuahty.
In addition to symbolic steps, government supports certain values by its
own speech; it need not be content-neutral. Public schools may"promote
civic virtues" and "inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the mainte-
nance of a democratic political system .... 609 Learning "in public schools-
is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools [also]
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order." 610 Indoctri-
nation in public schools can be effective because students are impression-
able and a captive audience in school for over a thousand hours every year.
Even considering whatever children experience at home, they are likely to
consider attitudes promulgated in school as the norm for public behavior.
Many people who do not discriminate against gays nonetheless disap-
prove of homosexuality and do not want government to condemn their
morals. The desire of gays for official endorsement is understandable,
but it is also understandable why many people oppose it. Disapproval of
note 570, at 97, 98.
603 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
604 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and SocialRoles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 953 (1996).
605 "[A] social order based on laws can be maintained without massive coercion only
if most people most of the time abide, as a result of supportive social norms, by the social
tenets embedded in the law .. " AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 171 (2001).
Material incentives to influence behavior are often expensive and may be counterproductive.
See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, Io2 MICH. L. REV.
71 (2003).
606 Lynching Victims Senate Apology, S. Res. 39, io9th Cong. (2005).
607 See SULLIVAN, supra note 562, at 161 (stating that a law barring discrimination against
homosexuals "contains an approval of homosexual behavior"); McConnell, supra note 504, at
252 (semble).
6o8 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (stating
that when government itself speaks, it may make content-based choices); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 194 (199') (semble).
609 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77-80 (I979).
61o Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
611 See Nugent, supra note 582, at 9-1o, 17, 19 (stating that Catholic bishops fear that
adding homosexuality to the select list of forbidden bases for discrimination would be per-
ceived by the public as government endorsement of homosexuality).
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homosexuality often stems from religious faith. If government condones
homosexuality, in effect it declares that faith false.
Because violence against gays remains common, government should
not merely enforce criminal sanctions against those who commit such
violence; it should use its expressive role to decry and deter it. Govern-
ment-especially public schools-should exercise its own speech to cor-
rect common falsehoods about homosexuals (e.g., that most homosexuals
are child molesters). Government should also educate people about the
material benefits of (traditional) marriage both for the married partners and
for their children. Otherwise, on questions whether homosexuality is "nor-
mal" or morally acceptable, equal to heterosexuality, government should
remain neutral. On one hand, this means that government (including public
schools) should not celebrate a Gay Pride Day or Day of Silence intended
to condone homosexuality. On the other, it means that public facilities and
programs (including school facilities and extracurricular programs) must be
611
equally available to homosexual and pro-homosexual groups.
CONCLUSION
The legal conflict between the homosexual movement and those who op-
pose it on religious grounds is intense and likely to grow; neither side is
about to obliterate the other. This conflict cannot be resolved by a single
legislative or judicial act; it will play out in innumerable skirmishes. How-
ever, certain principles should ensure tolerance for both sides. Homosexu-
als, like all people, should be free from harassment and physical abuse and,
in some cases, from discrimination. America has always afforded special
deference to religious freedom. That deference should extend to those
who have a religious commitment to either side of this debate. All should
be free to express their views about homosexuality and, in most cases, to
act on those beliefs so long as they avoid harassment and physical abuse.
These principles will not end disagreement between the two sides, but
they can help assure that the dispute will proceed civilly and with due
regard for the rights of all.
61 z See McConnell, supra note 504, at 247-48 (advocating a similar position).
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